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ABSTRACT 
Airworthiness certification of commercial transport aircraft requires a 
safety analysis of the propulsion system to establish that the probability of a 
failure jeopardising the safety of the aeroplane is acceptably low. The 
needs and desired features of such a propulsion system safety analysis are 
discussed, and current techniques and assumptions employed in such 
analyses are evaluated. It is concluded that current assumptions and 
techniques are not well suited to predicting behaviour of the propulsion 
system in service. The propulsion accident history of the high bypass ratio 
commercial transport fleet is reviewed and an alternate approach to 
propulsion system safety analysis is developed, based on this accident 
history. Features of the alternate approach include quantified prediction of 
propulsion related crew error, engine-level reliability growth modelling to 
realistically predict engine failure rates, and quantified credit for design 
features which mitigate the effects of propulsion system failures. The 
alternate approach is validated by applying it to two existing propulsion 
systems. It is found to produce forecasts in good agreement with service 
experience. Use of the alternate approach to propulsion system safety 
analysis during design and development will enable accurate prediction of 
the expected propulsion related accident rate and identification of 
opportunities to reduce the accident rate by incorporating mitigating 
features into the propulsion system/ aeroplane design. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background 
The introduction of the jet engine as a means of propulsion for the 
world's commercial transport aircraft has enabled unprecedented growth 
in air travel. Initial concern over the safety implications of the use of the 
jet engine led to the manufacturers producing design safety analyses, both 
to satisfy the regulatory authorities of the airworthiness of jet engines, and 
to seek out any potential design flaws before entry into service. 
Operational experience of jet engines has been generally good, resulting in 
a lower propulsion-related accident rate than for aircraft with piston 
engines, as remarked by Taylor (1), yet the challenge remains of 
demonstrating the safety of each new jet engine model before certification, 
and of continuing to improve the safety of the engine design. 
The intent of the safety analysis is manifold; satisfying the regulatory 
authorities is of paramount importance, since the engine might not 
otherwise obtain certification for use in service, yet it is also necessary to 
assess the safety of the new design in comparison to that of engines already 
in service. Potential weaknesses in the design may be discovered and 
addressed by appropriate safety analysis, avoiding troublesome and costly 
design changes in the future, and facilitating a trouble-free entry into 
service when the engine/airframe package is delivered to the customer 
airline. The safety analysis will minimise the risk to the travelling public 
both by preventing engine failures from occurring and by reducing the 
severity of the effects of such failures, improving overall airplane safety. 
Moreover, a thorough safety analysis provides a strong defence against 
product liability litigation at some future time, by helping defend against a 
charge of negligence by the engine manufacturer. 
Notwithstanding the benefits cited above, conducting a safety analysis of a 
jet propulsion system design before entry into service is accompanied by 
considerable difficulties. Selection of the most appropriate analysis 
technique is not straightforward (2) since each has specific strengths and 
weaknesses, and since engine development programmes are so 
compressed that using a wide variety of techniques to address the same 
issues is unlikely to produce results until long after the engine enters 
service. The specific airworthiness regulations to be addressed differ 
according to the country of manufacture, and the certification basis of the 
engine or the propulsion system, as does the interpretation of regulations 
with almost identical wording. The issues addressed by the analysis 
depend entirely upon whether it is conducted from an engine or airframe 
perspective, and there is considerable potential for some hazards to be 
neglected by both parties. 
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Quantification of failure rates for use in the safety analysis presents a 
formidable difficulty; since the length of time spent during engine 
development on testing components or entire engines (one or two 
thousand hours) is generally much shorter than the component lives (tens 
of thousands of hours), it is virtually impossible to obtain a statistically 
significant failure distribution for most engine components before they go 
into service. Failure distributions are not readily available from 
components already in service on previous engines, since as soon as an 
engine component experiences a safety-related failure, considerable effort 
is expended on preventing the same failure recurring, either by 
component inspection, operational limitations or component redesign. 
Any safety analysis quantification must therefore be executed with 
extremely sparse data. 
Finally, since certification is vital to the programme, there is considerable 
pressure to document the analysis in the same way that permitted 
certification of the last model. Any design changes resulting from the 
analysis are likely to be acknowledged informally rather than recorded in 
the documents presented for certification; a natural reluctance to point out 
past errors, together with concern that regulatory authorities may 
misinterpret a discussion of design evolution, combine to render the 
formal analysis documentation a simplified, condensed demonstration of 
compliance with the regulations, rather than a full record of trade-offs and 
outstanding concerns. 
The considerations raised above have led to some concern that the existing 
approach to propulsion system safety analysis may not correctly predict the 
behaviour of jet engines in the field. Although no systematic audit of 
analysis predictions versus actual experience has been carried out upon a 
high bypass ratio turbofan, there have been instances of discrepancies, both 
in the failure rates predicted and the kinds of events addressed. This study 
is intended to establish where current analysis techniques are lacking and 
to identify an improved approach. Specific opportunities for 
improvement were initially identified as: 
Basic assumptions used in the analysis. 
General utility of the analysis to the design community 
- Timely 
- Credible to design community 
- Cost effective 
- Clear identification of potential for design improvement 
Formal analysis techniques (inductive versus deductive). 
Integrated analysis of the propulsion system, including human 
interfaces, rather than a bare engine. 
Types of events addressed by safety analysis. 
Quantification of failure rates. 
Effect of small changes in design or in loading (derivative versus 
new design). 
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1.2 Regulatory Requirements 
As explained above, a primary requirement of the safety analysis is that it 
should enable demonstration of compliance with airworthiness 
regulations. These regulations, together with their supporting advisory 
material, provide only limited guidance regarding the appropriate means 
of conducting a safety analysis for an aircraft engine or propulsion system. 
This material is largely based upon historical precedent and negotiation 
between the airworthiness authorities and the industry; considerable 
discretion is allowed the manufacturer in the means by which compliance 
is demonstrated, and it is then up to the appropriate authority to evaluate 
the demonstration on a case-by-case basis. No effort is made in the 
regulations to compare analytical techniques and their merits and 
deficiencies, nor to enumerate the details of the analysis. Excerpts from 
the regulations are provided in Appendix B, for easy reference. 
FAR 33.75 (3), addressing engine certification only states that the analysis 
should show that any probable failure will not cause the engine to catch 
fire, burst, overload the engine mounts or lose the capability of being shut 
down. 
The corresponding European Regulation, JAR E 510 (4) requires a failure 
analysis of the engine to be carried out "to assess the likely consequence of 
all failures that could reasonably be expected to occur... a summary shall be 
made of those failures ... which could result in Major Effects or Hazardous 
effects". The associated advisory material (ACJ E 510) specifies hazardous 
effects as significant non-contained high energy debris, or toxic bleed air 
being supplied to the cabin, or significant thrust in the opposite direction 
to that intended by the pilot, or complete inability to shut the engine 
down. 
FAR 25 (5) (which deals with large ý transport category aircraft, often 
powered by high bypass ratio jet engines) gives guidance on safety analysis 
from the airline perspective. The regulations specifically addressing 
engine failures (25.901 and 25.903) direct the installation designer to ensure 
that "no single failure or malfunction or probable combination of failures 
will jeopardise the safe operation of the airplane" and that "design 
precautions must be taken to minimise the hazards to the airplane in the 
event of an engine rotor failure or of a fire originating within the engine 
which bums through the engine case". 
FAR 25.1309 requires a safety analysis for systems and equipment, and 
gives some guidance in the advisory material regarding acceptable 
probabilities of hazardous and catastrophic failures, but considerable debate 
exists over the applicability of this regulation to propulsion systems,. The 
FAA has historically allowed major parts of propulsion systems to be 
1A new rule and Advisory Circular is currently being developed to clarify the situation. 
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certified by showing compliance with 25.901 and 25.903 instead, by design 
review and statement of compliance. 
The corresponding European regulations, appearing in JAR 25, (6) are less 
ambiguous, in that the propulsion system is explicitly required to comply 
with JAR 25.1309, as well as being installed so as to minimise the risk of 
damage (JAR 25.903) resulting from uncontained rotor burst. Although 
the associated advisory material does not specify the analysis technique to 
be used, nor means of quantification, it does suggest that the effects of 
potential crew error or maintenance error be included in the analysis. 
The following points may be noted from this brief review of the regulatory 
requirements: 
Both FAR 33 and JAR E address the engine in isolation, rather than the 
'propulsion function' for the aircraft. As such, the analysis is directed 
toward those engine malfunctions which could actively prove Hazardous, 
such as those which direct high energy debris toward the airplane, rather 
than those resulting in the engine passively failing to perform an expected 
duty. Indeed, the advisory material for JAR E explicitly states that a failure 
with no result other than the complete loss of power and associated engine 
services from a single engine should be regarded as having a Minor effect; 
no suggestion is made that the engine manufacturer consider the effects of 
multiple engine failures. Conversely, ACJ No 5 to JAR 25.1309 explicitly 
requires consideration of "all possible combinations of engine and 
electrical power source failures ... except those that are shown to 
be 
Extremely Improbable. " Engine failures such as fire and uncontained disk 
failure are presupposed, rather than shown to have acceptably low 
probabilities. 2. 
The specification of undesired events in FAR 33 immediately promotes a 
deductive approach to analysis (one in which individual failure modes are 
inferred from a given result), whereas the JAR E 510 requirement to 
address all failures promotes a more exhaustive, inductive approach in 
which all failure modes are enumerated before conclusions are drawn 
regarding outcomes (as suggested by the wording of FAR 25.901 and both 
FAR and JAR 25.1309, although in practice only a small subset of possible 
engine failures are used to demonstrate compliance with these 
regulations). 
Definition of the severity of a given effect is not consistent between the 
engine regulations and the airframe regulations. Events such as release of 
213oth FARs and JARs currently incorporate an anomaly in safety analysis requirements, in 
that the safety analysis for engine certification is required to show that the engine will not 
catch fire or burst, whereas the analysis for powerplant (airframe) certification is required 
to show that, assuming an engine fire or engine burst occurs, the airplane will be safe. 
Although this approach leads to the most stringent safety requirements, it presents 
difficulties in consistency of quantified analysis. 
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high energy debris are defined or implied as Hazardous by JAR E and FAR 
33, yet ACJ Nod to JAR 25.1309 describes a Hazardous effect as being one 
involving: 
" i) a large reduction in safety margins 
ii) physical distress or a workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied 
upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely 
iii) Serious injury to or death of a relatively small proportion of the 
occupants. " 
The vast majority of uncontained engine failures or fires do not result in 
any of the above effects, and might reasonably be considered to have only 
Major effects from the airframe perspective. 
Such inconsistencies between regulatory requirements complicate the task 
of producing a powerplant safety analysis suitable for demonstrating 
compliance with all of the appropriate airworthiness regulations. 
1.3 Previous Work 
Very little work has been published on the safety analysis of jet engines, in 
part because of the sensitivity of the issue from the legal and regulatory 
standpoint. Much of the work published on safety analysis of other 
systems such as nuclear powerplants, chemical process plant and electricity 
grid systems is not directly applicable to jet engines with their severe 
constraints upon weight and space, as well as upon reliability and safety. 
The widespread use of redundancy and of protective systems, as used in 
the plant mentioned above, would incur prohibitive weight and 
performance penalties in the fiercely competitive world of jet propulsion; 
much effort is therefore expended in applying sophisticated design 
techniques to the components of architecturally simple systems, rather 
than in designing system architecture to accommodate the known failure 
characteristics of simple components. The material published on system 
safety is primarily written from the military perspective, concentrating on 
programme deliverables required by the military community and the form 
each task should take, rather than the substance of the task. A notable 
exception is Terry's (7) overview of system safety, which provides many 
philosophical insights into key issues confronting the system safety 
engineer, although guidance on execution of analyses is minimal. 
No studies are available comparing the predicted and actual safety statistics 
for jet aircraft engines, or otherwise validating the current safety analysis 
techniques'. 
3The sensitivity of the issues involved has led to the safety analyses being considered 
company limited data, which is available to the regulatory authorities as part of the 
certification process, but is not released for general publication. Similarly, the details of 
safety-related failures are not generally released, except as a Service Bulletin to the 
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A considerable body of work exists in the field of reliability forecasting, 
some of which could potentially be applied to the safety analysis of jet 
engines. A significant part of this study will be devoted to establishing the 
applicability of such forecasting techniques to the safety analysis of jet 
engines (see below and Chapter 5). Many of the forecasting techniques are 
based upon components with well-defined failure distributions, where 
hundreds or thousands of components have been tested to failure under 
well-delineated loads in equally well-defined environments. This is not 
the case for a jet engine, since cost and short development programmes 
only permit one or two examples of the more critical components to be 
tested to failure during an engine development programme; the majority 
of the programme consisting of tests without component failures. Once 
the engine enters service, a safety-related failure is quickly followed by 
corrective action throughout the fleet; leaving little opportunity to obtain 
experimental failure distributions for any safety-related component failure 
mode. One of the challenges addressed by this study is the selection of 
those predictive techniques which will best allow quantification of failure 
rates, given the paucity of data outlined above. The problem has been 
summarised in general terms by Gottfried and Weiss (8). 
Guidance on safety analysis 
Guidance on the best approach to aircraft engine safety analysis is generally 
limited to that guidance appearing in the airworthiness regulations (and 
equivalent military standards, which leave even more freedom for 
interpretation (9)). 
ARP926A (10), a completely general analysis procedure, recommends that 
analysis be limited to that which is strictly necessary: 
Specify quantitative results only to the extent essential 
Restrict the equipment item levels.... 
Limit the failure effects to those necessary. 
Do not call for an analysis of all probable failure modes ... 
Do not impose a specific analytic format .... It suggests that a combination of a hardware approach and a functional 
approach at any analysis level may be the optimum. 
Lloyd & Tye (11) recommend in a discussion of the safety analysis of 
aircraft systems in general that a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) be 
executed to review the extent and relevance of previous experience with 
allegedly similar systems. This should be followed by FMEAs upon 
airlines recommending corrective action, as an Airworthiness Directive from the FAA (or 
Mandatory Modification by another authority), or in the worst instances, as part of a 
formal accident investigation by the NTSB, AAlB or equivalent government body. Such 
limitations upon the availability of the relevant information effectively preclude such a 
study without the sanction and assistance of an engine manufacturer or regulatory body. 
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components, Fault Trees addressing undesired events identified in the 
PHA, and sensitivity analyses to establish the system effect of variations in 
component failure rates. Common mode failure analysis, zonal analysis 
and uncontained failure analysis are also recommended to address 
causally linked simultaneous component failures. It will be shown below 
(Chapter 5) that not all of these techniques are appropriate to the analysis 
of propulsion systems. 
Conversely, Kytasty (12) recommends the use of fault tree analysis rather 
than the historically used FMEA for evaluating the reliability of space 
vehicle propulsion systems, on the grounds that a fault tree directs 
attention to fundamental system incompatibilities, rather than individual 
instances of such incompatibility that might be uncovered by FMEA. "The 
level at which FMEA is performed places the attention and hence controls 
or barriers to failure modes close to the failure mode itself. The result is an 
often overwhelming attempt to solve individual problems . ...... A top down analysis with reliability allocation and predictions using Fault Tree 
models provides a different approach by organising system hardware 
according to function and failure mode. .... A strategy therefore exists for 
emplacing failure barriers at the most beneficial nodes in the system. " A 
similar point is made by Martin (13) advocating a functional rather than a 
component-based approach to reliability analysis of a system. The 
advantages of this approach for an architecturally complex system are 
clear, in that the system effect of an individual component failure is 
emphasised, but the relevance to propulsion system analysis will be 
pursued in more detail below. 
The Electric Power Research Institute has published a procedure (Strong 
and Eagle, (14)) for conducting reliability forecasts upon selected industrial 
gas turbine components, based upon the use of failure rates from existing 
installations, modified by environmental factors, together with polling 
expert opinion where no failure rates are available. They have also 
studied the applicability of fault tree analysis for industrial gas turbine 
reliability, (Kelly, Erdman and Gilbert, (15)) and concluded that the 
technique appeared useful, provided that appropriate failure rate data 
could be located. 
1.3.2 Validation of safety and reliability predictions 
None of the recommendations in the above referenceS4 include work 
strictly validating the approach advocated, by comparing the results of a 
forecast with measured system reliability subsequently experienced in 
service (as in the investigations of Snaith (16) and Taylor (17)). An 
AIA/FAA committee has recently published a comprehensive study of 
4Many of these references address reliability studies rather than safety analysis, and their 
recommendations are therefore of only limited applicability to the subject at hand. 
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recent safe ty-si gnifi cant propulsion system events occurring in service, 
(18), but this has not been related to previous predictions. The results of 
the fault tree analysis of Kelly, Erdman and Gilbert, (15) were presented to 
individuals experienced in the system, who confirmed that they 'seemed 
reasonable', but since those same individuals originated the failure rates 
and system descriptions forming the basis for the fault tree, it would have 
been remarkable had they been surprised by the results. No studies have 
been published comparing the results of existing safety analyses with 
service experience for high bypass-ratio jet engines, and until such a 
comparison is made, it is impossible to assess the total capability of current 
techniques. 
1.3.3 Reliability forecasting techniques 
Although much reliability forecasting relies upon testing large component 
populations to failure, as outlined above, the following approaches offered 
more promise and will be discussed in some detail below. 
Reliability growth modelling, as pioneered by Duane (19), was initially 
devised to predict reliability at entry into service by monitoring failures 
during the development programme. Much of the subsequent discussion 
of reliability growth modelling has focused on the mathematical model 
which most accurately represents the reliability growth curve during 
development testing (Lawlor, 20, Mead, 21, Taneja and Safie, 22). Since the 
length of time devoted to development testing in an aircraft engine 
programme is relatively short, and since the intended MTBF between 
safety-related failures is relatively long, reliability growth as measured 
over a single development programme is unlikely to provide useful 
information. (A similar objection was raised by Carter (23), on the grounds 
that very few failure modes can be experienced during initial prototype 
testing, and considerable scatter can therefore be anticipated in the 
measured failure rate). However, a slightly different approach to the 
technique permits the use of failure data from parent designs as well as 
improved derivative designs in the forecasting of failure rates. The 
validity of this philosophy is recognised by Lloyd & Tye (11), although the 
details of its implementation vary from one worker to the next (Lloyd, 
(24)). Carter objects that "no growth model could possibly span the process 
both before and after a major design change"; this viewpoint will be 
discussed later together with the concept of the continuity of design 
philosophy from one engine model to the next. 
Another approach meriting consideration is that of Mechanical Reliability, 
as introduced by Bompas-Smith (25), (26) and Kececioglu (27), which 
attempts to forecast component failure rates by assessing the interaction of 
a component strength distribution with the spectrum of loads experienced by components. Forecasting safety-related component failures by directing 
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attention to the low-strength tail of the strength distribution should be 
possible, provided that the relevant distributions are sufficiently well- 
defined, a difficulty acknowledged by Carter (23), one of the primary 
advocates of this approach. Martin (28) advocates the use of a complex 
equipment model following an exponential reliability law for aircraft 
engines, as opposed to the strength-load interference model or the load- 
chain model. Alternatively, use of threshold techniques (Smith, 29), 
rather than the more conventional normal, log normal, or Weibull 
distributions, may prove helpful in predicting failure rates for high- 
integrity components. 
A third approach, frequently employed in the US, is the use of generic 
component failure rate data, adjusted to take account of environmental 
severity by the use of theoretical or empirical relationships, or by using 
Bayesian statistics to factor in expert opinion (15). The use of such generic 
data to predict specific component failures leads to considerable problems 
when superficially similar components operating in similar 
environments exhibit very different failure rates (as recognised by Carter 
(23)). 
A fourth approach, which also offers considerable promise in sharpening 
the focus of FMEAs, is the use of precursor data in assessing the past safety 
performance of systems (Bier, 30) (Venton, 31). By looking at the incidence 
of failures which have the potential to lead to a Hazardous effect, but need 
not have actually done so, failure rates can then be based on a larger 
number of events, and can therefore be used with more assurance. 
Alternatively, presentation of each propulsion-related accident as a chain 
of events (as proposed by the Boeing Safety Department (32), and used by 
Welsh and Lundberg (33), similar to the loss-cause failure analysis 
presented by Ball (34)) can permit multiple contributing factors to be 
identified for each accident, and maximise the opportunities for accident 
prevention. 
A fifth approach recommended by some authors who have identified 
problems with the use of generic failure rates is the "Physics of Failure" 
approach in which the expected failure rate is based upon environmental 
stresses, temperatures, vibration etc. in a deterministic manner. 
Fortunately, the majority of propulsion system components have already 
been subjected to this type of analysis during the design process, and a "safe 
life" established for those considered critical to the safety of the propulsion 
system (the safe life is generally set considerably lower than the calculated 
fatigue life, using minimum material properties and a severe operating 
environment). This rigorous design process is partly responsible for the 
high component reliabilities experienced in service, and if it were 
completely valid, no component would produce a safety-related failure. In 
some cases, the design was done without full knowledge of the operational 
environment of the component (this would be typical of a failure of a pipe 
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or connector or seal; components which are not analysed in the same 
depth as "Critical" components). In other cases, the material or 
manufacture or maintenance of the component is not as intended by the 
designer (this would be more typical of a turbine disk failure). Prediction 
of these discrepancies between the design intent and the reality of the 
component is not possible, given the current state of the art. The "Physics 
of Failure" approach is therefore concluded to be of limited utility in this 
context. 
A more detailed review of the literature published in the field can be 
found in Appendix A. 
1.4 Objectives and Methodology of Present Work 
The goal of this study is to identify and remedy shortfalls in the safety 
analysis of high bypass-ratio jet engines powering large transport category 
aircraft, and to improve the usefulness and cost-effectiveness of such 
analysis where possible. 
The approach taken was initially to establish a baseline, using existing 
safety analysis techniques in use by the engine manufacturers to forecast 
the behaviour of an existing engine. Much of the original analysis work 
used for certification of that engine was made available by the 
manufacturer, providing the structure for an equitable evaluation of 
existing techniques and approaches. The analysis predictions were then 
compared with actual service experience for that engine, as recorded by the 
Service Engineering Department of the engine manufacturer. 
The baseline thus established provided a departure point for considering 
potential improvements to the safety analysis procedure, prompted by 
identifiable discrepancies between forecast and experience, enquiries from 
the engine manufacturer, or service incidents involving the engines of 
other manufacturers. Both quantitative and qualitative discrepancies were 
addressed; in that rates of safety related events could be derived for the 
baseline engine, and compared with predicted probabilities, and predicted 
failure sequences could be compared with those actually occurring in 
service. Since different engine families tend to experience different failure 
patterns, consideration of accidents and incidents pertaining to other 
manufacturer's engines was adjudged worthwhile. The engines 
considered in this study were the RB211, Tay, V2500, PW2000, PW4000, 
JT9D, CF6, CFM56 and ALF502 models, from entry into service of each 
model until December 1994. The results of the study should therefore be 
generally applicable to high bypass-ratio turbofans powering commercial 
transport aircraft in the western world. Military aircraft engines, including 
commercial models used for military transport aircraft, experience a very 
different operating and maintenance environment from those in the 
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commercial fleet, and were therefore excluded from the study. Data from 
engines designed and operated in CIS countries was also excluded, for 
similar reasons, and because of the difficulty in obtaining the relevant 
records. 
The proposed changes in approach were documented, and then validated 
by applying the new approach to a second engine and comparing the 
resulting prediction with service experienceS. 
1.5 Layout of thesis 
In order to preserve the confidentiality of proprietary data supplied by the 
engine manufacturer, the thesis has been divided into two volumes, 
volume II containing the proprietary material comprising appendices G 
and H. This material is not publicly available. The thesis is generally laid 
out as follows: 
Chapter 1 contains introductory material and the background leading to 
the execution of this study, together with summaries of the relevant 
airworthiness regulations and of the more important references published 
in relevant fields. A review of the literature and a discussion of the 
literature search strategy is given in Appendix A. Appendix B contains 
verbatim extracts from the relevant airworthiness regulations, for ease of 
reference. 
Chapter 2 establishes the baseline of current propulsion system safety 
analysis, outlining basic assumptions used, analysis techniques, methods 
of quantifying failure rates. The behaviour of the RB211-22B is predicted, 
using these existing techniques, and using the original safety analysis 
produced for engine certification (details of this analysis are given in 
Volume IL Appendix G-) The latter portion of chapter 2 summarises the 
safety related service experience of the RB211-22B. 
Chapter 3 presents definitions and basic assumptions underlying the safety 
analysis process. Chapter 4 discusses the service experience of safety 
related accidents and incidents throughout the commercial high bypass- 
ratio fleet; Appendix C gives details of the fleet service accident experience. 
Chapter 5 reviews the safety analysis techniques generally in use in the 
aerospace industry, with particular reference to their suitability for use in 
propulsion system safety analysis. Chapter 6 develops alternate means of 
assessing propulsion system safety, based on the service experience 
presented in chapter 4, and focusing on areas where standard techniques 
5The service experience of the second engine had been deliberately excluded from the study 
up to this point, to avoid the inadvertent use of pre-knowledge when validating the new 
analysis. 
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(as presented in Chapter 5) are not well suited to the analysis. An alternate 
approach to the safety analysis is derived. 
Chapter 7 applies the alternate analysis procedure to two other unrelated 
propulsion systems, and compares predicted failures and failure rates with 
those actually experienced in service. 
Chapter 8 discusses the results of the research in detail. 
Chapter 9 summarises the work, and includes suggestions for further work 
such as other applications. 
Chapter 10 presents references. 
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2.0 A CURRENT SAFETY ANALYSIS APPROACH 
2.1 Introduction 
The intent of the baseline safety assessment was to establish, for a suitable 
engine model, the success of the current approach to safety analysis in 
predicting service experience. "Current approach" in this context is 
intended to comprise: 
Ground rules of the assessment -as performed for the baseline 
engine model 
Safety analysis techniques used for the baseline model or in 
widespread use for other engine models 
Engine components or systems addressed by the baseline engine 
assessment or usually addressed by assessments for more recent 
engine models 
Types of Hazardous or Catastrophic failure effects specified by the 
regulations (see Appendix B) or normally addressed in current 
engine safety analyses. 
Each of these aspects is discussed in more detail below. 
2.2 Criteria for model selection 
The following factors were considered'crucial to selection of an appropriate 
engine model, for, the baseline assessment, and for validation of the 
'improved' analysis procedure: 
The initial assessment should be done for an engine with many 
millions of hours of service experience, including a substantial number of 
individual engines with high time. This would afford the opportunity for 
the fleet to experience a full spectrum of failures, including the wear-out of 
long-life parts. One of the first-generation high-bypass engines, designed 
in the late 1960's, would meet this criterion admirably. It was also 
considered advantageous to have access to the original safety analysis 
submitted for engine certification,, to ensure that the baseline assessment 
(as an expanded version of the certification analysis) gave an equitable and 
realistic view of current analysis techniques. 6 The cooperation of Rolls- 
61t is recognised that some advances may have been made in safety analyses since the late 
1960's, when the first generation high-bypass ratio turbofans were designed and certified, 
and that it could be argued that using one of these analyses does not represent the current 
'state-of-the-art'. In fact, the caliber of the safety analyses produced for certification 
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Royce led to the selection of the RB211-22 as the engine to be used for the 
baseline assessment. 
The engine model used to validate the improved safety analysis technique 
should also have significant service experience, permitting a meaningful 
comparison between the predicted and actual failure rates. It was 
considered important that the selected engine allow scope for the use of 
techniques assessing derivative designs with respect to their parent 
models, such as would be afforded by a recent model of RB211. However, 
it is generally recognised that different engine families may experience 
different kinds of failures, and so assessing a safety analysis technique by 
applying it to the RB211 family alone might not produce results which are 
generally applicable. Given these constraints, it was decided to use another 
manufacturer's propulsion system for validation. Considerations of 
commercial sensitivity preclude specific identification of this propulsion 
system. 
2.3 Ground rules 
The following ground rules were used for the original RB211-22 failure 
analyses, and are still generally in use today: 
Only mechanical failures of individual components are considered. 
Multiple failures are only addressed insofar as they resulted directly 
from the original component failure under consideration. 
The component under consideration is to the design standard, and 
the design standard has been shown to be satisfactory by 
development test or by analysis. 
The engine is being operated according to the operating instructions 
and is within its design flight envelope. 
Faulty maintenance and mishandling of the engine is not 
considered. 
Failure rates are quantified by reference to previous service 
experience (e. g. Spey, Tyne and Conway engines, by a simple average 
of incidents divided by fleet hours) or to development testing. It is 
varies considerably from one programme to the next and there is little evidence to suggest a 
steady advance in either techniques or realism. A aDmmon approach is to use the previous 
programme's analysis as a template, and to deliver an edited version of the previous 
engine's safety analysis. It is entirely possible that more critical thought and technical 
effort went into the original, first-generation analysis than into some of the subsequent 
documents. 
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acknowledged that this may result in higher predicted failure rates 
than would be expected for a mature engine. More recent RR 
failure analyses also permit estimation of the probability range for a 
failure, based on engineering judgement. 
The initial analysis performed for certification of the RB211 involved 
many significant omissions. The original analysis was largely confined to 
the turbomachinery of the engine, omitting the oil system, fuel system, 
flight deck instrumentation and other ancillary systems. The original 
analysis defined neither the functionality of each assembly or component, 
nor the criticality of the failure effects involved. A considerable degree of 
background knowledge and understanding was assumed on the behalf of 
the reader. The original analysis has therefore been expanded and clarified, 
and those systems not addressed (but provided by the engine 
manufacturer) have been analysed. 
Where analyses have been performed specifically for this baseline study, 
consistency with these ground rules has been maintained as far as is 
feasible, and consistency with the approach of the original failure analysis 
has also been maintained as far as possible. Since the intent of this 
baseline assessment was to establish the strengths and weaknesses of the 
techniques in use, rather than to produce the most accurate possible safety 
assessment of the RB211-22, any information on failure modes which has 
been acquired since the RB211 went into service has not been introduced 
into the analysis; every attempt has been made to produce analyses using 
the same knowledge-base as was available at the time of RB211-22 
certification. 
2.4 Techniques 
1-1 
Safety analysis of commercial jet engines is currently executed by Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis or by Fault Tree Analysis. Written 
enumeration of design precautions may also be used to provide 
explanatory material substantiating an analysis, or to explain why an 
analysis conducted for a previous engine model remains valid for the 
model under consideration. 
Individual engine manufacturers have generally used the technique most 
appropriate to demonstration of compliance with the regulation they are 
attempting to satisfy. 7 Although the combined use of FMEAs and fault 
7European manufacturers have demonstrated compliance with the JARs by preparing 
FMEAS or similar analyses, and US manufacturers have demonstrated compliance with the 
FARs by preparing fault trees or by verbal documentation addressing specific Hazardous 
events. 
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trees would significantly improve the resulting analysis8, the limited 
resources available for safety analysis do not generally permit this apparent 
duplication of effort. The original RB211 analysis took the form of a 
FMEA, supported by individual reports addressing specific technical issues, 
and the baseline safety assessment therefore followed suit, using a format 
intended to direct attention to the failure progression and final effect on 
the engine,, and to explicitly state both the estimated probability and 
severity of the effect9. 
2.5 Components and systems addressed 
The RB211 powerplant components and systems may be divided into three 
categories; those which were actually addressed by the original analyses 
performed by Rolls-Royce (indicated by a report name or number in the 
list below), those which were not actually analysed at the time, but which 
one might expect to be analysed according to current practice (in which 
case analyses have been performed as part of this study, as indicated by the 
wording "Analysed for study" in the list below), and those which are not 
normally addressed by the engine or powerplant safety analysis (indicated 
by the wording "Not analysed" below). This last group is largely made up 
of systems and components which may be supplied either by engine or 
airframe manufacturer, depending on contractual negotiation, and not 
considered to be part of the "basic engine". 
A list of the major systems and assemblies of the RB211-22B as installed in 
the L1011 aircraft is given below, indicating how each assembly or system 
was addressed. 
8The insight into individual component failure modes and failure propagations gained by 
the FMEA can be used to enhance the technical content of the fault tree, while the fault tree 
permits multiple failures (particularly dormant or common mode failures) to be addressed 
much more easily than does the FMEA. 
91n the interests of brevity, material appearing in the original Rolls-Royce analyses 
relating to minor failures, to the necessity for Unscheduled Removals and to the MSG-3 
process has been omitted from the baseline safety assessment. 
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LP fan module RB211-22B FMEA 
RB211-22 Failure AnalySis 
IP compressor module RB211-22B FMEA 
RB211-22 Failure Analysis 
LP fan casing module RB211-22B FMEA 
RB211-22 Failure Analysis 
IP casing module RB211-22B FMEA 
RB211-22 Failure Analysis 
HP compressor, combustor RB211-22B FMEA 
and HP turbine RB211-22 Failure Analysis 
LP/IP turbine module RB211-22B FMEA 
RB211-22 Failure Analysis 
Engine mounts RB211-22B FMEA 
RB211-22 Failure Analysis 
Extemal gearbox 
RB211-22 Failure Analysis 
Turbine sealing air system/ RB211-22B report (TDR 5730) 
Internal cooling air system (TDR 5977) 
Throttle control system RB211-22B report (ORR60020) 
Engine oil system Analysed for study 
Engine fuel system 
Engine control RB211-22B report (TDR7537) 
Fuel supply Analysed for study 
Electrical Generator - Not analysed (airframe supply) 
Starting/ ignition system Analysed for study 
Bearing load control system- RB211-22B axial location report 
Aircraft bleed air system Analysed for study 
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Engine instrumentation 
TGT control /indication system 
EPR system 
Rotor speed 
Oil parameters 
Fuel parameters 
Vibration 
Ice protection 
Fire protection 
Thrust reverser 
Hydraulic system 
RB211-22B report (ADR 60027) 
RB211-22B FMEA (ORR60031) 
RB211 FMEA 
Analysed for study 
Analysed for study 
Analysed for study 
Analysed for study 
Not analysed (airframe supply) 
Not analysed (airframe supply) 
Not analysed (airframe supply) 
Inlet and cowlings Not analysed 
2.6 Types Of Failure Effects Addressed 
The following failure effects are specified by the airworthiness regulations 
as being Hazardous: 
- Uncontained engine failure 
- Engine Fire 
- Engine Mount overload 
- Inability to shut down the engine 
- Uncommanded reverse thrust 
- Toxic cabin bleed air 
No single failure mode was identified in the analysis which could produce 
an inability to shut down the engine. 
The thrust reverser was not included in this study, being supplied by the 
airframe manufacturer. 
In addition to the failure types enumerated above, the original analysis 
also predicted explosive casing ruptures; this was considered appropriate 
for consideration in the safety analysis. In-flight shutdowns were also 
considered, as offering a good indication of the success of predicting 
numerical failure rates, although it is conceded that their role in engine 
and aircraft risk is yet to be established. 
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2.7 Baseline study results 
Appendix G presents the RB211-22B baseline safety analysis, prepared from 
the failure analyses and technical analyses originally produced by Rolls- 
Royce and from analyses produced by the author for this study. Table 2.1 
summarises the results of the baseline analysis, showing predicted rates of 
Hazardous failures by engine module together with predicted IFSD rates. 
Figures 2.1 to 2.6 present the same material graphically, together with the 
rates actually experienced in service, where appropriate. Since a very large 
number of possible Hazardous failures is involved, no attempt has been 
made to list them outside Appendix G, but the chief contributors to the 
predicted rates are noted. 
2.8 RB211-22B Service Experience 
The following sources of information were used to review the RB211-22B 
service experience: 
- Rolls-Royce database of In-Flight Shutdowns and Rejected Take- 
offs for the first five years of RB211-22B service, 1973 to 1977, 
(Company Proprietary data supplied by RR for the purpose of this 
research). 
- FAA rotor burst studies for US operators (35 - 44) 
- FAA Service Difficulty Report system (45) 
- CAA Significant Event report system (46) 
2.8.1 IFSD Rates 
The IFSD rate'O of the RB211-22B was 990/million engine hours in the first 
year of entry into service, gradually reducing to 160/million engine hours 
in the fifth year after 3 million fleet hours as the design reached maturity. 
An estimate was made of the proportion of that rate attributable to each 
module or system; although the level of detail in the database did not 
permit isolation of the component precipitating the failure sequence (each 
event was annotated with the major symptom annunciating the problem 
to the flight crew, together with the assemblies which were found 
damaged), it was nevertheless possible to perform a first-order estimate of 
the IFSD rate attributable to a module or system, by allocating a fraction of 
every IFSD to each system mentioned as being failed. It was recognised 
that'this approach would overestimate the rate for those modules or 
1017ailure rates are calculated annually unless otherwise stated. 
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systems prone to damage originating elsewhere in the engine, but this bias 
could be taken into account when examining the results. 
This approach showed the IP compressor and the oil system to be the 
major contributors to the IFSD rate, accounting for approximately 4-07o of 
IFSDs between them. The HP compressor, HP turbine, fuel system and 
engine instrumentation also made very significant contributions to the 
rate; the combustor, which had been predicted to produce over half of all 
IFSDs, made a relatively minor contribution. The proportion of IFSDs 
attributable to each system or assembly, for the baseline assessment and for 
service experience, is shown in Figure 2.1. 
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TABLE 2.1 RB211-22 SAFETY ANALYSIS SUMMARY: FORECAST 
FAILURE RATES (PER MILLION ENGINE OPERATING HOURS) 
MODULE IFSD UNCON 
TAINED 
FIRE SEPARA 
TION 
CABIN 
SMOKE 
EXPUSIVE 
CASING 
RUPTURE 
FAN 1114 2.2 . 005 0 0 . 04 
IP COMPRESSOR 1790 39 20 . 002 32.5 . 008 
HP 1333 40 211 0 0 0 
COMPRESSOR 
COMBUSTOR 8016 1.9 392 0 0 . 12 
HP TURBINE 86 0.3 .2 0 0 0 
IP/LP TURBINE 615 21 44 . 01 0 . 05 
MOUNTS 0 0 0 .2 0 0 
OIL SYSTEM 406 0 25 0 0 0 
FUEL SYSTEM 300 0 9.2 0 0 0 
STARTING 1.5 0 0.1 0 0 0 
SYSTEM 
INSTRUMENTA 116 0 0 0 0 
TION 
ICE 1.3 0 0 0 0 0 
PROTECTION 
BLEED DUCTS . 04 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 13777 104 701 0.2 32.5 0.22 
MEASURED 
MATURE 
FAILURE RATE 160 0.1 1.5 0.3 3 - (@ 3E6 HOURS) 
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2.8.2 Uncontained failure rates 
Only four events could positively be identified as resulting in uncontained 
failures in the first five years of service, giving an uncontained failure rate 
of 1.2/million engine hours initially. The mature uncontained engine 
failure rate was 0.1/ million engine hours over the time period 1981 to 1989 
(US operators only, 35 - 44). The rate predicted by the baseline assessment 
was approximately 100 to 1000 times higher than that experienced in 
service. 
The fan assembly and the HPT disc produced the uncontained failures in 
the first five years, exhibiting a much higher uncontained failure rate than 
predicted for the fan and a similar rate to that predicted for the HP turbine; 
the baseline assessment had predicted the majority of uncontained failure's 
to originate in the IP and HP compressors. 
2.8.3 Fires 
The first five years of RB211 service included 29 events where there was a 
fire warning. However, the majority of these were due to faults in the fire 
detection system or to borescope plugs coming loose from engine casings 
(maintenance error is suspected) permitting hot air to leak out into the 
space between engine casing and nacelle. Only one instance was found of a 
fuel leak resulting in a nacelle fire; the other four events accompanied 
major flowpath damage. The incidence of fires (including tailpipe fires) 
was therefore calculated as 1.5 /million engine hours, and the baseline 
safety assessment prediction was approximately 400 times too high. The 
baseline assessment predicted that two-thirds of the fires would be caused 
by failures in the combustion module; in fact, only two of the five events 
mentioned combustor damage. 
This low rate was verified by a review of the fires recorded by the FAA and 
CAA from 1986 to 1990, which also gave a rate of 1.5/million hours (three 
of the nine events being caused by failures in the combustion module). 
2.8.4 Separation of major components 
There was one recorded incident involving separation of major 
components from the airframe in the first five years of RB211 service. A 
failure of the LP shaft allowed the fan to proceed forward and depart the 
engine. This failure rate of 0.3/million hours was close to that predicted, 
although the module and failure mechanism were not those forecast. 
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2.8.5 Smoke in cabin bleed air 
There were not enough incidents involving smoke in cabin bleed air to 
perform a meaningful trend analysis, but when averaged over the 5 year 
interval for which RR data was available, the failure rate was 3 /million 
engine hours. Almost all of these events were attributable to the IP 
compressor/ intermediate casing, as predicted by the baseline assessment, 
although the actual rates predicted were too high by a factor of 10. 
2.8.6 Explosive casing rupture 
There were no instances of explosive casing rupture in the first five years 
of RB211 service experience ; the failure rate was therefore less than 
0.3/million hours. Based on the first five years, it is possible that the 
baseline assessment predicted rate of 0.2/million hours was representative 
(although it is the author's understanding that no RB211 has ever 
experienced this failure mode in service). 
2.9 Accident and serious incident review 
The RB211-22B was involved in three propulsion-related accidents during 
the first five years of service, each involving an uncontained failure. In 
each case there were no injuries or fatalities, although there was 
substantial aircraft damage. Chapter 4 gives details of these accidents. 
2.10 Conclusions regarding current approach 
The current safety analysis approach, as used to forecast the behaviour of 
the RB211-22B, is demonstrated to produce unrepresentative results. 
Many predicted failure rates were too high by orders of magnitude, and the 
analysis was unsuccessful in identifying which components or assemblies 
pose the greatest risk of failure. The use of this analysis to draw 
conclusions about the safety of the engine, or to make technical decisions 
on component design, would be very misleading. 
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3.0 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS FOR THE SAFETY 
ANALYSIS 
3.1 Definitions 
Accident Event resulting in fatalities, serious injuries or in 
substantial damage to the airplane -1 
Failure Engine response other than that commanded by the flight 
crew, or component not performing the intended function 
Hazard ratio Measure of the likelihood of a given type of failure 
resulting in an accident, calculated by dividing the number 
of instances of the initiating failure by the number of 
resulting accidents (or the respective rates). 
Propulsion-related event An accident or incident in which the behaviour 
of the propulsion system was a major factor in leading to 
the event occurrence. This includes propulsion system 
malfunction sufficient to cause an incident of itself, benign 
propulsion system malfunction to which the crew 
responded inappropriately, and incorrect commands/ 
expectations of the crew which lead to an accident with 
normally operating propulsion systems. 
Severity factor. Factor relating the likelihood of a given failure to the 
flight phase. For instance, if the cowling departure rate is 5 
times as high during climb as it is when averaged over the 
whole flight, the severity factor would be 5 for climb. 
3.2 Intent of Analysis 
There has been considerable variation in interpretation of the intent of 
performing a safety analysis. Some have considered it to be a design tool 
for comparing one design with another, without regard to the absolute 
values of predicted failure rates. Others have considered it to be a means 
of ensuring that a design meets an absolute standard of safety, such as 1E- 
9/hour for any individual cause of an accident. The analysis has then been 
performed on an 'ideal' system with standard material properties, with 
components manufactured to drawing and assuming correct assembly, 
inspection, maintenance and operation. This approach is consistent with 
that of other certification activities, and may be considered the 'design 
capability' of the system (Smith, (54)). A third approach, which has not 
been generally used so far,, is to attempt a realistic prediction of the accident 
rate which will be experienced in a 'real-world' operational environment. 
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A realistic assessment offers an opportunity to tailor the design to reduce 
the accident rate, while limiting the resources devoted to prevention of 
purely theoretical risks. It is recommended that such a realistic approach 
be used using the incidence of manufacturing defects, maintenance- 
induced damage, unsuccessful maintenance, improper procedures by the 
flight crew and so forth that has actually been observed in a similar 
environment. 
Since the intent of the analysis is to predict actual accident rates, average 
failure rates should be used throughout the analysis, unless there is some 
good technical reason to do otherwise. Component or assembly failure 
rates should be calculated at mean values and an average engine 
installation should be assessed for an average flight. Using worst-case 
assumptions throughout (minimum properties for materials, with 90% 
confidence failure rates, on an extreme day at a comer of the flight 
envelope, dispatching under the MMEL) will not give a realistic forecast 
for accident rates throughout the fleet. An exception may be made where 
appropriate: for instance, if the likelihood of a failure and the severity of 
the effect are both strongly dependent on flight phase, average values 
would be inappropriate. 
Analyses have historically been based on "mature" failure rates, after some 
indeterminate but lengthy interval after introduction into service. This is 
reasonable for predicting accident rates over the life of the fleet, but 
consideration should be given to the rates at introduction into service. 
Individual component failure rates may be derived from published data if 
no better information is available, although the published failure rates on 
a given component may vary by orders of magnitude for mechanical 
components (Appendix A). Alternatively, if the environment and duty of 
the component is known in sufficient detail, a failure rate can be derived 
from a 'Physics of Reliability' approach (55). It is recommended that 
service experience with a similar application and environment be used to 
derive component failure rates where necessary (see below). It is also 
recommended that aggregate failure rates for groups of components (e. g. 
assemblies or modules) be used wherever possible , since this will 
eliminate some of the variation in failure rates occasioned by details of the 
component manufacture or environment not known at the time of 
conducting the analysis. Chapter 6 discusses the prediction of failure rates 
in more detail. 
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3.3 Scope Of Analysis 
Previous analyses have been confined to the engine, EBU and flight deck 
engine instrumentation. Other systems which are not specifically devoted 
to propulsion have made significant contributions to the propulsion- 
related accident rate whilst interfacing with the propulsion system. It is 
therefore recommended that the propulsion system safety analysis give 
consideration to the autothrottle system, the fuel delivery system and the 
flight crew, so far as they enable propulsion system operation. 
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4.0 GENERAL REVIEW OF ACCIDENTS/ SERIOUS INCIDENTS 
4.1 Statistical Review 
It was considered essential to this research to understand how propulsion 
failures have led to accidents in the past, and the likelihood of a given 
failure resulting in an accident, with due regard to the circumstances of the 
event. The history of the high bypass commercial transport fleet was 
reviewed, and 82 accidents were identified as being propulsion-related. A 
summary of each accident is given in Appendix C. 
Similar studies of propulsion-related accidents have been presented by the 
CAAM committee (18) and Sallee (47). The former was a simple 
tabulation of events, sanitised to de-identify airframes and engines. Sallee 
explored the relative safety of two, three and four engines aircraft in the 
context of comparing the incremental risk associated with ETOPS (all- 
engine power loss for unrelated causes) to existing propulsion system 
risks. Table 4.1 summarises the major similarities and differences between 
this study and references 18 and 47. 
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STUDY KNIFE CAAM SALLEE 
(18) (47) 
SCOPE High bypass ratio Turbofan and Transport 
fleet turboprop fleet category jet fleet 
1970-1994 1982-1991 1959-1989 
# ACCIDENTS 82 66 category 3 or 4 22 high bypass 
events in high accidents 
b 
ACCIDENT Downward with Silent Silent 
TREND time 
AIRFRAME Recent designs Silent Rate 
EFFECTS have lower rates. proportional to 
3 or 4 engine number of 
have higher engines 
rates than twins 
FLIGHT PHASE Assessed for each Silent Assessed for 
EFFECTS accident cause accidents as a 
whole 
CAUSAL Uncontained For level 3+4 Uncontained 
FACTORS 267o' events. High 27 7o' 
Propulsion bypass fleet; Propulsion 
failure + crew Uncontained failure + crew 
error 187o 207o' error 417o 
Thrust control Propulsion Crew error 187o' 
1070 failure + crew Other 97o 
Fire 117o error 117o' 
Engine Common cause 
separation 92o' 387o' 
Reverser 97o 
HAZARD Calculated for Similar Calculated for 
RATIOS most causes parameter some causes 
calculated for 
some causes 
DISCUSSION OF Extensive None Very extensive 
_RESULTS 
I I 
Table 4.1 Comparison With Previous Studies Of Propulsion-Related 
Accidents 
Note: Level 3 and 4 events are defined in detail in (18). They include both 
accidents and events which are considered to have hazarded the airplane. 
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Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of accidents by airframe. It can be seen 
that the airplanes with more engines have a higher propulsion-related 
accident rate, although the increase is not directly proportional to the 
number of engines, as has been implied in the past (Sallee, 47); three- 
engined airplanes appear to have a disproportionately higher rate of 
propulsion related accidents .... the rate is virtually the same as 
for four- 
engined aircraft". Since the number of accidents is limited, random 
variation plays a significant effect in some categories of accidents; the likely 
magnitude of this effect is indicated by quoting an error equivalent to 
having one more accident in the category of interest. 
The overall propulsion related accident rate is 6.0 E-7/airplane hour12. 
The modernity of the aircraft design appears to have a significant 
influence upon the propulsion-related accident rate. If the BAe146 is 
excluded (as the first high bypass commercial transport produced by that 
manufacturer), designs from the 1980s generally have lower propulsion- 
related accident rates than those from the 1970s. 13 This cannot be 
attributed to the older airplanes wearing out and having more accidents, 
because the older models actually had worse accident rates on entry into 
service than they do currently; it seems likely that improved analytical and 
manufacturing techniques and consideration of lessons learned in the past 
are responsible for the newer aircraft models experiencing a lower 
propulsion-related accident rate. 
The effects of contributing factors to accidents will be considered below. 
It can be seen from Figure 4.2 that there has been a steady reduction in the 
propulsion related accident rate in the high bypass fleet from the early 
1970s to the current date. This is in contrast to the constant accident rate 
observed throughout the 1980s forý_all accidents (propulsion and otherwise) 
in the commercial jet fleet (Boeing Statistical Summary (48). This steady 
improvement may be partially ascribed to the prompt introduction of 
improvements and fixes for problems after the engines have gone into 
service. Trending the accident rate for older aircraft types alone (DC10, 
L1011,747 except 747-400, and A300) confirms this hypothesis. Figure 4.3 
shows that the downward trend holds for each of the chief causes of 
propulsion-related accidents as well as for the overall statistics. 
11 This is not the case in the low bypass fleet, according to Sallee's studies. 
12 Accident rates have been measured on a flight hour basis and also on a flight basis; there 
is no general consensus on a preferred convention. Calculation per flight hour was more 
convenient in this study. 
13Definition of new types is approximately in accordance with the usage of Boeing's 
Commercial Accident Summary, early wide bodies are the 747, DC10, L1011 and A300; the 
remainder of the high bypass ratio fleet are considered new types. 
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It has been recognised that most accidents result from a series of failures 
and/or circumstances, some of which may have occurred in the past and 
may have led to incidents rather than accidents. It is often difficult to 
evaluate the gravity of an incident before an accident of a similar nature 
occurs (Camino et al., (49)). The study of accident precursors may provide 
a useful tool in the probabilistic assessment of safety in cases where the 
accidents themselves are rare events (as in propulsion-related aircraft 
accidents). 
A database of 870 serious incidents was also compiled, based largely upon 
the records of the FAA, CAA and NTSB. The incident rates generated 
from this database are undoubtedly lower than reality since the database 
does not include many events occurring outside North America and 
Europe. In the interest of brevity, this database is not included in the 
appendices. 
The accidents were categorised by causal factors as follows: 
Each event was assigned a primary causal factor. These factors should be 
considered the proximate cause of the event, in the opinion of the author, 
rather than the root cause; in many cases the behaviour of the propulsion 
system was a minor contributing factor, but that aspect of the event has 
nevertheless been cited as the primary causal factor from the propulsion 
system perspective. In the same way, the interpretation of "propulsion 
related accident" has been expanded from previous studies (Sallee, 47) to 
include those where the propulsion system behaved normally but the 
expectation of the flight crew was not met. 
Example: In ACC55, after a low speed, low altitude fly-by during an 
airshow, the flight crew increased engine power to clear trees. The engines 
did not spool up before the airplane hit the trees. There is no suggestion of 
engine malfunction in this instance, but the crew evidently expected a 
faster response than they received from the engines. The "reason" for the 
accident was determined by the French courts to be crew error. 
Causal factors have been assigned according to the following convention 
14(generally consistent with the CAAM study (18)): 
Crew error Improper command given to fully operational engines 
by flight crew 
Propulsion system + crew error Benign failure of an engine 
or instrumentation which would not itself lead to an accident if the 
Min cases where several of the above causal factors were involved, the initiating factor is 
the one assigned. Example, uncontained failure causes undercowl fire and rejected takeoff 
above VI, assigned to "Uncontained" group. 
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appropriate AFM procedure were followed, but which provided the 
opportunity for the crew to respond incorrectly. Example: Rejected 
takeoff above V1. 
Uncontained failure Release of debris at high speed through 
the engine casing or nacelle 
Case rupture Sudden rupture of high pressure casing 
releasing core air. 
Fire Ignition of flammable material within the nacelle, or within 
the engine oil system. Flowpath fires for which casings were not 
designed (HP compressor titanium fires, but not tailpipe fires 
resulting from hot starts etc. ) are included. 
Engine separation Inflight separation of an engine or major engine 
module. 
Cowl separation Inflight separation of nacelle components such 
as cowls, tailcones, spinners etc. 
Reverser Event resulting from thrust reverser malfunction 
Multi-engine Event in which multiple engines cannot deliver 
sufficient thrust (or other required power) for safe flight and landing 
Tailpipe fire Fire confined to the turbine flowpath resulting from 
leaked/ mis-scheduled fuel. 
Thrust control Event resulting from thrust so different from 
that intended by the pilot that aircraft control is jeopardised 
(although technically possible). Some accidents resulted from this 
type of event which could not be otherwise categorised. 
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The distribution of accidents (tabulated in Appendix Q by causal factor was 
as follows: 
CAUSE # ACCIDENTS Yo OF ACCIDENTS 
Uncontained 21 26 
Propulsion + crew is 18 
Fire 9 11 
Thrust control 8 10 
Engine Separation 7 9 
Cowl separation 5 6 
Multi-engine 5 6 
Crew 4 5 
Case rupture 3 4 
Tailpipe fire 2 2 
Reverser 2 2 
other 1 1 
Although casing burnthrough, inability to shut down and toxic cabin bleed 
air are defined as Hazardous by regulatory material, they have never 
resulted in an accident in the high-bypass commercial transport fleet. 
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4.2 Discussion of Individual Failure Effects 
4.2.1 Uncontained Engine Burst 
Current turbofans are designed with the intention that the disk or drum 
forming the structural attachment for compressor or turbine blades should 
never fail. In the event of a disk failure, the engine casings and nacelle are 
likely to be holed by the departing disk fragments, and there is a significant 
risk that high-energy fragments impacting the airframe may cause 
unacceptable system or structural damage. The high energy fragments 
may include released blade fragments exiting the hole in the engine casing 
made by the disk or disk piece. Blade failures may also result in debris 
fragments impacting the airframe, although the energy and number of 
such fragments tends to be somewhat less than in the case of a disk failure 
and the resulting hazard to the airplane is much less. 
Aircraft accident history includes many accidents directly attributable to 
uncontained engine burst, and both the FARs and JARs include the 
requirement to consider uncontained engine failure during safety analysis. 
Advisory material is currently being produced to improve the ground 
rules for such safety analysis. 
Not every uncontained failure results in an accident, even where debris 
produces similar airplane damage; the event progressions from 
uncontained engine failure to accident are presented in appendix E to 
focus attention on specific opportunities for accident prevention. 
Usage of the term 'uncontained failure" is not universally consistent, in 
that the regulations pertaining to engine certification limit it to incidents 
in which a fragment of rotating machinery has made a hole in the engine 
casing, and exited through that hole. No consideration is given to the 
containment capability of the surrounding cowlings, and therefore a 
fragment emerging through a hole in the casing and falling to rest in the 
cowling is considered an uncontained failure by this definition, although 
its energy is relatively low. On the other hand, high-energy pieces of fan- 
blade tip released forward of the plane of the fan, to burst through the 
inner and outer walls of the inlet, are not considered uncontained failures 
because they have not penetrated an engine casing. Another school of 
thought places the boundary for containment at the outer envelope of the 
nacelle, leading to a reversal in classification for the two instances cited 
above. For the purposes of this study, the two usages have been combined, 
to include all failures in which a rotor fragment exits an engine casing or 
the outer envelope of the nacelle. 
The majority of uncontained failures were found to occur in takeoff, 
which involves the highest rotor speeds and high turbomachinery 
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stresses. Approximately 67o' of the uncontained failures resulted in 
accidents, generally involving significant damage to wing and fuselage 
skin by uncontained debris. A detailed statistical study of these events is 
found in Appendix C. 
4.2.2 Single-Engine Failure Likely To Be Accompanied By Pilot Error 
Since all transport category aircraft are capable of safe flight and landing 
with one engine shut down, and since crew training includes engine 
shutdown and subsequent flight, it is not initially obvious that 'single 
engine failure accompanied by crew error' should be designated as a safety- 
related event. Advisory material for airworthiness regulations has even 
specifically stated that a failure with no effect other than engine shutdown 
should be considered Minor, yet reference to the accident record and to the 
conclusions of CAAM shows that failure of an engine is a significant factor 
in precipitating pilot error, and that such a sequence of events is a major 
contributor to propulsion-related accidents. (This issue was recently 
recognised by the FAA who requested the formation of an industry 
working group under the auspices of the AIA, to address crew error 
associated with propulsion failure. ) Before beginning an analysis to 
establish whether a given design will be subject to this type of failure, it is 
essential to establish which kinds of engine failure are most liable to result 
in hazardous pilot error. Detailed analysis of this error type is presented in 
Chapter 6. 
The majority of these accidents took place in takeoff or landing. 
4.2.3 Engine Fire 
The danger of an uncontrolled engine fire is intuitively obvious, since 
many engines are located directly beneath a wing full of aviation fuel. 
Engine fire is one of the top five contributors to propulsion-related 
accidents; study of aircraft accident history produces many instances in 
which engine fire was at least a contributing factor to an accident, and 
airworthiness regulations explicitly require the possibility of engine fire to 
be addressed 
It is extremely difficult to predict with certainty whether a given engine 
failure will inevitably produce a fire or not; much depends upon the 
flammable fluid involved, its temperature and degree of atomisation, the 
air pressure and velocity in the vicinity of the flammable fluid, as well as 
the nature of the ignition source involved. Many engine failures have led 
to IFSDs alone, which might have produced significant fires, had the 
failure occurred on a warmer day or at a different engine power setting. A 
deterministic approach to engine fire is therefore impracticable given the 
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current state of the art. Similarly, the existence of an engine fire does not 
necessarily result in an airplane accident; hazard ratios (i. e. the conditional 
probability of an accident resulting from a given failure condition) are 
presented in table 4.2. 
The majority of engine fires and of resulting accidents were found to occur 
in climb, when undercowl temperatures are highest. Only 57o' of engine 
fires resulted in accidents, and over half the accidents were not direct 
results of fire damage, but involved flight crew or passenger response to 
the fire, such as hard landings or injuries incurred during emergency 
evacuations. A detailed statistical analysis of engine fire events appears in 
C 
4.2.4 Thrust Control Difficulties 
Although no previous studies in the field have specifically identified this 
as an accident cause, review of the record showed eight accidents where 
the thrust produced by the engine was so dramatically different from that 
intended by the pilot that there was great difficulty in maintaining 
directional control. The majority of these cases were associated with 
functionality of thrust reverser systems; unavailability of reversers or high 
forward thrust on one side with full reverse on the other creates a 
significant' turning moment on the airplane, sufficient to cause runway 
departure in several instances. Detailed discussion is presented in 
Appendix C. 
4.2.5 Engine mount failure or component departure 
Failure of the mount of an operating engine, unless complete redundancy 
is provided in the mounting attachments, is likely to produce some degree 
of misalignment in the engine thrust vector. The resulting pivoting about 
the remaining attachment points is likely to lead to their sequential 
failure, until the engine completely breaks away from the airplane 
structure (except for buried installations such as centre tail engines, which 
may remain in place). Separation of the engine from the airframe implies 
the following potential risks: 
The engine may hit the airframe as it departs, along some trajectory 
determined by its initial angular momentum, aerodynamic drag 
and gravity. 
The airframe may suffer some consequential damage as 
comparatively flexible fluid lines, power cables and wiring 
harnesses are torn away by the engine. 
Persons or property on the ground may be injured as the debris falls 
to earth. 
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The above risks from impact damage also apply to smaller components 
departing the engine, such as nacelle cowlings, tailcones and even small 
access panels. 
Airworthiness regulations require the analysis to address the possibility of 
excessive loads being generated by the engine and failing the engine 
mounts; mount failure by other mechanisms such as fatigue is not 
specifically addressed, although in practice, stress analyses do address other 
causes of mount failure besides overload. The departure of "low-energy" 
components from the nacelle is not currently covered by airworthiness 
regulations. 
Although no fatal accidents have yet occurred attributable to loss of an 
engine cowl or similar component in flight, the potential for such an 
outcome is clear. Many cowls and other nacelle components have been 
lost in flight so far, either as a result of some major engine failure, or a 
failure of the cowl itself, or maintenance error in latching the cowls; it 
seems likely that one will eventually do sufficient damage to the airplane 
to result in a hull loss (combined with other adverse factors). The extent 
of the potential hazard depends as much upon the airplane design as upon 
the component involved; for example it might be speculated that a 
composite control surface would be more vulnerable to splintering and in 
flight flutter following impact damage than one constructed of sheet 
metal. 
Engine separations have primarily occurred during climb or landing, at 
which time pre-existing damage to an engine mount system was subjected 
to high loads. All engine separations have resulted in accidents. Detailed 
discussion of engine or cowl separations appears in appendix C. 
4.2.6 Multiple Engine IFSD 
The in-flight shutdown of multiple engines may lead to complete loss of 
thrust (for a twin) or partial loss of thrust, thrust asymmetry, and 
significant reduction in electric power, hydraulic power and bleed air 
available to the airplane. It should be recognised that since all commercial 
transport aircraft are certified to be capable of safe flight and landing with 
one engine shut down, loss of airplane capability is not simply a matter of 
the proportion of engines still operating. Four engined aircraft may not be 
controllable with two engines failed, if they are on the same side, and three 
engined aircraft may not be capable of sustained flight with only one 
engine running. 
It should also be recognised that complete loss of engine power does not 
automatically entail loss of the aircraft, provided that a suitable landing 
site is close at hand, the pilot is sufficiently skilled and circumstances are 
otherwise favourable. Indeed, the loss of airplane services such as 
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hydraulic power may have a more immediately adverse effect than loss of 
airplane thrust; diligent attention to airplane system architecture is 
required to protect the airplane from such adverse consequences. 
Notwithstanding the potential consequences of multiple engine in-flight 
shutdown, the airworthiness regulations do not specifically address this 
hazard. Some individual causes of multiple engine IFSD are addressed by 
specific regulations, although compliance with the regulation should 
generally be considered as reducing, rather than eliminating the potential 
for an IFSD. The following causes of multiple engine IFSD have been 
identified so far; new causes manifest themselves periodically: 
Engine instability 
Maintenance error/ Flight Crew Error 
Birdstrike 
Inclement weather (rain, hail) 
Volcanic ash ingestion 
Flowpath icing 
Fuel icing 
Fuel contamination/ exhaustion 
Common mode component failures (e. g. fuel-nozzle coking) 
Independent failures 
Regulatory attention has recently been directed toward the in-flight restart 
capability of the engines, so that in the event of a multiple IFSD which 
leaves the engine undamaged, there is some confidence in the engine 
capability to start before the airplane reaches the ground. This would have 
no effect upon the accident record, however, since the limited number of 
accidents resulting from multiple-engine IFSDs have been in 
circumstances where the engines were damaged, or external factors 
prevented restart. 
The relatively small number of accidents involving multiple engine 
failures have been equally distributed throughout the flight envelope. 
4.2.7 Propulsion Related Crew Error 
There were 4 accidents resulting from crew error in the high bypass ratio 
fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. One of these occurred in cruise, the 
other three were in landing. It is not possible to discover the incidence of 
crew errors which do not result in accidents, although 6 such were 
identified in Appendix C, all of which occurred in climb. It may be 
hypothesised that takeoff and landing are the phases of flight in which 
there is least time to evaluate a situation carefully and rationally, and in 
which there is the greatest potential for automatic (but inappropriate) 
action sequences to be triggered. It may be argued that there is minimal 
time to re-evaluate the situation and compensate for inappropriate action 
during takeoff and landing, and that crew fatigue may specifically reduce 
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alertness during landing. These considerations are addressed further in 
Chapter 6. 
4.2.8 Casing rupture 
Although there is currently no explicit regulatory requirement to address 
engine casing rupture in powerplant safety analysis, it might reasonably be 
considered a safety-related failure, being accompanied by the release of 
high-pressure, high-temperature core air, and possibly by casing debris 
being propelled at high speed toward the airframe. Several accidents 
(below) have resulted from this type of failure occurring during the take- 
off roll when core air pressures are at their highest; this type of event does 
not, however, make a major contribution to the high bypass fleet accident 
record. 
The majority of case ruptures occurred during takeoff, coincident with 
peak core air pressures. Approximately 30% of such case ruptures resulted 
in accidents. 
4.2.9 Uncommanded in-flight reverse thrust 
In-flight deployment of a thrust reverser immediately increases the 
airplane drag. The results of such in-flight deployment may include the 
following: 
Thrust asymmetry, if the reverser of only one engine deploys. 
Sudden decrease in airplane speed. 
Disturbance of airflow over the adjacent wing (for wing mounted 
engines). 
Very high loads upon reverser and nacelle structure, for high speed 
deployment. 
The severity of the above effects will depend upon the initial flight 
condition, the reverser design and the engine installation in the airframe, 
among other factors. Deployment at low airspeed may permit aircraft 
control and recovery to normal flight (provided sufficient altitude margin 
exists), whereas deployment at high speed may produce irrecoverable loss 
of control. Deployment of a target reverser, typically used to reverse the 
core airflow of a low bypass-ratio jet engine, will produce lesser effects than 
deployment of a cascade-type fan reverser of a high bypass-ratio turbofan. 
Engines located far from the airplane centreline will produce a greater 
turning moment and effective thrust asymmetry than tail mounted 
engines. 
Airworthiness regulations have, until recently, required that engine thrust 
be limited to flight idle during in-flight reverse, and that either the 
airplane should be capable of safe flight and landing with the reverser 
deployed, or that the reverser should be able to be stowed in flight. The 
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regulations are in the process of revision, to more fully account for the 
potential consequences of high speed fan reverser deployment. 
There was only 1 accident resulting from in-flight reverser deployment in 
the high bypass ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. It occurred in 
climb. This accident followed a history of reverser deployment in flight 
without adverse effects on controllability; in fact the FARs required 
demonstration of airplane controllability with a reverser deployed in 
flight. There have been at least eight incidents of reverser deployment in 
flight in the past, and an analysis before the occurrence of ACC62 would 
not have predicted a catastrophic effect. The reasons the previous fleet 
history no longer applied are as follows: 
Some of the previous incidents involved deployment of the turbine 
reverser, which has a relatively small net thrust effect. 
Flight testing of reverser deployment was done at relatively low 
airspeeds, to minimise the resulting damage to the airframe. This 
was a valid approach, to the extent that a likely cause of inadvertent 
reverser deployments in flight was considered to be error by a flight 
crew accustomed to aircraft for which reverser deployment was an 
acceptable means of reducing airspeed before landing. Four of the 
eight reverser deployment incidents identified were in descent or 
landing. 
The location of the reverser with respect to the wing has a greater 
effect on the outcome than had previously been thought. Recent 
aircraft designs have the powerplant closer to the wing than do 
earlier designs (forced, in part, by increasing engine diameters to 
accommodate higher bypass ratio fans). This enables a high-speed 
in-flight reverser deployment to induce stall near the wing root, in 
addition to the drag imposed by a deployed reverser. 
One other accident was attributable to the reverser design, although no 
malfunction was involved. The reverser design did not permit 
deployment during landing until multiple weight-on wheels signals were 
received; when the airplane landed fast and in a non-level attitude, there 
was a significant delay before reverser deployment, which may have 
contributed to the airplane runway departure. The system logic 
contributing to the accident was explicitly intended to prevent in-flight 
deployment. 
4.2.10 EMI Affecting Controls Or Instruments Of Multiple Engines 
Considerable concern has been expressed recently over the potential for 
EMI (electromagnetic interference) affecting aircraft systems, including 
electronic engine controls. The move towards electronic control systems, 
affording much greater flexibility and diagnostic capability than 
hydromechanical controls, while potentially reducing system weight and 
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avoiding some of the reliability problems associated with mechanical 
control cables, has introduced the potential for high-intensity electro- 
magnetic sources such as lightning and military radar installations to 
induce spurious signals in the aircraft wiring. 
The actual threat posed by EMI to engine systems and instrumentation is 
not well-defined. Anomalous airplane behaviour has been attributed to 
man-made EMI in the past, but such attribution is supposition only, since 
no measurements of high EMI intensities were made at the time (nor is it 
reasonable to expect commercial aircraft to carry the appropriate recording 
equipment, to address an environment that may not be encountered 
during the life of an individual aircraft. ) Lightning activity has been 
associated with failure of some cockpit instruments. Arbitrary levels of 
EMI have been designated for use in aircraft electronics design, and the 
design response has generally been to shield and screen the relevant 
components from interference, rather than attempting to predict the 
response of equipment subjected to random interference signals. 
It is conceivable that EMI might affect the electronic engine controls or 
instruments in some way that was hazardously misleading to the flight 
crew. It is probable that all engines would be so affected, since they would 
be of identical design and subject to the same environment, although 
variations in the exact state of the individual EECs (Electronic Engine 
Controls) would permit differing responses. However, a more likely 
response to EMI affecting the engines would be some incorrect scheduling 
of fuel, or incorrect instrument reading, which would be immediately 
apparent to the flight crew. Since it is difficult to envisage them taking any 
useful corrective action under the circumstances, it is fortunate that the 
high-intensity EMI event would be likely to be of short duration (a few 
seconds). 
Lightning strike and HIRF have not resulted in any accidents to the high 
bypass ratio commercial transport fleet, other than ignition of fuel by 
lightning. Lightning has the potential to disrupt the airflow into an 
engine and cause a stall, but the effect is generally local and multiple 
widely separated engines are not affected. HIRF has not yet resulted in a 
significant number of propulsion related incidents in the commercial 
transport fleet. Lightning damage has generally been limited to small 
areas of mechanical damage to engine nacelles. 
4.2.11 Failure Of Airplane Services From Multiple Engines 
Besides supplying thrust, the engines also supply electrical power, 
hydraulic power and bleed air for anti-icing, cabin pressurisation and as a 
further power source, as mentioned above. Although these services are as 
essential to the airplane as thrust, little consideration is generally given to 
engine failures, other than multiple shutdown, depriving the relevant 
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system of engine-derived power. This is in part because system 
architecture provides for considerable redundancy -a twin airplane might 
have three hydraulic systems, pressurised not only by engine-driven 
gearbox pumps, but by air driven pumps using engine or APU bleed-air, as 
well as electrically driven pumps. Common-cause multiple engine 
shutdown therefore forms an obvious weak point in the system, since it 
would reduce hydraulic, electrical and pneumatic capability 
simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, consideration should be given to all common mode failures 
affecting multiple airplane services, whether they result in engine 
IFSD/thrust loss or otherwise. Although no accidents have resulted from 
such failures in the past, review by the propulsion safety analyst may 
avoid future occurrences. 
4.2.12 Inability To Shut Down Engine 
Loss of control of the engine, so that it cannot be shut down at will by the 
flight crew, contains the potential for a number of adverse consequences to 
the aircraft. Directional control could be adversely affected; the flight crew 
would be deprived of the primary means of preventing other hazardous 
engine effects such as the spread of fire or eventual uncontained failure, 
and the psychological effect on the flight crew would be most 
disconcerting. It must be freely acknowledged that the accident record for 
commercial jet transports (non-Soviet) includes no instances of an 
accident resulting from inability to shut down an engine; this may be 
attributable in part to the success of airplane and engine manufacturers in 
complying with the airworthiness regulations requiring the engine to 
retain the capability of being shutdown, and in part to the relative rarity of 
circumstances where shutting down an engine, as opposed to throttling 
back to idle, is crucial to flight safety. 
4.2.13 Toxic Fumes In Cabin Bleed Air 
jet engines extract bleed air for cabin pressurisation from the HP 
compressor, upstream of the normal area of combustion. It is possible for 
engine oil leaks to enter the compressor airflow, and for the oil to begin 
combustion in the compressor as the local air pressure and temperature 
increase. The main toxic products of such combustion are carbon 
monoxide and acrolein. Acrolein is an irritant to the eyes and nose, and 
signals the presence of contaminants in the bleed air long before the 
carbon monoxide could have a deleterious effect upon the health of 
passengers and crew. The normal response is to shut off the bleed from 
the engine responsible, provided it can be identified. The remaining 
engine(s) are capable of providing sufficient bleed air for the cabin. No 
accidents have resulted from toxic bleed air from a turbofan. 
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4.2.14 Casing Burnthrough 
Casing burnthrough can allow a jet of extremely high pressure, high 
temperature air to be directed against firewall boundaries, structure and 
systems. This highly erosive jet can burn or abrade through most barrier 
materials of reasonable thicýness within seconds; fortunately, it dissipates 
by jet mixing with a bypass stream or with ambient air before it can cause 
other than local damage. Provided that flight-critical systems are kept 
away from the engine core and that the engine can be isolated from fuel 
sources even if firewalls are holed locally, this " of event is unlikely to 
result in an accident (and has not, in fact, done so in the high bypass ratio 
fleet. ) 
54 
4.3 Conclusions of Accident Review 
The following failures are historically most likely to result in accidents and 
should be the primary focus of the safety analysis. 
Uncontained engine failures account for 267o of propulsion related 
accidents in the high bypass ratio fleet. 
Propulsion failure accompanied by crew error contributes 18yo of 
propulsion related accidents in the high bypass ratio fleet. 
Thrust control problems contribute 107o' of propulsion related 
accidents in the high bypass ratio fleet. 
Engine fire contributes 11% of propulsion related accidents. 
The airworthiness regulations pertaining to safety analysis direct specific 
attention to three of the above; uncontained failure being cited as 
Hazardous by FAR 33-75, JAR-E 570 and FAR/JAR 25.903, fire being cited by 
FAR 33.75, and thrust in the opposite direction to the pilot's intention 
being cited by JAR-E 570 (this does not address the full spectrum of thrust 
control related accident causes). Since propulsion failure accompanied by 
crew error is not addressed, and thrust control is only partially addressed 
in safety analyses intended to show compliance with airworthiness 
regulations, it seems likely that the analyses are only partially effective in 
predicting or controlling propulsion system safety. The scope of future 
analyses should be expanded to address the major contributors among the 
accident causes cited above. 
It is noteworthy that the likelihood of an accident resulting from an 
incident (the hazard ratio) can be strongly influenced by the details of the 
powerplant installation ( an example would be the chance of a cowl 
separation causing substantial damage to the aircraft). Although the 
hazard ratios shown in Table 4.2 are useful as average (and conservative) 
estimates, it is recommended that future analysts verify their applicability 
by comparing them with the most recent and applicable service experience 
available. 
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EVENT HAZARD 
RATIO 
NOTE 
Uncontained engine failure 0.06 Lower for outboard 
engines 
Propulsion failure + crew 0.004 Higher for twins 
error 
Thrust control Indeterminate 
Fire 0.05-0.025 
Engine separation (engine 1 
running) 
Cowl separation 0.05 Higher for tri-jets 
Multiple engine failure 0.07 
Case rupture 0.3 Engine-model 
dependent 
Crew error Indeterminate Engine-model 
dependent 
Tailpipe fire 0.09 Engine-model 
dependent 
Reverser Indeterminate Airplane configuration 
dependent 
... .. -. 1 
Table 4.2 Estimated Generic Hazard Ratios 
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5.0 Review of Techniques 
5.1 Desired Features 
A number of formal safety analysis techniques's are available for the use of 
the analyst. The following characteristics are considered desirable for any 
technique to be used for Propulsion System Safety Analysis: 
- Identify safety concerns 
- Focusing resources selectively on safety-related failures 
- Credible quantitative forecasts of accident /serious incident rates 
- Generate new information or understanding of weaknesses in a 
design 
- Results repeatable or verifiable by an outside observer 
- Use available data (no dedicated tests required) 
- Produce results early enough to change the design 
5.2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)/ Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA) 
A PHA is simply a catalogue of the potential hazards existing in a system, 
such as high temperature components, compressed gases, flammable 
materials and so forth. An FHA is a high-level review of all of the 
functions performed by a subsystem and the effect of function loss upon 
the system as a whole. It may consider loss of a function, improper 
activation of a function (too fast, too slow, too much, not enough) or 
unwanted activation of a function. It is generally used to establish overall 
safety objectives for each functional failure condition. It is not useful in 
verifying that these objectives have been met. 
Both a PHA and FHA are useful where the analyst is dealing with an 
unfamiliar system for which there is no service experience. The FHA is of 
particular use in establishing the extent to which subsystems are 
interdependent, where a large number of subsystems are being designed by 
semi-independent groups. 
15AImost any of these techniques can be made to work on any system, if sufficient effort is 
involved. However, some techniques are more suited than others to particular problems, as 
discussed below. 
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The FHA is not well suited to addressing active threats (fire, Foreign Object 
Damage, uncontained high energy debris from an engine etc. ) as opposed 
to passive loss of a function. It is difficult to reach agreement on the 
system level effect where non-deterministic failure conditions are being 
considered (for instance, airplane control margins are significantly reduced 
so that an unskilled pilot in bad weather might have difficulty in 
controlling the aircraft). It does not produce quantitative forecasts. 
High bypass ratio turbofan installations have acquired hundreds of 
millions of hours operational experience, involving a large number of 
failure effects, which renders both PHA and FHA unnecessary provided 
that system architectures remain similar to those used in the past. Formal 
analysis is likely to produce little or no new understanding, compared 
with a simple list of propulsion related accidents which have already been 
experienced. 
5.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault tree analysis is a diagrammatic means of establishing all possible 
sequences of failures and combinations of failures which could result in a 
given undesired event or failure effect. The event of concern is selected 
and carefully defined, and the analyst then considers all failures and 
conditions which are both sufficient and necessary for the "top event" to 
occur. The process may be repeated for each failure until a sufficient level 
of detail is reached for the purpose of the analysis. The logic path so 
produced resembles an inverted tree, when presented as a diagram, with a 
single event at the top and many branches leading up to it. If failure rates 
are available for individual failure modes, they may be used to calculate 
the probability of the "top event" using Boolean algebra. Alternatively, 
the fault tree may be left unquantified if overall failure rates are not 
needed or if all component failure rates are similar (as for some electronic 
systems), in which case it may be valuable to derive minimum cut sets (a 
list of the fewest component failures required to produce system failure or 
the top level failure effect under investigation). 
Apparently large and complex trees may in fact be dominated by a few 
crucial failure rates; if there is significant uncertainty regarding the 
numerical values to be used for these failure rates, then the outcome of 
the tree (the probability of the top event) may be called into question. 
Sensitivity analysis may be used to identify such crucial failure rates, so 
that further efforts may be made to reduce their uncertainty. For very 
reliable components, it may not be possible to reduce the uncertainty on 
the failure rate, in which case the sensitivity analysis is unproductive. 
Fault trees are well suited to the analysis of architecturally complex 
systems incorporating considerable redundancy, especially where 
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individual component failure modes are simple and well-established. The 
other major advantage of the fault tree technique is that it limits analysis 
to those failures which are of concern, rather than requiring consideration 
of every possible failure. An example of the benefit of this approach 
would be in considering externally inflicted damage on a wire harness. 
Evaluation of the results of all possible combinations of wires shorting to 
each other and shorting to ground would be a very laborious task for more 
than a few wires, but by considering the fault trees for all undesired events, 
it may be easily determined which wires in the harness could contribute to 
the "top events". Damage to the remaining wires can be disregarded. 
Architecturally simple systems derive little benefit from fault tree analysis. 
A fault tree for a series system contains the same information as a simple 
list of component (or subsystem) failures, presented in a diagrammatic 
form. It is notable that in the whole history of the high bypass fleet, no 
propulsion-related accident has been attributed to a combination of 
independent failures in multiple systems (Chapter 4, above). It is therefore 
questionable whether analyses need cover independent inter-system 
failure combinations. It is also difficult to address technically complex 
failure modes within a fault tree, especially a quantified fault tree. For 
instance, if a medium sized bird is ingested by an engine, the resulting 
damage can vary considerably,, even if all known external factors remain 
the same (same aircraft speed, engine speed, bird species, engine design 
and construction etc. ). Attempting to construct a fault tree including 
turbofan damage from birdstrike would therefore include some 
empirically based inhibit gates to account for the fact that damage is 
sometimes significant and sometimes minimal, depending on random 
variables such as the bird attitude at impact and the number of fan blades 
struck by the bird. 
Fault tree analysis is useful for propulsion sub-systems where there is 
some redundancy, such as controls systems and thrust reverser systems. 
Much of propulsion system architecture is series systems, and although 
FrA may be used to provide visibility of failure propagation to a top event, 
it is unlikely to provide new insight into system operation. If fault tree 
analysis is used, it is essential that the failure rates used in propulsion 
system FTAs be verified and their applicability to the specific environment 
in question be confirmed. It is also essential to verify that contributing 
failures in the fault tree are truly independent,. and that no common cause 
or cascading failures will bypass apparent redundancy in the design. 
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5.4 Reliability Block Diagrams 
A reliability block diagram presents the functional relationships between 
components of a system, with a separate diagram for each function. It 
enables the analyst to see which component failures would affect 
functionality, and to calculate system failure probabilities. Since 
mechanical systems do not make great use of redundancy, reliability block 
diagrams may become merely a component list drawn in series for 
mechanical systems (23). 
5.5 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis considers each component in a sub- 
system in turn, and assesses the failure modes of that component, the 
effect upon the system of each mode, and (sometimes) the probability of 
each failure mode and the means which would be used to detect and/or 
preclude failure. The results are presented as a table. 
An FMEA is the most comprehensive (and most labour-intensive) means 
available of addressing subsystem failures. It is well suited to subsystems 
with simple architecture, and preferably with simple failure modes (valve 
fails open, closed, part-closed). 
FMEAs address single failures. Systems incorporating significant 
redundancy (such as many electronic systems) are not easily analysed by 
FMEA, since most component failures will be concluded to have a system- 
level effect of "Loss of redundancy". If there is no means of detecting the 
failure, the system may continue to operate in a degraded state until 
sufficient failures have accumulated to cause a system-level malfunction - 
one not predicted by the FMEA. Systems with complex failure 
progressions are not easily addressed within the limited space of a FMEA 
(cf. the bird ingestion example above). It may be difficult to translate the 
results of a subsystem FMEA to the system level, since the FMEA is often 
conducted from the component viewpoint rather than the functional 
viewpoint, and generally a system-level analysis requires information on 
how subsystem functions change in the event of failure, and not on the 
fate of subsystem components. 
Although a FMEA complies exactly with the wording of the joint 
Airworthiness regulations relating to engine safety analysis, it is not the 
most effective means of conducting a propulsion system safety analysis. It 
is an excellent way to assess a completely new and unprecedented 
mechanical system, to find the effect of each potential component failure. 
Current turbofan designs have accrued sufficient service experience that a 
FMEA on the entire propulsion system is unlikely to produce new 
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information, if the design bears any relation to those that have gone 
before. 16 
5.6 Simulation 
Computer simulation (such as Monte Carlo assessment or Markov 
analysis) can be used to assess the effects of individual component failures 
or degradations on very complex subsystems, by modelling the subsystem 
behaviour over time with random component failures introduced to 
simulate service experience. If a large number of trial runs are made, the 
results can be combined to give a probabilistic model of system behaviour, 
even if the system is too complex to be modelled analytically. The effects 
of different inspection and repair intervals may easily be studied, as may 
the probability of being in any given degraded state after a given time 
interval. 
Although computer simulation allows systems to be modelled which 
could not otherwise be assessed, it is at the cost of losing visibility of the 
analytical process. It is difficult to justify or explain the results of such 
simulation if they are other than as generally expected. Similarly, it may 
be difficult to identify the components or design features having the most 
influence upon the outcome. 
Markov analysis is widely used for modelling the behaviour of Electronic 
Engine Controls and assessing which degraded states should be permitted 
under Time-Limited Dispatch. Where component failures become 
immediately obvious, as in many mechanical systems, there is little to be 
gained from computer simulation safety analysis. 
5.7 Failure Mode and Effects Summary (FMES) 
A FMES presents sub-system functional failure conditions in a tabular 
form, relating them to the system level effect. It provides a succinct, easily 
comprehended system-level summary of the information found in 
FMEAs, omitting those failures which have no system-level effect. The 
FMES may be based on individual FMEAs, or it may be possible to prepare 
the FMES directly. 
The IMES has some of the weak points of the FMEA. It deals with 
individual functional failures. Combinations of functional failures cannot 
16This statement is not intended to imply that every possible failure (and airplane level 
effect) which could take place has already done so, new failures will occur in the future. 
However, all of the failures which could obviously occur, the failures which an analyst 
could be expected to foresee, have either occurred in service or are sufficiently unlikely 
(because they have not yet occurred) that the credibility of the analysis would be 
questioned if they were included. 
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be readily addressed by this format. It is difficult to reach agreement on the 
system level effect where non-deterministic failure conditions are being 
considered (safety margins are reduced). 
The IMES is a good means of communicating propulsion system 
functionality to the airframe-level analysis (especially if each table is 
accompanied by a narrative explaining assumptions, approximations and 
the origins of failure rates). It provides little additional insight into the 
operation of the propulsion system itself, or the safety of the installation 
5.8 Common Cause Failure Analysis Methods 
Zonal Safety Analysis entails reviewing the systems and components 
within and immediately adjacent to a given spatial region. A local source 
of damage may be hypothesised (high pressure air leak, fire, birdstrike etc. ) 
and the system-level effects of such damage can then be evaluated. If the 
results are considered unacceptable, subsystems may be re-routed or means 
to reduce local damage may be introduced. The use of zonal analysis 
presupposes that subsystem relocation is possible. It is generally the case 
for propulsion systems that subsystem location cannot be changed or that 
the alternate location is very close to the original one, or subject to similar 
threats as the original one. 
There are individual cases involving very localised threats where zonal 
analysis has been used (formally or informally) to relocate systems to a 
more sheltered region (for instance, in reducing the risk of cross-engine 
debris for wing-mounted engines, or for reducing the risk of fuel leaks and 
fire in the event of an engine nacelle scraping the ground in a runway 
departure). These have not, however, identified common-cause failures 
which may be avoided by system relocation17. Zonal safety analysis should 
be used as an adjunct to fault tree analysis, to confirm that system 
redundancy is not violated by local threats. 
Particular Risks Analysis entails the review of a specific cause of common- 
cause failure and assessment of the system-wide effects of that risk (e. g. 
volcanic ash ingestion). The effectiveness of this approach depends upon 
firstly, identifying all the particular risks which should be considered, and 
secondly, validating the assumptions previously made regarding the 
severity of that risk. Service experience is likely to prove invaluable in 
both of these steps. In practice, many particular risks have regulatory 
requirements associated with them for propulsion system certification. 
These do not provide complete protection against that risk,, but set a 
minifnum standard which has been shown to be generally acceptable and 
achievable. This minimum standard is reviewed at intervals, and may be 
made more stringent for new models as a result of undesired service 
17The engine itself, and its safe shutdown, form a much more likely common cause for 
multiple subsystem losses of function in the propulsion system. 
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experience with existing models. Complete protection against particular 
risks is not generally within the state of the art (for instance,, it is not 
currently feasible for every engine to ingest a 20 pound goose and to 
continue to develop enough power for safe flight and landing). The 
analyst should spend time hypothesising particular risks which are not yet 
covered by regulatory material, to establish whether their risk may be 
mitigated before they can produce their first accident. 
5.9 Alternative Analysis Techniques 
When dealing with extremely rare events, particularly in the absence of 
generally agreed and validated failure rates, the utility of highly structured 
analysis techniques proceeding from first principles becomes questionable. 
Such techniques are useful in identifying accident sequences which could 
reasonably be expected to occur. They are less successful in those cases 
where unlikely combinations of circumstances, including (but not limited 
to) human error, result in one-of-a-kind accidents. For instance, a FMEA 
(or fault tree) might predict failure of a fan blade. It would not be likely to 
predict that the pilot would shut down the wrong engine, contrary to the 
evidence of flight deck instruments. Prediction that the damaged engine 
vibration would coincidentally abate, so deceiving the crew into believing 
they had taken correct action, and that the damaged engine would then fail 
to produce power within minutes from landing (but at too low an altitude 
to allow recovery of the shut down engine) would strain the bounds of 
credibility; yet this is precisely the sequence of events producing ACC53. 
There are many examples of accidents resulting from apparently non- 
threatening malfunctions which occur from time to time, usually without 
affecting safety, including accident numbers 1,7,22,32,39,41,44,45,46,52, 
54,57,60,61,65,68,70,74,75,76. This major contribution is not addressed 
by regulatory or advisory material, nor do current analyses address it. 
Alternate analysis techniques may focus upon actual service experience to 
indicate areas of high risk, rather than attempting to proceed from first 
principles and to be fully comprehensive. Accident precursor analysis, for 
example, identifies failure combinations which are necessary (but not 
sufficient) for an accident, and monitors how frequently these occur in 
service. Accident rates may be derived from this data with reasonable 
confidence. 's 
Two completely new approaches were derived during this research, both 
of which are focused upon gaining a better understanding of service data 
so that predictions could be made. Details of the two new techniques, 
referred to as Event Sequence Modelling and of Crew Error Modelling are 
presented below. 
18This approach is clearly most suitable for redundant systems or those with multiple 
levels of warnings and safeguards. 
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The conclusion must be drawn that emphasis on a structured analysis 
reviewing combinations of failures is less useful than a dual approach of 
firstly concentrating on high reliability in all systems and the prevention 
of individual failures which could in themselves, or in conjunction with 
inappropriate crew response, result in an accident, and secondly, assessing 
the vulnerability of the airplane to an accident in the event of the failure 
occurring. 
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6.0 ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO PROPULSION SYSTEM SAFETY 
ANALYSIS 
6.1 Areas to be Investigated 
Three specific areas of safety analysis were initially identified as offering 
significant opportunities for improvement: 
a) Current airworthiness regulations either require all possible failure 
modes to be addressed GARs) or certain specific failure modes which were 
envisaged as being particularly hazardous at the advent of commercial jet 
transportation. A review of the accident record to establish which 
propulsion system related failures present the greatest risk to the airframe 
would enable the safety analysis to focus on major contributing factors. 
b) It has been acknowledged that the majority of accidents are caused by a 
combination of circumstances rather than a single event. Current safety 
analysis techniques generally focus upon hardware failures (although both 
fault trees and FMEAs are capable of documenting external circumstances). 
A detailed review of accident sequences, identifying critical weaknesses 
which enable the accident sequence to propagate in several instances (or 
which led to the outcome of the accident being more severe), offered an 
opportunity to add depth to existing analysis techniques and to identify 
multiple opportunities in each case to improve safety. 
c) The baseline study demonstrated a significant shortfall in the prediction 
of quantitative failure rates. A means of predicting failure rates at entry 
into service was sought, both at the component level and at the overall 
propulsion system level. 
6.2 Prioritising The Effects To Be Considered By Safety Analysis 
Definition of the types of events which should be considered by a safety 
analysis presents considerable grounds for discussion. It could be argued 
that any engine failure, no matter how minor, has the potential to reduce 
airframe safety by some increment, as has any aspect of the propulsion 
system design which might lead to inappropriate flight crew or 
maintenance crew action. Such a broad definition of "Safety-related 
Failure" would render the task of both safety analyst and designer 
impossible, and would lead to concealment of key flight-safety issues by a 
morass of minor problems which make a negligible contribution to 
propulsion system risk. Consideration of the in-flight shutdown of an 
engine (IFSD) would include many failures with no effect upon safety (instrumentation failures leading to a precautionary shutdown) whilst 
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neglecting other events producing considerable cause for concern 
(multiple engine malfunction, high speed rejected take-off). 
However, it is clear that performance of a safety analysis to address only 
the hazards identified by airworthiness regulations such as FAR 33.75 
affords too limited a perspective upon the safety of the system of engines, 
airframe and flight crew. Recent debate by international committees of 
experts from the industry and the regulatory authorities has disclosed that 
the "Classical" issues of uncontained engine failure and engine fire may 
pose no greater threat to airplane safety than events such as failure of a 
single engine accompanied by crew error (18). A detailed review of 
propulsion-related accidents and their causes was presented in Chapter 4 
illustrating this point. 
Review of the accident record strongly suggests that the safety analysis 
should focus upon those failure types which have contributed to a large 
proportion of propulsion-related accidents in the past, namely; 
uncontained failures, propulsion system failure accompanied by crew 
error, engine or component separation, thrust control and fire. These five 
failure types account for 73Yo of all propulsion related accidents in the 
high-bypass ratio fleet. 
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6.3 Failure Progressions And Opportunities For Accident Prevention 
The majority of complex systems incorporate a series of defences-in-depth 
(technical, procedural or organisational) intended to prevent a mistake or 
a malfunction, of itself, resulting in a system failure or in an accident 
(Maurino et al, 56). In the event of an accident, every one of these defences 
has been bypassed or negated. Each accident is considered to offer multiple 
opportunities for prevention, in the robustness of the hardware design, in 
system architecture or in emergency procedures. It was hypothesised that a 
series of detailed reviews of the sequence of events leading up to the 
accidents might identify significant weak points in these defences, either as 
recurrent patterns of cause and effect, or conversely as sequences with 
similar originating events but very different outcomes. 
The utility of this novel approach was tested on the accidents resulting 
from uncontained engine failures; although future work could clearly 
address other accident categories. Since this research is primarily focused 
on safety assessment of the propulsion system of the airplane, and the 
intent of this study is to assess the connection between a hardware failure 
and loss of safe flight, organisational issues were not addressed in the 
assessment of failure progressions (it is acknowledged that organisational 
issues may provide valuable opportunities for safety improvement, but 
they lie outside the scope of this research). The initial engine hardware 
failure was generally taken as given and the study directed towards means 
of preventing the initial failure from propagating into an accident, or of 
reducing the accident severity. It should be noted that the failure of rotor 
disks, rather than smaller rotating parts, was the primary cause of these 
accidents. 
Event sequence sheets were developed for each accident reviewed (the 
author is not aware of this specific technique having been used before). 
The sequence of events was tabulated, including all events which were 
considered material to the progression of the accident chain, together with 
ways in which the chain could have been interrupted at each point. 
Examples of event sequence sheets are presented in Appendix D. The 
event sequence sheets were prepared with specific reference to those 
events which made the accident dangerous, and to considering means 
which would mitigate the hazard 
The results of the event sequence analysis are as follows: 16 accidents were 
analysed, and 31 separate means of reducing the likelihood of an accident 
in the event of an uncontained failure were identified. The majority of 
these each applied only to a single accident, and would not, therefore, 
significantly impact the overall accident risk if implemented. Seven of the 
means of mitigating the risk applied to more than one accident,. and are 
discussed in more detail below. 
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An improved debris trajectory model for uncontained failures, as in 
the recently issued AC20-128 and the associated User's Manual, 
would enable system separation and local shielding or armour for 
critical systems in the plane of the engine turbine disks. This would 
have significantly reduced the system damage and concomitantly 
maintained margins of safety for seven of the 16 accidents, 
including two fatal accidents (ACC 4,23,24,29,56,66,84). 
Improved wingskin impact-toughness, at least for the lower surface 
of the wing might reduce local damage and resultant repair cost for 
eight of the sixteen accidents. Major increases in wingskin thickness 
might have avoided fuel leaks from the wing tanks in four out of 
five accidents involving tank penetration. However, the weight 
penalties associated with this approach would be very significant, 
since disk fragment energy levels are so high. 
A credible means of monitoring engine vibration in real-time, 
together with the use of crew procedures to reduce power and 
monitor other parameters in the event of high vibration, could 
have prevented three of the sixteen accidents (ACC 23,24,29). 
Assessment of wing designs for residual lift with a section of leading 
edge destroyed could have improved safety margins for two of the 
sixteen accidents (ACC 2,4). 
Enhanced simulator training for flight crews of engine failure at V1 
could have reduced the likelihood of two of the accidents19. These 
accidents resulted from an incorrect flight crew decision to reject the 
takeoff above V1, occasioned by an uncontained engine failure 
which was, in itself, benign (ACC 8,33). 
Improved simulator training for flight crews in the accommodation 
of an uncontained engine failure with concomitant secondary 
damage (multiple systems failures, asymmetric thrust) and 
physically distressing symptoms (loud noise, smoke, vibration) 
could have enabled flight crews to follow correct emergency 
procedures in two of the sixteen accidents, considerably improving 
safety margins (ACC 4,29). 
19The NTSB recommendations for one accident include a clear indication of V1. All 
transport aircraft include provision for reference markers or "bugs" to be set before takeoff, 
indicating V1, V2 and Vr. These may be set manually or automatically according to the 
flight deck design. It is the task of one of the flight crew to monitor airspeed and to ca II 
Wi", "W", "V2" for all takeoffs. It is not clear how crew awareness of V1 can be improved 
within the flightdeck. Distance-remaining markers on the runway might be of assistance in 
enabling better judgment of the consequences of a high-speed rejected takeoff. 
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It is estimated that use of the above means of mitigation would result in a 
257o reduction in the overall accident rate attributable to uncontained 
engine failures. Of the three accidents which resulted in fatalities or a hull 
loss, two involved significant systems damage caused by uncontained 
debris, and the risk could therefore have been mitigated by appropriate 
systems design. The remaining accident was a hull loss because fuel 
leaked from shrapnel holes in the wing tanks and ignited. Means to 
prevent fuel leaks from the tanks could possibly have avoided this event, 
although the associated weight penalty is likely to limit the practicability of 
this approach. 
The limited success of this "defences in depth" approach may be attributed 
to the fact that the majority of the accidents were so classified because of 
the cost of repairing the shrapnel punctures in the airplane resulting 
directly from the uncontained event, rather than from reduced safety 
margins, loss of life or injury. These offered little opportunity for 
prevention, but the safety margins for the passengers and crew could have 
been enhanced substantially by use of the above means of mitigation. 
Accident causes such as fire, involving a series of safeguards which have 
been bypassed or negated, might be more productively assessed by this 
means of analysis. 
Detailed review of event progressions for the uncontained accidents 
resolved an anomaly which had been uncovered in Chapter 4. It has been 
claimed that the airplane risk of an accident resulting from an 
uncontained failure is proportional to the number of engines. The 
accident review of Chapter 4 showed that this is not the case; the accident 
rates for four-engined aircraft are slightly lower than for three engined or 
twin aircraft. The event progressions highlight the fact that most of the 
accidents resulting from uncontained failures were classified as such 
because the airframe incurred substantial damage involving local 
penetrations of wing, stabiliser or fuselage skin, together with engine and 
local pylon damage. In some cases, there was multiple system damage 
where systems clustered together in the wing root or in the tail. It became 
apparent that the outboard engines of a four-engined airplane have a 
greatly reduced chance of hitting the fuselage, the tail, or another engine. 
It might therefore be expected that'an outboard engine would have a 
smaller chance of causing an accident in the event of an uncontained 
failure. Review of the accident and incident records confirmed this 
hypothesis; although uncontained incidents for the 747 were equally 
distributed between inboard and outboard engines, eight of the nine 
accidents resulting from uncontained failure on the 747 involved inboard 
engines. 
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6.4 Crew Error Modelling 
6.4.1 Current State Of The Art 
The review of the historical accident record for high bypass ratio engines 
powering transport aircraft, undertaken in Chapter 4, shows that crew 
error or propulsion system failure resulting in crew error is one of the 
major contributors to the propulsion related accident rate. It accounts for 
over 207o of propulsion-related accidents, corresponding to an accident rate 
of 4E-8/engine hour or 1.14E-7/flight hour fleet wide. Currently there is 
no propulsion-related crew error model generally available to assess the 
likelihood of crew error for one propulsion system compared to another, 
or to improve propulsion system design and operation by reducing the 
potential for crew error. There has been a recent increase in interest in the 
role of crew error within the industry, but no structured analysis of service 
experience has been published. 
Recent work on the nature of human error (57) has pointed out the fallacy 
of assuming crew error to be due to the culpability of specific individuals; 
it is not reasonable to require perfection in flight crew performance, nor is 
it productive to urge them to be careful .... the desire to avoid participating in an accident is a powerful incentive for them to exercise as much skill 
and care as they are capable of doing on a day-in, day-out basis. A safety 
analysis should, therefore, assume that crew error will occur, based upon 
the most frequent types of error encountered in service and upon 
modifications in design or procedures intended to reduce the likelihood of 
error. 
6.4.2 Crew Error Study 
A study was initiated as part of this research project, to review those 
propulsion-related accidents in which crew error had played a major part; 
some additional accidents from the low bypass/ turboprop fleet and some 
serious incidents were also included, to gain as much information about 
crew performance as possible. The intent of the analysis was to establish 
what kinds of crew error were most significant contributors to the 
propulsion-related accident record and what propulsion system features 
would be of material assistance in preventing crew error. 
Discussion of the study is limited to those aspects which are relevant to the 
safety analysis of propulsion systems. More general results are recorded in 
Appendix E, together with an example of a detailed worksheet. Several 
distinct causal groups emerged from the study. These may be treated as 'normal' crew errors - that is,, they are not isolated instances but form 
credible indicators of a potential for future errors, although the majority of 
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crews will not make these particular errors on the majority of occasions. A 
more comprehensive study would probably identify more causal groups. 
Each of these groups offers a significant opportunity for examining factors 
in design and procedures which may predispose crews to error. 
6.4.3 Results Of Study 
The most significant contributors to the propulsion related crew error 
accident rate were2O: 
1) Rejected takeoff after V1; 6 events, five of which were accidents 
(ACC 13,22,47,52,76, ASRS95408). Each of these involved a 
compressor stall or loud noise above V1, accompanied in some 
instances by tactile vibration on the flight deck (in one case the 
vibration was so severe that the crew were unable to read flight deck 
instruments). Studies of crew error (58) indicate that unfamiliar 
engine noise and vibration is likely to result in rejected takeoffs 
after V1, despite training and published procedures to the contrary. 
Crew simulator training frequently does not fully represent such 
events: the crew apparently experience doubts over the aircraft 
airworthiness when exposed to physically disturbing and novel 
symptoms and to multiple parameter changes indicating engine 
failure. 4 
2) Asymmetric thrust which was not appropriately compensated for 
by the flight crew; 13 events, five of which were accidents (ACC 22, 
39,83, TPROP1, TPROP2, ASRS79941,228930,187833,69231,210629, 
172754,289651,192977). The majority of the incidents occurred early 
in the takeoff roll, as one engine spooled up to takeoff power more 
slowly than the other(s) during a rolling takeoff manoeuvre. There 
appeared to be a significant degree of confusion over the best means 
to compensate for asymmetric thrust; several pilots attempted to use 
the rudder for directional control early in the takeoff roll, at which 
point it has negligible authority. Conversely, at least one accident in 
flight was associated with a lack of awareness that the rudder must 
be used to adequately compensate for an engine-out situation at high airspeeds (for wing mounted propulsion systems), even 
though the flight crew was fully aware that one engine was 
producing minimal thrust. 
3) Conflict between the autothrottle or autopilot thrust control 
commands and the intent of the flight crew; 5 events of which three 
were accidents (in two accidents, the pilot attempted to land while 
20Some events included more than one scenario, such as high speed rejected takeoff 
followed by asymmetric thrust and loss of directional control). 
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the autothrottle attempted a go-around). (ACC34,83,86, 
ASRS262211,194115) 
4) Propulsion system failure and crew distraction leading to a 
procedural violation (altitude deviation or loss of separation 
between aircraft); 7 events, none of which were accidents (ASRS 
252461,208817,209170,152464,98530,123465, INC751). 
5) Inadvertent engine shutdown in flight; 4 events, none of which 
were accidents (INC317,397,808, ASRS235107). 
6.4.4 Crew Error In New Designs 
The historical propulsion-related accident rate for aircraft powered by high 
bypass ratio engines is 5.9E-7/flight hour, of which 1.1413-7/flight hour is 
judged to result directly from crew error in operating propulsion systems 
or from crew error in coping with the results of inherently non- 
catastrophic propulsion system malfunction. The propulsion system 
safety analysis should take account of this historical rate, but credit should 
be allowed for design features, changes in procedures or other 
compensating factors which would reduce the propensity for the crew 
error identified in the study. At the same time, the new features should be 
assessed critically to ascertain whether they may introduce the potential for 
new crew errors. 21 
The results strongly suggest that rejected takeoff above V1, crew response 
to asymmetric thrust, and conflicts between automatic thrust control 
systems and the intent of the pilot are key areas in the field of propulsion 
system safety and crew error. Examples of features which might 
reasonably be expected to reduce the crew error related propulsion accident 
rate, and the appropriate credit for each, are given below. These are not 
the only features which could reduce the accident rate. 
Means to indicate engine failure (engine fail light/ message) 
An engine failure indication would be unlikely to reduce the accident rate 
from rejected takeoffs above V1, since the go/no go decision appears to be 
heavily influenced by tactile and audible symptoms rather than by engine 
instrumentation. There were three events where an engine fail indication 
might have assisted the crew. In one case the flight crew said they did not 
know which engine had failed. In another, they said they thought both 
engines had failed. In one instance, they believed a wheel had failed when 
21For example, one early accident resulted from deployment of thrust reversers in flight by 
the flight crew. Later airplane models included features in the reverser control logic to 
inhibit in flight deployment. A more recent accident resulted in part from delayed 
deployment of reversers and a runway overrun, because of the said inhibiting features. 
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the engine was experiencing high vibration but had not failed. However, 
it is questionable that an engine fail indication would have led them to 
follow their training and published procedures in the face of misplaced 
concern over the airplane's ability to fly. 
Means to indicate engine failure might possibly be of assistance in 
preventing events associated with asymmetric thrust. Three of the 
accidents involving asymmetric thrust had an engine at idle, and in each 
case the flight crew believed the engine to have failed or to be in the 
process of failure. Following published procedures, observing and 
understanding all of the engine indications in each case would have 
shown this belief to be incorrect. It is possible, but not likely, that the 
absence of an "engine fail" indication would have led them to behave 
differently. Of the 8 incidents involving asymmetric thrust, five resulted 
from slow spool-up from idle. Two resulted from high forward power on 
one engine and reverse on another. One resulted from a misperception 
that a high landing speed would be advantageous if the crew needed to 
execute a go-around with an engine out. Since no engine failures were 
involved, an engine fail light would not have prevented any of these 
incidents. 
An engine failure indication would not have been effective for the five 
events involving autothrottle/autopilot command in conflict with the 
pilot's intent. An engine fail light based on engine speed or thrust alone 
would not have affected the outcome of the accident where the pilot shut 
down the wrong engine, since the "Failed" engine was still developing 
significant thrust. 
It is concluded that an indication of engine failure might reasonably have 
avoided two of the high speed rejected takeoffs. Table 6.4 assigns credit to 
such means. 
A more sophisticated system of real-time engine health monitoring might 
be capable of indicating that an engine was in the process of failing but 
would last for a few more minutes (for some failure progressions, at least). 
This would be of considerable value in removing some of the time 
pressure from the flight crew and offering the opportunity for error 
recovery after an incorrect decision. The opportunity for error recovery 
appears a significant factor in determining the outcome of an event. 
Means to indicate autothrottle/autopilot mode and specifically to 
announce a go-around 
The primary flight display for modern transport aircraft indicates the 
autothrottle mode in the top left hand comer, by such codes as SPD, THR 
and so forth. The meaning of the code may be altered by the flight mode, denoted by roll and pitch mode codes on the primary flight display. In 
some aircraft, including one of those involved in a "control mode" 
accident, changes in the autothrottle or flight director modes are highlighted by a green or amber box around the mode code. It has been 
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noted by the FAA Human Factors Team that "Mode changes can easily be 
missed, even when additional cues are provided-the same mode 
annunciation may represent a different airplane state or behaviour in 
different situations. " (59). It appears that more specific and noticeable 
means to announce a go-around might have prevented the two accidents 
in which the pilot attempted to land while the autothrottle attempted a go- 
around. It is possible that annunciation of mode might have also have 
prevented one or both of the incidents in which autopilot function was 
not as intended (operating inadvertently,, or vice versa). Table 6.4 assigns 
credit to such means. 
Improved training of engine failure during takeoff above V1 
There have been sufficient accidents resulting from high speed rejected 
takeoffs to make this a high priority in prevention of accidents, although 
generally speaking designing out errors is preferable to addressing them by 
procedural means. It is of particular importance that this appears to be a 
rule-based error, in which the flight crew are aware of the correct 
procedure and the significance of V1, but their perception of the risk of 
becoming airborne is such that they elect to reject the takeoff. 22 Flight 
simulators do not give a faithful representation of the full range of 
somewhat perturbing symptoms likely to be encountered during such an 
engine failure. For example, ingestion of a large bird above V1 might be 
accompanied by a loud bang or series of bangs as the engine stalled, 
vibration (indicated and tactile) from fanblade damage and resulting 
unbalance, and a foul smell and smoke as burned organic material entered 
the flight deck air supply. A typical simulator currently represents this 
event as a noise and spool down of engine parameters. 
It is concluded that inclusion of a realistic simulation of engine stall above 
V1 in crew training (including noises and tactile vibration) should be 
credited with a substantial reduction in the accident rate as shown in Table 
6.4. Further emphasis in recurrent training could increase this to the 
theoretical maximum of 3.413-8, but such airline-centred issues would be 
outside the scope of the initial propulsion system safety analysis. 
22There has been only one instance in the high bypass ratio fleet of an accident resulting from continuing the takeoff after an engine failure above V1. In the case of ACC18, the 
engine separation began just before rotation (a crew member indicated concern one second before rotation). It is possible that a decision to reject the takeoff at this point would have 
resulted in a less severe takeoff with less loss of life, but this point cannot be established definitively. 
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Means to avoid all engines being shut down in flight 
Of the four inadvertent shutdown events, three involved complete loss of 
engine thrust, with the concomitant risk of greatly reduced hydraulic and 
electrical capability and the need for emergency starting procedures. It 
would be reasonable to require a non-routine action in order to shut down 
the last remaining engine in flight (although that capability should be 
retained). The potential reduction in the accident rate from such a feature 
(approximately 5E-9/flight hour) should be balanced against the loss of 
architectural isolation between propulsion systems which has hitherto 
been a key feature in preventing common mode failures, and against the 
increase in complexity in what is currently a simple and robust electro- 
mechanical system. 
Means to clearly annunciate asymmetric thrust 
A number of incidents were attributable to one engine spooling up more 
slowly than the other(s) from a low power setting. In some cases, the 
pilots clearly did not understand the reason for the airplane yaw. An 
indication of significant asymmetric thrust could have been of significant 
assistance in these cases. It is unlikely that this feature would have 
prevented any accidents. In each of these accidents, the crew were aware 
that one engine was producing low thrust, but did not take appropriate 
measures to minimise drag/ maintain directional control. Credit for a 
reduction in the accident rate is proposed in Table 6.4. A more proactive 
means than annunciation might be to match engine thrusts at a given 
throttle setting. This approach would seriously impair propulsion system 
isolation, leading to a major difficulty in the event of an engine failure; it 
is therefore not recommended at this time. 
Means tq prevent high forward thrust on one engine while another is in 
reverse 
This feature would be likely to have prevented one accident and three 
incidents. Several accidents unrelated to crew error could also have been 
avoided by this means. However, it has the potential to reduce 
architectural isolation between propulsion systems, and would lead to 
significant aircraft control problems in the event of inadvertent thrust 
reverser deployment. It is therefore not recommended. 
Means to deploy reversers promptly during a soft landing 
Some current thrust reverser logic includes the requirement for multiple 
squat switches in the landing gear to be closed before the reversers can 
deploy (to avoid deployment in flight). In the event of a soft landing, 
possibly with some aircraft bank, the airplane may proceed for some 
considerable distance down the runway before reversers can deploy. This has led to one accident. While it is desirable to have multiple inhibits on deployment, it may be possible to use other means more tolerant of 
airplane attitude (such as any squat switch in combination with an 
appropriate radio-altimeter-derived altitude of less than 10 feet AGQ. 
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Such means could be credited with an accident rate reduction of 5E-9/flight 
hour. 
6.4.5 Summary of Crew Error Study 
The accident rate attributable to crew error in handling propulsion systems 
(failed and unfailed) is 1.14E-7/ airplane flight hour, averaged across the 
high bypass ratio fleet. Major contributors to this rate are rejected takeoffs 
above V1, errors in dealing with asymmetric thrust, and conflicts between 
the crew intent and the commands of the autothrottle/autopilot. 
The following features may substantially reduce this rate: 
9 Engine fail light 
Autothrottle/autopilot mode indication 
e Improved training of engine failure above V1 
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6.5 A Novel Approach to Predicting Failure Rates 
6.5.1 Engine-Level Failure Rates 
Realistic and consistent predictions of component failure rates are of some 
importance in the propulsion system safety assessment, enabling the 
comparison of relative risks and assisting in design evaluation. The high 
integrity and reliability of aircraft propulsion system components generally 
precludes sufficient testing to establish a failure distribution by 
conventional means; alternative methods of predicting failure 
distribution were sought. Traditional approaches to failure rate prediction 
(published rates with technological severity factors) do not consider the 
evolution of technology as a product matures (Collas, 60). Propulsion 
system technology has improved considerably over the last 25 years to give 
a 10-fold reduction in IFSD rates (1); failure rate predictions should be able 
to take this into account by considering reliability growth. 
Traditional reliability growth models are generally used during the 
development phase of a project, and incorporate assumptions which are 
unrepresentative of products after entry into service, such as immediate 
incorporation of design improvement after a failure, and a homogeneous 
population of components in operation. However, Collas has advocated 
the use of the reliability- growth approach throughout the product life cycle 
(for mainframe computers), and discusses the analysis of non- 
homogeneous data collected from models of different ages and vintages, 
including the aggregate effects of component reliability growth, 
improvements in manufacturing processes and evolution of the product 
support system. He proposes that such an aggregate reliability growth 
curve be modelled as a function of the number of years since entry into 
service, rather than of operating hours as originally conceived by Duane 
(19). 
A database of Service Difficulty Reports leading to In Flight Shutdowns in 
the CF6 fleet from 1973 to 1985 was compiled and used to assess methods of 
failure rate prediction; this was comprised of over 1200 events, which was 
felt to be enough to make valid statistical comparisons. Details of the 
analysis can be found in Appendix F; the results are summarised below. 
The annual rate of service difficulty reports (per engine hour) decreased 
from entry into service both for the CF6-6 and the CF6-50. The CF6-6 
entered service first and had a higher failure rate. There was considerable 
random variation from year to year, but the decrease in the failure rate 
appeared approximately exponential. Both engines experienced a low, but 
constant rate of induced (non-design related) failures each year. The CF6- 
80A entered service with the mature failure rate of the CF6-50. Further 
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review of the high bypass ratio fleet (all engines, all manufacturers) 
showed that this previously unknown relationship in IFSD rates is a 
general one; in all cases where data was available, the derivativeDentered 
service24with an IFSD rate within a factor of three (and usually within a 
factor of two) of the precursor engine at that time (see Table 6.1). This 
relationship is hypothesised to be the result of increasing experience and 
improved design within the relevant design and development 
organisation; it is not closely related to physical parameters such as thrust 
(see Appendix H for a detailed exploration of this area). 
PRECURSOR DERIVATIVE YEAR OF % THRUST RATIO OF 
ENGINE ENGINE DERIVATIV GROWTH OF IFSD 
E ENTRY DERIVATIVE RATES 
INTO DERIV/ 
SERVICE PARENT 
AT ENTRY 
INTO 
SERVICE 
C176-50 CF6-80A 1983 -47o 3 
CF6-80A CF6-80C 1986 +15% 1.8 
CFM56-3 CFM56-5A 1988 +6 7o' 0.5 
CFM56-5A CFM56-5C 1993 +287o' 2.2 
SPEY 555 TAY 1986 +317o' 1.4 
RB211-22B RB211-524B 1977 +19yo . 55 
RB211-524 RB211-535C 1983 -25Yo . 54 RB211-535C25 RB211-535134 1985 +12Yo . 73 RB211- RB211-524G 1990 +10yo 2.4 
524D41) 
JT9D-7R PW2000 1985 -25Yo 1.43 
JT9D-7R PW4000 
1 
1989 
-- - 
+127' 
Io -- 
1 
L ----------- 
TABLE 6.1 
23The precursor/ derivative relationship was not necessarily a close one; evolution of design 
sophistication appeared to be the governing factor rather than the number of similar parts. 
24first full calendar year statistics, where available 
25Data for 1986 
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A reliability growth equation of the form proposed by Smith Industries, 
X=A +Be-Ct 26 
was found to model the behaviour of engine failure rates in service (as 
measured by SDR reports). When the parameters A, B, C were empirically 
derived from the in-service data, all but 1 data point per parameter set fell 
within the 90% confidence bounds for this equation. Table 6.2 gives 
derived *parameter values for this equation, using a least mean squares fit 
to the data. 
A A B B c c 
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range 
All SDRs CF6-6 1.06E-5 0.46-1.65 1 E-4 . 65-1.5 3E-8 2E-8- 4 E-5 E4 E-8 
All SDRs CF6- 0.86E-5 0.71-1.01 7 E-5 . 45-1.0 5E-8 4E-8- 6 
50 E-5 E-4 E-8 
New SDRs CF6-6 - 2.7E-5 1.3-5.4 8E-8 6E-8 -1 
-5 E-7 
New SDRs CF6- - 2 E-5 . 74-5.2 8E-8 . 55-1.1 
50 E-5 E-7 
rable 6.2 
Carter has objected to the use of reliability growth to forecast the behaviour 
of a product subject to major design changes, on the grounds that no 
model could account for the results of such a change. This viewpoint is 
theoretically correct, yet it is evident empirically that both jet engines and 
mainframe computers (Collas, 60) do, indeed experience reliability growth 
despite major design changes. A partial explanation for this phenomenon 
may be found in the rigorous internal disciplines of the design 
establishments for products where a single system failure may result in a 
financial loss of tens of millions of dollars. Before a major design change 
is incorporated into a jet engine, it is formally audited at several stages of 
its evolution by the most experienced and astute technical experts in the 
company (61). The design may be audited for compliance with compliance 
with company design practices, which codify the company's experience of 
good and bad designs over several decades. Abusive testing locates any 
problems in areas not subject to analysis. The net effect of this screening 
26 incidence of SDRs per engine hour 
A random failures unrelated to specific design or manufacturing problems, e. g. 
maintenance error or birdstrike 
t= fleet hours summed over all models 
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process is that most of the components have a negligible failure rate both 
before and after the design change. The components with an initial 
unacceptable failure rate have received sufficient unfavourable attention 
that in most cases the new design incorporates measures to substantially 
reduce the failure rate. The key to answering Carter's objection lies in 
acknowledging that for high reliability systems, the system will 
demonstrate reliability growth through the course of design changes if a 
few of the least reliable components - upon which attention is focused - 
improve in reliability, and no really bad mistakes are made with the other 
components. It is not necessary for every component to experience 
reliability growth. 
Reliability growth trending has been established above as a valuable 
means of predicting aggregate failure rates at entry into service, but the 
utility of the approach for specific safety-related failures must also be 
established. The service history of uncontained27 failures was therefore 
reviewed for high bypass ratio engines in the commercial transport fleet. 
The reliability growth behaviour observed for SDRs was also seen for 
uncontained failures. The second generation high bypass fleet appear to 
enter service with uncontained failure rates very similar to those of the 
mature first generation engines at that time, just as was the case for IFSDs. 
It follows that reliability growth techniques appear valid for predicting the 
rates of uncontained failures for new engine models at entry into service. 
6.5.2 Component Failure Rates 
A fundamental issue in safety analysis is that of whether to address 
component failures individually, or to treat all instances of a certain type 
of failure as a statistical aggregate. Identification of individual component 
failure modes affords greater technical understanding of system behaviour 
and shows more promise of directing the attention of the designer to areas 
of potential weakness, and thus improving the overall design, yet the task 
of quantifying the failure distribution for each component in the engine is 
a formidable one, much of which would produce results irrelevant to 
safety-related failures. Grouping failures of a given type (such as all disc 
failures) renders numerical prediction very much easier, yet the result 
may be of very limited value to the designer who wishes to reduce the 
incidence of such failures - there is nothing in such an aggregate result to 
direct him or her to the components or issues most likely to cause 
problems. 
27 Uncontained failures were selected bemuse they are the major contributor to propulsion 
related accidents and therefore form an important indicator of propulsion system safety. 
Accurate statistics on uncontained failures were available in the SAE studies AIR 4003, 
AIR1537, AIR 4770 (Refs. 50,51,52). 
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An attempt was made to predict failure rates for engine submodules such 
as HPC blades and vanes, using a similar approach to that employed for 
engine-level analysis. Details of the analysis appear in appendix F. The 
submodules with the highest initial failure rates showed reliability growth 
over time and from one engine model to the next. Those which had 
relatively low initial failure rates were less predictable in their behaviour. 
Although the high reliability of individual components results in 
statistically sparse data, making the reliability growth techniques above 
impracticable at the component level, there may still be a need to forecast 
failure rates at the component level. The following approach is therefore 
proposed: 
Consider an engine with a known failure rate, comprised of N 
components. Some number (M) of these will never have caused an 
inflight shutdown in the history of the fleet (X hours). Making the classic 
assumption of a failure tomorrow for each of the M components would be 
unrealistic, resulting in M unprecedented failures all occurring at once. It 
would be more reasonable to assume one failure tomorrow, and to divide 
it out equally among the M components. Each of the M components has 
an assigned failure rate of 1/ MX 
For the remaining N-M components (these have each actually experienced 
a failure at some time), a reasonable approach is to take the forecast failure 
rates for each submodule and divide it amongst the submodule 
components not already addressed. The division may be done equally 
among components, or if the results are sufficiently critical to the outcome 
of the analysis as a whole, the allocation may be weighted in proportion to 
past failure rates. 
6.5.3 Effect Of Flight Phase On Failure Rates 
Failure rates are generally averaged over the flight without regard to the 
effect of flight phase upon the likelihood of a given failure. If the outcome 
of a failure depends strongly upon the external circumstances such as the 
flight phase, consideration should be given to factoring the failure rate so 
that it is more truly representative of the phase of interest. The effect of 
flight phase can be very significant, as demonstrated in Table 6.3; the 
severity factors presented may be used to convert an average failure rate to 
a flight-phase dependent rate for the types of failures shown. It should be 
recognised that the factors calculated in table 6.3 are based on an average 
fleet and flight profile. Individual engine models and specific failure 
modes would each have a separate set of factors which would better 
represent the engine behaviour. The factors presented are nevertheless 
more representative than a simple average over the flight. 
The physical and technical reasons for the variation of failure rate by flight 
phase are discussed further in appendix F. 
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6.5.4 Summary of Failure Rate Prediction 
Engines exhibit reliability growth after entry into service, not only during 
the formal development cycle. This reliability growth continues from one 
engine model to the next, so that a derivative engine enters service with 
inherent "maturity". This effect appears to hold true for all three of the 
major engine manufacturers for which data was available. 
The IFSD rate of an engine may be predicted at entry into service by 
applying reliability growth techniques to previous engines produced by the 
same manufacturer. The prediction is likely to be within a factor of two of 
the measured value. 
For any given submodule, reliability growth from parent to derivative 
engine cannot be universally assumed at entry into service. The "Worst" 
submodule of the parent engine will exhibit significant reliability growth, 
both within the model and in the transition from parent to derivative. It 
is likely that at least one submodule of the derivative will have much 
worse reliability than it did for the parent, but this will still be higher 
reliability than that of the parent's worst submodule. 
Component reliabilities are so high that insufficient failure data can be 
accrued to apply reliability growth techniques generally with confidence in 
the results. Estimates of failure rates for individual components can be 
made by allocating out the submodule rate. Special consideration is 
required for the subset of components which have not failed in the fleet 
experience. 
Failure modes more directly related to safety are infrequent and therefore 
difficult to trend. Reliability growth techniques may provide a useful 
estimate of rates at the engine level as shown for uncontained failures; 
dividing rates between submodules or components is unlikely to prove 
dependable. 
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6.6 Summary Of Recommendations For Alternate Approach 
1. The safety analysis should attempt to predict failure rates and 
accident rates which will actually be experienced in service, since this 
approach offers the greatest opportunity to actually reduce accident rates. 
2. The scope of future analyses should be expanded to address all of the 
following major contributors to the accident rate: 
Uncontained engine failures (267o' of propulsion related accidents 
Propulsion-related crew error (237o' of propulsion related accidents 
Thrust control problems including autothrottle failures and 
asymmetric thrust (107o' of propulsion related accidents 
Engine fire ( 117o of propulsion related accidents). 
The safety analysis should give consideration to the autothrottle system, 
the fuel delivery system and the flight crew, so far as they enable 
propulsion system operation. 
3. Failure effects which have not yet resulted in accidents in service 
need not be addressed, unless novel aspects of the design make such effects 
much more likely. The requirements of the certification regulations may 
be met in these cases by a statement of previous service experience and 
similarity of the proposed system to those previously certified. The 
historical record shows that single initiating failures in conjunction with 
adverse circumstances are much more significant than combinations of 
independent failures. The analysis should be structured accordingly. 
4. The historical accident rate for non-contained rotor bursts should be 
used. Credit may be taken for the state-of-the-art of engine design (e. g. first 
generation vs. second generation high bypass ratio engines) and for specific 
airplane installation measures to reduce risk (up to 257o reduction in this 
accident rate). 
5. A baseline accident rate attributable to crew error in handling 
propulsion systems (failed and unfailed ) is 1.14E-7/ airplane flight hour. 
Credit should be taken for specific airplane installation measures to reduce 
risk. 
6. Engine fire should be addressed by a review of service experience to 
identify means of risk mitigation other than those already in place. 
7. Engine separation while the engine is running, in flight, may be 
addressed elsewhere, by analysis of the engine trajectory and resulting 
damage, and by AC 25.571-1A (62) on engine mount damage tolerance . 
8. The historical accident rate associated with thrust control should be 
used. Evaluation of the thrust reverser reliability may significantly alter 
this rate. 
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9. Table 6.4 presents some specific means of mitigating the risk for 
some accident causes, together with the relevant accidents and proposed 
"credit". This is not a complete list of mitigating features. 
10. Details of the propulsion system design should be reviewed 
qualitatively, to establish that it affords a similar level of safety to previous 
designs and that the use of historical failure rates is valid. 
11. Service experience with a similar application and environment 
28should be used to derive component failure rates . Aggregate failure rates for groups of components (e. g. assemblies or 
modules) should be used wherever possible. Analysis in great depth 
should be avoided, since it will not predict those components with 
abnormally high failure rates due to design problems, while giving a false 
impression of precision. 
12. Average failure rates should be used throughout the analysis, except 
that severity factors may be used to account for variation of failure rate 
with flight phase. Mean component or assembly failure rates should be 
calculated. 
13. Reliability growth from one engine model to the next should be 
used to forecast IFSD rates at entry into service. The prediction is likely to 
be within a factor of two of the measured value. 
14. Reliability growth techniques should be used to estimate infrequent, 
safety-related failure effects at the engine level only; dividing rates 
between submodules or components is not recommended. 
Relatively frequent failures (IFSDs) may be forecast at the submodule level 
at entry into service, to a limited extent. Submodules making a major 
contribution to the parent engine failure rate will exhibit significant 
reliability growth. Submodules making minimal contributions to the 
parent failure rate may have worse reliability than for the parent. 
Estimates of failure rates for individual components can be made if 
absolutely necessary by allocating out the submodule rate. Special 
consideration is required for the subset of components which have not 
failed in the fleet experience. 
28 This should include the incidence of manufacturing defects, maintenance-induced 
damage, unsuccessful maintenance, improper procedures by the flight crew and so forth th at 
has actually been observed in a similar environment. 
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15. Since the approach outlined above attempts to predict and mitigate 
accident causes in a conscientious and realistic manner, it is likely that it 
will result in less exposure to product liability litigation. The approach 
permits identification of potential problems in a timely manner, enabling 
them to be resolved before airplane certification. 
16. The principles of the above approach, although generated using data 
from high bypass ratio commercial transport aircraft, are generally 
applicable to other aircraft propulsion systems. (Consideration of causes of 
actual accidents, limiting the depth of analysis to that essential to generate 
valid numbers, consideration of crew error and manufacturing defects, 
and so forth). The details would require modification for other types of 
propulsion system; for example, quantification of failure rates would be 
subject to considerable uncertainty if the propulsion system incorporated 
unique and novel design changes without prior service experience. 
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7.0 VALIDATION OF RECOMMENDED ANALYSIS IMPROVEMENTS 
7.1 Introduction 
The recommendations made in Chapter 6 were primarily based on the 
service experience of the high bypass ratio fleet, observed throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. However, it was considered essential that the validity of 
these recommendations be tested by applying them to an engine/ airframe 
combination which had made a minimal contribution to the original data, 
to establish whether the recommendations were generally valid or only 
applied to the special case of the propulsion system database used to 
generate them in the first place. In view of the commercial sensitivity of 
such a prediction in today's intensely competitive marketplace, the engine 
and airplane have been de-identified. 
The validation propulsion system (systemXd.,, as in derivative) was 
selected as such for the following reasons: 
This installation went into service recently enough that it did not 
appear in the data used for the analyses of chapter 6. 
9 Service data was readily available for its parent engine models. 
Propulsion system X, has an electronic engine control and engine 
parameters are displayed in a "glass cockpit" style flight deck. This will 
be typical of many future engine/airframe combinations; it is therefore 
essential that any recommendations regarding safety analysis 
approaches should be valid for such installations, in which control 
signals are transmitted by databuses rather than mechanical throttle 
cables and the capability exists for specific flight deck text messages 
relating to an engine conditions, rather than a warning light or gage. 
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7.2 Validation Engine (Xd,,, ) Description 
The validation engine (engine Xder) is a two-spool high bypass ratio 
turbofan rated in the 60 to 70,000 lb. takeoff thrust range. It entered service 
in the early 1990s, and is a close derivative of an engine (engine as in 
parent) which entered service in the mid 1980s. 
Significant changes from engine to engine X, are as follows: 
- Increased fan diameter, number of fanblades, reduced slightly. 
- Booster pressure ratio increased by 12%. 
- High temperature alloys used for the 14th stage of the HP 
compressor and the HP turbine. HPT rotor strengthened and 
cooling flows improved. 
- LP turbine redesigned to improve efficiency and cooling flows. 
- Second generation Electronic Engine Control . 
- Fuel system staging valve to improve low power operability. 
7.3 Aircraft (X,,, ) Installation Details 
The engine is conventionally installed in an under-wing configuration on 
a twin-engined medium/long range wide-body transport aircraft. The 
aircraft features many automated systems intended to improve overall 
safety and reliability such as: 
- Fly-by-wire 
- Electronic flight deck 
- Redundant fuel system monitoring computers controlling fuel 
transfer and balance 
- Autothrottle 
-Flight Management Computers 
The architecture of these systems is conventional as regards the power 
plant and thrust control functions, and is closely based on that of previous 
aircraft produced by this manufacturer. In particular, engine to engine 
isolation is maintained between control systems. 
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7.4 Prediction Of General Reliability of Propulsion SystemXder 
7.4.1 Prediction at Entry into Service 
It was proposed in Chapter 6 that the reliability of an engine at entry into 
service could be predicted by reference to the reliability at that time of a 
previously certified, related engine model. The annual rates of significant 
Service Difficulty Reports (here defined as IFSDs and RTOs) were tracked 
for engine (same engine family as engineXd,, ). Figure 7.1 shows the 
results (data only). 
Figure 7.2 shows the same results with an equation of the form proposed 
by Smith Industries fitted to the data, using a least mean squares 
technique. It is concluded from Figure 7.2 that the significant SDR rate for 
propulsion system X. ...... is 12/million hours, and lies between 8 and 15 per 
million engine hours with 90% confidence. Based on the empirical 
relationships developed in Chapter 6, propulsion system X, is predicted to 
enter service with a significant SDR rate between 6 and 20/million hours. 
The accuracy of this prediction will be evaluated below (section 7.6). 
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7.4.2 Long Term Prediction 
It was noted in Chapter 6 that an engine family reliability growth 
characteristic was well represented during the first fifteen years of 
operational experience by the Smith Industries equation: 
X=A+Be'ct 
Values of A, B and C for the first 40 million engine operating hours were 
empirically established in Chapter 6 using least mean squares (or 
arithmetic average in the case of A) as: 
A=8 to 10 E-6 /hour 
ME-4 /hour 
C=3 to 5E-8 
In order to establish whether these constants would continue to predict 
engine family behaviour indefinitely, the Smith equation with the 
empirically derived constants was tested against the behaviour of engine 
Xparent in the 1990s, by which time the fleet experience was approaching 150 
million hours. It was immediately evident, on calculating the failure rates 
for YP,,,,,,, that A (corresponding to the rate of random failures induced by 
external events such as bird ingestion, maintenance errors etc. ) was 
significantly lower than the value observed for the propulsion systems 
modelled in Chapter 6. An average value of A was calculated at 313-6 /hr 
for X. P,,., t . This reduction is a reflection of technical advances being incorporated into the propulsion systems to make them more resistant to 
such induced failures, as had been speculated in Appendix F. 
For large values of t, the value of B is not critical. The previously derived 
value was therefore retained. 
It was also noted that the previously derived value of C (approximately 
4E-8) was no longer valid as t grew large (over 100 million hours). A new 
value of C was therefore derived empirically from the measured failure 
rates for Xp,,,,, n, using a least mean squares approach, and found to be 1.5 E-8. The new equation describing reliability growth of the preceding engine 
model is 
X=3E-6+lE-4 e"'t 
The extent to which the new equation models the data (with upper and 
lower 907o confidence bounds) is shown in Figure 7.2. The prediction of 
the equation using the Chapter 6 constants is also shown, for comparison 
(it predicted service experience within a factor of 2, which is reasonably 
good agreement for a ten year forecast). It may be concluded from this 
experience that as t continues to increase, the current constants will 
describe the propulsion system reliability growth somewhat less accurately, 
and new values of constants A, C may need to be derived. The current 
constants (A= 3E-6, C= 1-5E-8) should remain useful for the next 100 
million engine hours. 
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7.5 Prediction Of Specific Engine-Level Failure Modes and Resulting 
Accident Rate Forecast for Propulsion System X, 
This forecast is based on the data available up to the year before entry into 
service, at which point the safety analysis would be expected to be 
complete. 
7.5.1 Uncontained engine failures (X,,, ) 
Engine X, is a second (or possibly third) generation high bypass ratio 
turbofan. The incidence of uncontained engine failures for this type of 
engine, based on the industry -wide SAE study (52) may be estimated as 
1.6E-7/engine hour (for the time period 1985 -1989). The rate of non- 
contained events for this engine at entry into service may therefore be 
estimated as close to 2E-7/ engine hour; equivalent to 4E-7/ airplane flight 
hour. 
The hazard ratio derived in Chapter 6 indicates that 67o of uncontained 
events result in accidentS29. The airplane was designed and went into 
production before the intensive industry study (AC 20-128 under ARAQ 
of means to mitigate the hazard of non-contained debris, and does not 
incorporate the specific mitigating factors enumerated in 3.5; the above 
hazard ratio is therefore likely to be reasonably representative. 
Based on the above assumptions, the accident rate resulting from non- 
contained failures for the validation propulsion system might be predicted 
to be in the range of 2AE-8 /airplane flight hour, compared with a 
historical average of 1.6E-7/ airplane flight hour (equivalent to a "credit" 
of 1.36E-7/ airplane flight hour). 
. 
29 This is an overall hazard ratio, based on non-containment of both small parts like 
blades and large, high energy parts such as disks. It could be argued that more specific 
hazard ratios, relating to disks and to blades separately, would give a more precise 
prediction (accidents have only resulted from disk failures so far in the high bypass fleet). 
However, there is insufficient data (to the time of certification) to reasonably predict the 
rate of uncontained. disk failures for this engine, and therefore generic hazard ratios and 
failure rates are used here. 
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7.5.2 Propulsion Related Crew Error (X,,., ) 
The baseline rate, derived above in 6.4, for crew error in handling 
propulsion systems is 1.14E-7/ airplane flight hour. The high reliability of 
second generation turbofans will result in fewer unanticipated engine 
failures likely to produce crew error. It may be argued that against this 
must be offset the limited experience of flight crews in dealing with such 
eventualities; yet even in the early days of jet transport, engine reliabilities 
were such that a pilot might only encounter a jet engine failure once or 
twice in his life - flight crews have never been accustomed to engine 
failures on large commercial jet aircraft. 
Credit may be taken for reliability of the propulsion system as follows: the 
high bypass fleet historical average failure rate (IFSDs plus high speed 
RTOs) is estimated as 90 per million hours. The equivalent rate for this 
propulsion system has been estimated above as 12/million hours. This 
would apparently reduce the incidence of propulsion related crew error 
accidents by 87%. Even if it is assumed that the crew is twice as likely to 
react incorrectly to a propulsion failure, an overall credit of 40% (4.511-8) 
should be attributed to increased reliability. 
Specific features of the airplane flight deck which may alter this rate 
include the following: 
Engine failure indication 
ENG FAIL message with single chime and master caution light. 
Enabled during all phases of flight, when an engine core speed drops 
below idle. There is also a separate ENG SHUTDOWN message to 
announce that the crew has shut down an engine (same chime, 
master caution light). 
There is also an ENG STALL message with single chime and master 
caution light, which is inhibited during the critical phases of flight 
(takeoff roll from 80kts to 1500 ft, approach from 800 ft to 80 kts). 
In the event of an engine failure resulting in a high speed rejected takeoff 
and accident, a review of DFDR data/accident reports indicates that the 
flight crew responds very quickly to a loud bang or vibration. The 
response time (to retard the throttles and reject the takeoff) was typically 1 
to 3 seconds, so the actual decision by the crew may be considered 
"immediate". The core of a high bypass engine may take from 5 to 7 
seconds to spool down below idle from an initial takeoff power setting 
after an engine failure; in the case of a bird ingestion which only impacts 
the fan3ý the core may not spool down at all. It follows that an engine 
failure indication based on the core spooling down sub-idle is likely to 
appear too late to assist the flight crew in their decision, and will have no 
30 30% of propulsion-related accidents resulting from high speed rejected takeoffs are 
caused by birdstrike. 
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effect on the incidence of high speed rejected takeoffs. An engine failure 
indication would have to appear within substantially less than a second of 
the bang or vibration in order to contribute to the flight crew's decision. 
The record shows some accidents occurring during other flight phases as a 
result of the crew being uncertain of the engine status (ACC30, ACC39, 
ACC53). The appearance or non-appearance of an engine failure 
indication would have been of some assistance in these cases, and 
sufficient time was available for methodical evaluation of the situation. 
In two of these accidents, the "core sub-idle" implementation of an engine 
failure indication would have been technically effective, in the third, the 
"'ENG STALL" message would have been effective. Assuming a 507o 
effectiveness for crew recognition of this information, these messages are 
credited with a reduction of ME-8/airplane hour. 
Autopilot/autothrottle mode annunciation/go around 
The thrust limit mode (e. g. TOGA) selected by the thrust lever is 
displayed in blue at the upper right comer of the primary engine 
parameter display. In some circumstances (alpha floor protection) 
go-around thrust may be commanded regardless of throttle position, 
in this case messages "A FLOOR" and "TOGA LK" are displayed, 
surrounded by an amber flashing box. 
Pending review by human factors specialists, a visual indication is not 
considered sufficiently compelling to completely prevent the type of 
confusion observed in ACC83 and ACC86. 
Asymmetric thrust 
The airplane has no direct indication of different thrust being 
produced by left and right hand engines. 
If the airplane is in autothrust mode, LVR ASYM amber caution 
message will be displayed if one of the two thrust levers is set at 
takeoff or max. continuous power while the other is set in the 
climb/ cruise/idle range. 
Both N1 commanded by the FADEC and actual N1 are displayed on 
the primary engine parameter display for each engine. The 
discrepancy between the two is highlighted if autothrust is active. 
If the engine FADECs select different thrusts for takeoff, a message 
ENG TO THRUST DISAGREE is displayed, with a single chime and 
master caution light. 
Three accidents involving asymmetric thrust did not involve reverse 
thrust (ACC39, ACC57, ACC74). One involved a crew aware of asymmetric 
thrust, who did not provide the requisite input to the flight controls to 
maintain the flight path. None of the flight deck annunciations 
incorporated in this airplane would prevent such an event. one involved 
slight thrust asymmetry in the takeoff roll; the ENG TO THRUST 
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DISAGREE might possibly have been effective in preventing this event. 
One involved an engine which did not spool up when the throttles were 
advanced; the resulting thrust asymmetry went unnoticed by the 
flightcrew. None of the caution or advisory messages provided here 
would appear effective in preventing this event. It may be concluded that 
the incidence of asymmetric thrust-related accidents for this propulsion 
system is likely to be unchanged from the baseline, historical figure. 
Prompt reverser deployment (X,,, ) 
The validation airplane thrust reverser logic requires an indication of 
main gear compression to enable reverser deployment on command; 
signals indicating each shock absorber (left and right main landing gear) is 
not compressed disable the reversers until the airplane was level and on 
the ground. No credit should therefore be given for "means to enable 
prompt reverser deployment". 
It is concluded that the rate of propulsion related accidents associated with 
propulsion failure followed by crew error may be forecast as the baseline 
rate (1.14E-7/ airplane flight hour) minus credit of 4.5 E-8 for increased 
propulsion system reliability and of ME-8 for engine failure messages - 
that is, a rate of 5.8E-8/airplane flight hour. 
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7.5.3 Thrust Control Difficulty (X,,., ) 
The majority of accidents resulting from asymmetric thrust involved 
reverse thrust on one side of the aircraft and forward thrust on the other, 
producing a turning couple. The thrust reversers are controlled 
independently for the two engines of this airplane. Redundant sensors in 
the reverser translating cowls indicate to the FADEC when the reverser is 
in the process of deploying. The FADEC will not command the engine to 
produce thrust greater than idle during the reverse cycle until the reverser 
is almost deployed. It is therefore extremely unlikely that a thrust reverser 
malfunction could result in unwanted high forward thrust on one engine 
when the flight crew had commanded reverse thrust. Credit should be 
given to this logic of 1.5E-8/airplane hour. 
It is also likely that increases in overall reliability of propulsion subsystems 
will actually improve this rate compared to the baseline, but insufficient 
details on thrust control architecture are available to determine the 
magnitude of this effect. It is therefore proposed that a baseline rate of 513- 
8/airplane flight hour be used for thrust control accidents (average 
historical rate both for the total twin fleet and for the specific airplane 
manufacturer's twin fleet), as opposed to the overall baseline of 6. lE- 
8/airplane hour. Applying the above credit results in a reduced accident 
rate of 3.5E-8/airplane hour for thrust control difficulty. 
7.5.4 Engine Fire (X,,, ) 
The baseline accident rate for propulsion system fire is 6E-8/ airplane flight 
hour. Insufficient detail was available in the public domain to establish 
the detailed circumstances of four of the eight accidents contributing to 
this historical accident rate. 
Two of the remaining four accidents were caused by the response to the 
fire rather than by fire damage itself; a similar response could have 
resulted from a false fire warning (and has, in fact, done so). 
One accident resulted from a fire in the strut area. This contains the main 
fuel inlet line, electrical cabling supplying power from the engine to the 
airplane, and hot air ducts. It has no dedicated fire detection or fire 
extinguishing, either on the airplane involved in the accident or on the 
validation airplane. 
One fire was associated with an uncontained engine failure, the relative 
damage caused by the fire and by the ejected debris is not known. 
Of the four accidents where some details were available regarding the 
origin of the fire, no fundamental design changes can be identified which 
would prevent recurrence of these events for the validation propulsion 
system. It is therefore proposed that the baseline rate accident rate for 
propulsion system fire be used for the validation propulsion system. 
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7.5.6 Overall Propulsion Related Accident Rate Forecast for Propulsion 
SystemXder 
The historical overall propulsion related accident rate for high bypass ratio 
turbofans is 5.9E-7/airplane flight hour. Credit reducing that rate may be 
attributed as follows: 
Mitigation Reduction from baseline (per 
airplane flight hour) 
Low uncontained failure rate 1.36E-7 
Eng fail messages 1.1E-8 
Engine reliability (fewer crew errors) 4.5E-8 
Thrust control logic in reverse 1.5E-8 
Total credits 2.07E-7 
The overall propulsion-related accident rate forecast for propulsion system 
X,,, is therefore approximately 3.8E-7/ airplane flight hour; a 357o reduction 
below the historical average for the high bypass commercial transport fleet. 
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7.6 Validation Propulsion System X,,,, Service Experience 
Propulsion system X,,., has acquired over 100,000 engine hours (50,000 
airplane hours) in service to date. It has experienced: 
- No RTOs 
- No IFSDs 
- No uncontained engine failures 
- No Fires 
- No events involving thrust control difficulty 
- No propulsion related accidents of any kind. 
Although a much longer period of service experience would be required to 
verify all of the rates predicted in 7.5 (of the order of 50 million hours) the 
service experience so far does enable upper bounds to be placed on the 
actual rates for comparison with those predicted. 
7.6.1 General Reliability - Service Experience of X, 
If the assumption is made that an IFSD or RTO occurs tomorrow on 
propulsion systemXd,,, an estimate of the significant SDR rate may be 
made as 1E-5/engine hour. Since no such event has in fact occurred, the 
use of confidence levels in connection with this estimate is not felt to be 
justifiable. 31 The measured rate of 1E-5/engine hour or less is completely 
consistent, so far, with the predicted range of 613-6 to 2E-5/engine hour 
made in 7.4. 
It is theoretically possible that the measured rate could be very much lower 
than 1E-5, such as 1E-6/engine hour. The most reliable propulsion 
systems in service today have basic engine IFSD rates of 3E-6/hour; it is 
therefore considered very unlikely that the significant SDR rate for the 
validation propulsion system (including basic engine IFSDs, non-engine 
IFSDs, and rejected takeoffs) would be lower than 3E-6/engine hour. 
It is concluded that the measured SDR rate for the validation propulsion 
system lies somewhere between 1OE-6 and 3E-6/ engine hour, and that the 
predicted value agrees with the measured value within an "average" 
factor of two. 
31 If an event had indeed occurred, the rate could be estimated to 90% confidence as being 
between 613-6 and 1413-6 /engine hour, using the standard deviation of the SDR rates for the 
precursor engine to calculate confidence bounds. 
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7.6.2 Specific Engine-Level Failure Modes and Resulting Accident Rate - 
Service Experience of X,,, 
The service experience accrued so far (50,000 airplane flight hours) is not 
sufficient to thoroughly validate the predicted rates for accidents and safety 
significant failures (in the range of 4E-7 to 1E-8). However, an upper 
bound may be placed on an estimate of the measured rate for total 
propulsion related accidents and for uncontained failures, by assuming 
one such event occurred tomorrow. 
If such an assumption is made32, the "measured "'rate of propulsion related 
accidents would be 2E-5/aircraft hour compared to a prediction of 3.8 E- 
7/aircraft hour. The prediction therefore agrees with the measured rate 
within a factor of 53. As more time in service is accumulated, a closer 
estimate may be made of the measured rate and it is anticipated that 
agreement between measurement and prediction will become very much 
closer. 
If an equivalent assumption to the above is made, the measured rate of 
uncontained failures would be 1E-5/engine hour, compared with a 
prediction of 2E-7/engine hour. The prediction therefore agrees with the 
measured rate within a factor of no more than 50 (it is anticipated that 
agreement will be seen to be much closer). 
32 This is an extremely pessimistic assumption in the opinion of the author. However, it 
enables an estimate of the worst possible case discrepancy between forecast and measured 
rates. 
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7.7 Secondary Validation (Propulsion System Y) 
It was felt that the very limited service experience of propulsion system X, 
detracted significantly from the above validation, although it was 
sufficient to demonstrate the validity of the reliability growth concept as 
applied to general reliability. A second, supplementary validation was 
therefore conducted on propulsion system Y. An outline of this validation 
is given below. 
7.7.1 Description of propulsion system Y 
Propulsion system Y is based on a second generation high bypass ratio 
turbofan, powering a twin-engine narrow-body commercial transport. The 
propulsion system entered service in the mid 1980s, and has accrued 
approximately 10 million engine hours of service experience to date. It 
was not initially chosen for the validation because comparatively little 
detailed technical information was available on the engine, propulsion 
system and airplane as a whole. 
The engine is not a close derivative of the previously certified engine, 
Yp.,,,. It is a "new centreline" engine (i. e. the modules were designed ab 
initio rather than scaled or otherwise modified from a previous existing 
engine) and is the first large commercial engine produced by this 
manufacturer to feature an electronic engine control, rather than a 
hydromechanical control. 
The airplane features an electronic flight deck display, generally modelled 
on previous mechanical displays to maintain commonality with previous 
aircraft. The engines are mounted conventionally under the wings. 
7.7.2 Prediction Of Specific Engine-Level Failure Modes and Resulting 
Accident Rate Forecast for Propulsion System Y 
This forecast is conducted using the information which would have been 
available to analysts at the time of propulsion system. Baseline rates 
which would have been calculated in the mid-80s are used, rather than 
those developed in Chapter 6. 
Uncontained Failures The industry report 4003 (51) was published in 
the early 1980s and the data it contains would therefore have been 
available to the analysts at the time of propulsion system certification. 
Reference to the published statistics for high bypass ratio turbofans in the 
commercial transport fleet, given in this reference, would lead to a 
prediction of an uncontained failure rate of approximately 6E-7/engine 
hour for this second generation turbofan. The corresponding accident rate 
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for propulsion system Y, using the hazard ratios developed in Chapter 6, 
would be 7.2E-8/airplane hour, compared with a baseline of 3.512- 
7/airplane hour.. 
Propulsion Related Crew Error. The mid-80s baseline rate for this type of 
accident is 8.8E-7/airplane flight hour. No specific flight deck measures 
could be identified which would mitigate against this failure mode. 
However, the reliability of the previous propulsion system, Yp-, at the 
time of Y entering into service, was somewhat higher than the overall 
fleet average (7E-5/engine hour rather than 9E-5/engine hour for a 
significant SDR rate) and a case could therefore be made for mitigation by 
general reliability improvement. A credit of 207o' reduction to the baseline 
"Propulsion Failure plus Crew Error" accident rate is therefore used, 
bringing the forecast rate for this mode down to 7E-7/airplane flight hour. 
Thrust Control No measures were identified for this propulsion 
system which would mitigate the potential for a thrust control accident. 
Fire No measures were identified for this propulsion 
system which would mitigate the potential for a fire-related accident. The 
mid-80s baseline rate of 8.8E-8/airplane hour is therefore used for 
propulsion system fire-related accidents. N. B. This corresponds to a rate of 
4E-7/engine hour for fires). 
Overall accident prediction The mid-80s baseline propulsion system 
accident rate is 10.5E-7/ airplane hour. After credit was taken for mitigating 
factors as described above, the forecast propulsion related accident rate for 
propulsion system Y is 5.9E-7/airplane hour, a 447o reduction from the 
industry baseline rate. 
Mitigation Reduction from baseline (per 
airplane flight hour) 
Low uncontained failure rate 
' 
2.78E-7 
- Engine reliability (fewer crew errors) T. -8E-7 
Total credits 4.6E-7 
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7.7.3 Service Experience Of Specific Failure Modes And Accident Rate for 
Propulsion System Y 
Uncontained Failures. Review of the available data shows that propulsion 
system Y has experienced approximately eight33uncontained events in 10 
million engine hours, corresponding to an uncontained failure rate of 813- 
7/hour. This is remarkably close to the predicted rate of 6E-7/engine hour 
(although the prediction applied to the time of entry into service, and the 
measured rate is averaged over the last ten years - an approach necessitated 
by the limited data available). None of these uncontained events has 
resulted in an accident. 
Fires Propulsion system Y has experienced at least two engine fires 
(excluding tailpipe fires) to date. This corresponds to a rate of 2E-7/engine 
hour, compared to a prediction of 4E-7. It is believed that some events are 
likely to have been omitted and the measured rate should be higher; 
nevertheless, agreement is remarkably close. 
Overall Accident Rate There has been one propulsion related accident 
to date involving propulsion system Y. This corresponds to an accident 
rate of 2E-7/airplane flight hour. This accident rate agrees very closely 
(within a factor of 3) with that predicted. 
7.8 Discussion of Validation 
The validation was successful in giving close numerical agreement 
between predicted failure rates and those actually measured. There was 
insufficient service experience available to measure every failure rate 
which could be predicted with this approach, and the statistical sample (of 
one accident) was too small to enable confidence limits to be placed upon 
the measured accident rate. However, the agreement was excellent 
(within a factor of three, where measurements could be made) when 
compared with the results from a previous approach (Chapter 2 showed 
agreement within a factor of 10 to a factor of 1000 between prediction and 
experience). 
The validation did not give any insight into system architecture, other 
than in those specific areas where previous architectural decisions had led 
indirectly to accidents. It would be entirely possible for a poorly designed 
system architecture to result in an accident for a completely new cause; this 
analysis would not be able to predict such an event. Similarly, poor design 
of a single component could result in an accident under the right 
circumstances, and it would not be predicted by this type of analysis. 
33 Tally based on review of Service Difficulty Reports and Airworthiness Directives. It is 
very likely that some events have been omitted, but it is believed that the number is of the 
correct order of magnitude. 
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7.9 Summary of Validation 
The following significant features should be noted from the validation 
presented above: 
Reliability growth can be used with assurance to forecast propulsion 
system failure rates at entry into service, for engine-level reliability 
as well as for safety specific failure modes such as non-containment. 
Propulsion system accident rates can be forecast with assurance, 
using historical data with credit given for mitigating design factors. 
The above approaches apply to new (but similar) engines using 
existing technology, as well as to close derivatives of existing 
engines. 
The proposed technique produces clear, concise results. It can be 
applied to a proposed propulsion system and produce results within 
a very short time span, using information readily available once the 
propulsion system and airplane flight deck design is defined. 
The proposed technique relies heavily on continuity of design 
philosophy within the propulsion and airframe communities. It 
could not easily be applied to a truly novel installation with unique 
system architecture (e. g. a single-engine hypersonic transport 
powered by a ram-jet). 
For propulsion systems powering large commercial transports, in 
today's design tradition, it offers an opportunity to produce very 
accurate forecasts with a minimum of resources, and to focus very 
clearly on prioritisation and appropriate technical design of safety 
features (mitigating design features). 
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8.0 DISCUSSION 
8.1 Goals 
Goals of research 
The intent of this research was to establish the major shortfalls in the current 
approach to safety analysis of high bypass ratio turbofans powering the 
commercial transport fleet, and to develop an alternate safety analysis 
approach to address these shortfalls. Significant areas of interest identified at 
the beginning of the research program were: 
- Realism of neglecting human error as a material factor in propulsion 
system safety (assumption that all parts are produced and assembled to 
drawing, maintained in accordance with maintenance manuals and 
the airplane operated in accordance with crew training and published 
procedures). 
- Effect of small design changes upon safety. 
8.1.2 Goals of safety analysis 
The intent of the safety analyses performed in the past has been to 
demonstrate that the safety of the propulsion system design meets an 
acceptable standard, and therefore to enable certification of the engine or 
propulsion system by the airworthiness authorities. This goal presents the 
following difficulties: 
It is not easy to establish whether the analysis is realistic or otherwise. 
The airworthiness authority may accept it at face value, or may request 
substantiation of every aspect of the analysis, to the point of checking 
arithmetical details. Either approach has disadvantages. 
The "acceptable standard" was developed based upon the information 
available in the late 1970s, which may be considered as largely outdated 
(ref. BCAR paper No. 484 (146)). It should be noted that this acceptable 
standard is too stringent for any current or past propulsion system to 
achieve in service. 
This approach does not adequately account for the operating 
environment of the propulsion system. 
The results of the analysis clearly conflict with service experience, since 
the analysis addresses only the "'design capability" of the system. This 
places the analyst in the somewhat awkward situation of justifying that 
a significant number of observed failure progressions were not caused 
by the design as such and therefore need not be considered. 
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It is therefore proposed that the goal be modified to assessment of propulsion 
system safety by forecasting propulsion-related accident rates likely to be 
encountered in service, specifically in relation to existing propulsion systems. 
It is proposed that certification should subsequently be sought on the basis of 
equivalent safety to existing propulsion systems. Highly desirable features of 
the alternate safety analysis might include: 
Identification of specific safety concerns and areas requiring design 
changes. 
Focusing resources on the failure sequences most critical to safety. 
Using data readily available early in the design, so that any necessary 
changes to design can be made at minimum cost. 
Producing new information or understanding of design weaknesses. 
Incorporating realistic, defensible assumptions. 
Addressing an integrated propulsion system, from basic engine to flight 
deck. 
Reproducible, easily understood results. 
Credibility within the design community. 
8.2 Traditional approaches to safety analysis 
8.2.1 Overview 
The two approaches which have been traditionally used for propulsion 
system safety analysis are Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (a bottom-up, 
deductive approach) and Fault Tree Analysis (a top-down, inductive 
approach). The two techniques are frequently portrayed as one being the 
inverse of the other: this is indeed the case for the logic required to develop 
the failure sequence, but there is one significant assumption common to both 
approaches - the assumption that component level failure rates will be 
available for quantification. The FMEA assigns failure rates to each 
component or subsystem failure mode; those resulting in a given effect can 
then be summed up to give an overall event rate. The FTA graphically 
depicts all component failures resulting in a given effect; Boolean logic is 
then used to sum individual component (or subsystem) failure rates to 
produce an overall event rate. It will be shown below that this assumption 
contains significant flaws when considering extremely reliable series systems 
comprised of many components unique to the system under consideration. 
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The true converse of the FMEA would resemble a fault tree diagram in which 
the probability of the top event was known a priori. This probability could 
then be subdivided amongst the contributing event paths (in a similar 
manner to a reliability allocation process), and the fault tree developed 
downward to the extent required to identify design features or other 
controllable factors having a significant effect on the overall probability. Both 
the traditional Fault Tree and the approach developed in Chapter 6 combine 
elements of synthesis and analysis. The key philosophical difference between 
the two is that the fault tree explores the details of hardware failures, taking 
conditioning events as given. The alternate approach effectively assumes 
groups of hardware failures at historical rates and explores the potential for 
reduction of the failure criticality by inhibit gates. 
The dichotomy between approaching the issue by synthesis (FMEA) and 
analysis having been noted, the other major issue to be confronted in the 
propulsion system safety analysis is the analytical intent, which will 
determine the ground rules by which the analysis is to be conducted. If the 
intent is to develop a formal mathematical model of the propulsion system 
failure process, which is internally consistent and complete, and can then be 
compared with the results of previous similar mathematical models, then the 
ground rules used previously should be applied, Le.: 
- Mechanical failures of individual components and cascading failure 
sequences may be considered. 
- Failures are assumed to be independent unless demonstrated 
otherwise. 
- All components are produced and assembled according to the design. 
- The propulsion system is operated and maintained in accordance 
with manufacturers' published instructions. 
- The aircraft is flown only within the certified flight envelope by pilots following published procedures. 
The above ground rules will provide a reasonable assessment of the design 
capability of the system (Smith, 54), provided reasonable component failure 
rates can be obtained. It must be recognised that the concept is a somewhat 
artificial one, in that the distinction between a maintenance error and a 
design fault is frequently arbitrary. Many designs are conducive to 
maintenance error (Norman, 144), to the point where extraordinary skill or 
care may be required to avoid perpetrating an error. In such circumstances, 
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taking full credit for the reliability of the hardware whilst neglecting the poor 
maintainability of the design would appear a significant distortion of reality. 
If, however, the analysis is intended to produce realistic forecasts of accident 
rates and so to enable reduction of the measured accident rates, as described 
above, completely different ground rules are appropriate. Much of the 
mathematically correct formalism and completeness of the traditional 
approach may be neglected as making third or fourth order contributions to 
the outcome. The data and resources required for the analysis may therefore 
be greatly reduced or applied to the most productive aspects of the design. 
Appropriate ground rules for this approach might be as follows: 
- Component manufacturing and assembly defects should be assumed 
at a rate representative of today's technology and operating 
environment. 
Flight crew error must be assumed at representative rates. 
Maintenance crew error must be assumed at representative rates. 
- Component failures which have not resulted in accidents or serious 
incidents in the past need not be addressed, unless: 
Failure of a single such component would be likely to result in 
the loss of the aircraft 
or 
The component design or system architecture is unique and is 
more likely than previous designs to result in loss of the aircraft 
in the event of a failure. 
The merits of traditional approaches to safety analysis must be acknowledged. 
Both the FMEA and the Fault Tree Analysis promote a careful review of the 
system or assembly design down to the component level. A component 
FMEA, conducted by the analyst and designer working together, might or 
might not uncover design weaknesses which could then be addressed. If the 
design were subject to a failure mode which had not been considered by the 
designer (for instance, low cycle fatigue driven by thermal stress), or if the 
analyst had special information regarding system interfaces, this approach 
might well be productive. If the failure mode had been considered, and 
assessed as presenting no problem (due to a misunderstanding or incomplete 
knowledge of the operating environment and the loads on the component) it 
ill 
is unlikely" that this decision would be revisited by the safety 
analyst/ designer team. 
Traditional approaches have been demonstrated to be acceptable during 
engine and airplane certification. Both fault trees and FMEAs specifically 
address the requirement that 'no single failure or probable combination of 
failures' should produce a hazardous effect. Both provide a sufficiently 
detailed description of the engine and systems design to allow the certifying 
authority to gain reasonable confidence that the design is indeed 
conventional, well-understood and of a similar safety standard to previous 
designs. Furthermore, the results (failure rates) of the fault trees or FMEAs 
could theoretically be compared to those of previous propulsion systems 
designs to enable a quantified assessment of comparative safety standards; any 
departure from the traditional safety analysis approaches would prevent such 
a comparison. " 
8.2.2 Component Failure Rate Prediction 
It has been noted above that the synthesis approach to safety analysis (FMEA 
and traditional FTA) assumes the availability of individual component or 
system failure rates. There are a number of approaches to obtaining these 
failure rates, some of which will be enumerated below. The following points 
should be considered first since they apply to several of the approaches below: 
a) The majority of components comprising the propulsion system are either 
unique to that propulsion system, or common to that system and one or two 
similar engine models. Items such as O-rings, nuts, bolts and clamps will 
have more widespread use, but most of the components are unique. 
b) Almost all of the components are very reliable (many thousands of hours 
between failures). Many of the components never fail in service. For 
example; an engine will often spend 10,000 hours or more on wing before 
maintenance to recover lost performance margin. The overall engine life is 
of the order of 30,000 to 40,000 hours. * This shows clearly how most engines 
never experience a component failure sufficient to cause an IFSD or to affect 
airplane safety in any way. 
m In practice, if the team were to review and check every assumption or piece of information 
used in the design, the workload would be prohibitive and the designer would rapidly become 
frustrated and uncooperative. 
-" The validity of this comparison is questionable, since the overall airplane level effect rates 
will be strongly influenced by the thoroughness and conservatism used in any individual 
analysis. 
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c) Propulsion system development cycles are being steadily shortened to 
reduce development costs and gain market advantage. Only a few complete 
engines and flight test airplanes will be involved in the development 
program. 
d) Component testing accurately represents those aspects of the design loading 
with which the test engineer and designer are familiar, and which the 
component was designed to withstand. Component testing is less likely to 
disclose the component response to unforeseen loads. 
e) The expense of engine components and mechanical test stands makes it 
unlikely that a large number of engine components will be tested without 
some overriding cause for concern. 
f) Points b, c and e above imply that there will be at most a few failures of the 
least reliable components during the development program. These are likely 
to be redesigned immediately to improve reliability for the propulsion 
systems to be delivered to airlines. 9 is not possible to obtain a failure 
distribution, or even a credible failure rate, for any of the propulsion system 
mechanical components or subsystems based on development testing. 
8.2.2.1 Published Data 
It has been noted above that the majority of components are unique to the 
engine model or a very few engine models. Published data will not be 
available for the specific component model of interest. It is also noted that 
there is wide variation in the published failure rates for given components, 
even those operated in similar environments (Appendix A). Moreover, the 
published data discovered in the course of the literature search generally 
dated from the 1960s, and was therefore obsoleteý' 
' Furthermore, even if these difficulties could be overcome, data is generally presented as a 
simple failure rate or MTBF. This does not afford any opportunity to establish the scatter in 
failure rates, a component subject to infant mortality with a very low subsequent failure rate 
would have a much better long-term failure rate capability than one where all components 
failed at similar times, although-they might average out to the same MTBF. 
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8.2.2.2 Physics of Failure 
This approach uses generic failure rates as a baseline and then weights failure 
rates by environmental severity factors expected to affect failure rates because 
of the fundamental physics of the failure mode". For example, 
semiconductor failure rates might be expected to be affected by ambient 
temperature in accordance with the Arrhenius equation. The difficulty of 
obtaining initial generic failure rates has already been noted; this approach 
compounds the difficulty by requiring a forecast of the most significant failure 
mode before obtaining the failure rate (unless the failure mode is known, the 
appropriate environmental stress factor cannot be chosen). In fact, the study 
performed in Appendix H showed no clear relationship between easily 
obtained physical parameters and engine-level failure rates (and by 
implication, component level failure rates). It follows that the use of this 
approach would necessitate very detailed environmental data for every 
component. It is unlikely that the analyst, who must divide attention 
between multiple components and systems, would be able to obtain better 
environmental information than the designer, who has many months to 
devote attention to a single component and to the environment experienced 
by that component. 
8.2.2.3 Mechanical Reliability 
The approach to failure rate prediction known as Mechanical Reliability 
(Carter 23, Bompas-Smith 25,26) is based on the premise that component 
failures reflect the overlap between the distribution of loads experienced by a 
component and the distribution of component strengths in the population. " 
A stochastic approach may then be taken to predicting component failure 
rates, provided that the distribution of component strengths and that of 
component loading is completely known, for all load types. Considerable 
emphasis is placed upon reducing the spread in either distribution as a means 
of reducing overlap and hence failures. 
A version of this approach to component strength is currently being used for 
certain specific components where integrity is crucial and where material 
properties have historically made a significant contribution to the failure rate. 
" Assuming the information regarding the failure mode can be developed, it would seem to 
oblige the analyst to return to the designer and obtain assurance that compensating measures 
had been taken to ensure that failure rates were not adversely affected by the increased 
environmental stress. These measures would then invalidate the previous analysis. 
' The terms load and strength are used here in the broadest sense to include all possible modes 
of failure. 
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The resulting analysis addresses material anomalies only using data derived 
from material test specimens. It cannot be used to address manufacturing 
defects or maintenance induced damage, since 
i) These components are too expensive to test thousands of items in 
order to derive the "low strength" tail of the distribution 
ii) As soon as a manufacturing or maintenance induced defect is 
discovered, a program is instituted to purge the fleet of any similar 
items and to prevent recurrence of the problem. Such efforts have 
been very successful for critical rotating parts such as turbine disks. 
This corrective action immediately changes the form of the "strength 
distribution, which becomes unknown once more. 
Difficulties with this approach include the following: The technical effort in 
developing the detailed load spectra required for every component of a 
turbofan would be prohibitive. The unavailability of extreme values of loads 
and strengths has been previously acknowledged by proponents of this 
technique (Freudenthal 143, Carter 23). Moreover, the utility of deriving 
every component failure rate by such means in order to develop a system 
failure rate is extremely questionable, as noted by Carter. His exposition may 
be summarised in the following points: 
1) For mechanical systems, the majority of component failures occur to a few 
of the components - the 'weak links of the chain'. Pareto data is available to 
support this statement, both generally (Carter) and for high bypass turbofans 
(Appendix F). Deriving failure rates for every component would be largely 
wasted effort. 
2) For those components which make significant contributions to the system 
failure rate, failures may not necessarily be independent, since the same 
increase in loading may drive failures in different components. This lack of 
independence invalidates the traditional approach of Fault Tree Analysis/ 
summing FMEA failure rates to derive system reliability. 
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8.2.2.4 Precursor Data 
The use of accident precursor data is based upon the concept that several 
failures are required before an accident can result. The database of failure 
rates measured in service can then be used to make realistic forecasts of 
accident rates. This technique has proved valuable in the nuclear industry, 
which uses system redundancy and functional redundancy to preclude a 
serious accident, but is not so easily applied to a series mechanical system. 
A similar concept was used by the CAAM committee in the initial 
development of hazard ratios, which has been incorporated into the alternate 
approach proposed in this work. 
8.2.2.5 Reliability Growth 
It has been acknowledged that service experience provides the best estimates 
of failure rates (Martin, Strutt and Kinkead, 87). The work of Chapter 7 and 
Appendix F shows that the use of a Reliability Growth approach can predict 
the behaviour of failure rates in service at the overall propulsion system 
level, and that the failure rate of a propulsion system model at entry into 
service is closely related to the failure rates of preceding models. This effect 
may be considered as a reasonable consequence of conservatism and the use 
of precedent in propulsion system designs, driven by the high cost of 
development programs and by a desire to facilitate engine and airframe 
airworthiness certification. . The use of a reliability growth model of the form 
proposed by Smith Industries permits forecasting of the reliabilities of future 
engine models with reasonable assurance, up to ten years into the future, 
providing there is significant service experience with previous engines. 
This approach has been shown to be less successful when applied to 
components or groups of components. Although component groups with 
high failure rates do experience reliability growth, the same may not be true 
for all component groups; the failure rate for a group of components may 39 
actually increase from one model to the next. The effectiveness of reliability 
growth modelling as applied to individual components across engine 
programs is not proven. 
3' This pattern may be perceived as a rational use of limited resources to make design 
improvements where they will most benefit the customer, or as a sporadic, reactive approach to 
system reliability, depending on the perspective of the observer. 
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8.2.2.6 A Note on Confidence Limits 
Many workers in the reliability field have made a practice of specifying high 
confidence limits (90% or 95% confidence) when quantifying failure rates. 
This practice is perceived as offering the following benefits: 
- Use of high confidence limits will compensate for incomplete 
reporting on the number of failures which have actually occurred. 
- If an additional failure occurs in the near future, any remedial action 
based on current data will still probably be appropriate if high 
confidence limits were initially used, all that will be required is a 
statement of a lower confidence limit. 
- The result is perceived as being conservative and therefore 'safer' 
than a less conservative approach. 
- The likelihood and repercussions of the analysis being demonstrated 
to be incorrect by subsequent field experience is reduced. 
The validity of these benefits becomes questionable under closer scrutiny. 
Recently published work differentiates clearly between statistical variation (to 
be addressed by confidence limits) and uncertainty (to be addressed by other 
means). Incomplete reporting - where the extent of the incompleteness is 
unknown - falls under the heading of uncertainty, and should not be 
addressed by mandating high confidence limits. Such an approach is likely to 
produce a misleading impression in the mind of an observer, by a confusion 
between statistical confidence and credibility. 
Moreover, the concept of confidence limits is based on the assumption of a 
normal distribution of failure rates. When the events being considered are 
very rare and no physical basis for assuming a normal distribution exists, this 
assumption is questionable. 
A further consideration applies to the practice of specifying high confidence 
limits. Unless this is done consistently through all calculations and trade 
studies, it is likely that the results of any decisions made based on failure rates 
will be biased by the use of the high confidence limits. Since these decisions 
generally involve weighing benefits against penalties (even safety benefits 
against safety penalties - more frequent inspection of a part may increase the 
risk of induced failure in it and surrounding components), overall safety may 
actually be decreased by this bias. 
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8.2.2.7 Component Failure Rate Conclusions 
It has been shown above that the unique designs of propulsion system 
components, their reliability and the limited time available for the 
development cycle place considerable obstacles in the way of producing 
component failure rates. If an aggregate propulsion system failure rate is 
considered instead, the problem is greatly simplified. The aggregate rate is so 
much higher than the individual rates that it becomes measurable within a 
few years of entry into service (although not within the development 
program) and the statistical variation of the rate from year to year becomes 
relatively small (of the magnitude of the rate itself, or less). It is then possible 
to discern trends over time for the rate, establish relationships between one 
propulsion system rate and another, and produce forecasts with some degree 
of assurance. 
8.2.3 FMEA 
The use of an FMEA to predict propulsion system safety was evaluated at the 
beginning of the study (Chapter 2). It should be recognised that the FMEA is 
generally acknowledged as a very comprehensive technique, and that since 
the RB211-22B was the first high bypass ratio engine designed by Rolls-Royce, 
a comprehensive approach covering all possible failure effects could have 
significant advantages. Notable difficulties experienced with the technique 
were: 
- Labour expended. This approach addresses every component 
regardless of whether it could or could not affect propulsion system 
safety. 
- Volume of output. The large volume of material generated by a 
propulsion system FMEA makes it difficult to extract the data needed 
for a safety assessment, since the entire document may need to be 
reviewed to cover a single failure effect. Kytasty et al have noted that 
the FMEA approach leads to attention being divided amongst an 
overwhelming number of individual problem areas, lack of 
perspective on relative importance of problems and neglect of the 
potential for creating simple solutions by architectural change. 
- Unrealistic failure rates. The failure rates for individual components 
and failure modes were almost impossible to estimate realistically, 
even using experienced engineering judgement from the designers 
most closely involved and service experience from a previous engine 
model. The reliability of some components is so high that it is outside 
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normal everyday experience. Although designers may be familiar with 
the technical capabilities of a component, it may be very difficult to 
make an apparently rash estimate of a component failure rate of 1E-8 or 
111-9/hour, although many components actually realise these failure 
rates. There is, therefore, an inherent conservatism associated with 
engineering judgement, made up of a reluctance to promulgate what 
appears a wildly optimistic number, a sense that conservatism equates 
to greater safety,, and the general inexperience of most experts in 
estimating very low failure rates. It has also been noted that the 
opinions of experts vary widely, so that no overall compensating factor 
can be made for this conservatism (Mosleh, Bier and Apostolakis, 145). 
The use of service data from a previous engine model for component 
failure rates is limited by the difficulties noted in 8.2.2. 
- Questionable arithmetic processes. As noted by Carter, summing 
component failure rates to produce a system failure rate assumes 
independence of failures from one component to the next. Moreover, 
even if the failures are truly independent, arithmetic summing of the 
rates may magnify the inaccuracies of assumptions made in generating 
the failure rates. For example, in the case of a system with a large 
number of components, none of which have yet failed in service, the 
failure rate for each component might reasonably be estimated by 
making a Weibayes-type assumption that a failure occurs in the 
immediate future. However, if such an assumption is made for every 
system component, the system failure rate resulting from such a series 
of assumptions becomes completely unrealistic. 
- Most likely result. The format of the FMEA lends itself to a simple, 
short series of steps in a failure progression. As the number of steps in 
the progression increases, or as alternative results in the failure 
progression are identified and the event path followed, the 
presentation of the analysis becomes more tortuous and the reader 
becomes inclined to question the plausibility of the successive 
assumptions made regarding the failure propagation. In the majority 
of cases of a specific failure, the reader would be right to do so -a bearing failure may be detected during maintenance activity and 
magnetic chip detector inspection on 997o' of occasions. However, 
review of historical propulsion system accidents shows they can and do 
involve unlikely coincidences and apparently far-fetched failure 
progressions. It is difficult for the analyst to present these in a credible 
manner using an FMEA. 
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8.2.4 Fault Tree Analysis 
The selection of the FMEA as the conventional technique to be tested in 
Chapter 2 was based on the original use of the FMEA in RB211 certification. It 
might be argued that selection of Fault Tree Analysis might have produced a 
better result; the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach can be 
evaluated here without actual execution of such an analysis. 
A Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) applied to the RB211-22B would have greatly 
reduced the number of component failures considered, relative to the 
original FMEA. The results would have been more easily understood by the 
reader (provided that he or she was familiar with the FTA pictorial 
conventions) since overall rates of undesired events would be specifically 
presented in a specified location and since it would be relatively easy to track 
down the components making major contributions to the undesired event. "' 
However, since the component failure rates used in the fault tree would be 
the same as those used in the FMEA, which have been demonstrated in 
Chapter 2 to include major inaccuracies, the overall failure rate derived by the 
fault tree would be no better than that extracted from the FMEA, and the 
highest risk components would have been incorrectly identified. 
The fault tree would have allowed assessment of the system architecture. 
This is a significant advantage for the electronic control systems of today's 
engines, but is of little advantage in the case of a hydromechanically 
controlled engine such as the RB211-22B. 
Fault tree analysis would have explicitly assumed independence of failure 
rates, which may not necessarily be the case (Carter) although in the author's 
opinion, such an assumption is a good approximation at the engine level. 
The Fault Tree has a significant disadvantage when compared with an FMEA 
for assessment of a completely novel type of engine; it is necessary to specify 
at the outset which airplane level effects are considered hazardous 
/catastrophic and should be addressed by the Fault Tree(s). This information 
is currently available from a review of the accident record, but in the late 
1960s, when high bypass turbofans were initially being designed, the severity 
" There would be significant advantages to some means of identifying these major contributors 
diagrammatically. For a series mechanical system, where the component failure rates are 
generally summed to produce the overall event rate, this could be done relatively easily by 
depicting the branch (or branches) of the fault tree making the greatest contribution in bold 
typeface. 
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of various failure effects (compared to low bypass turbofans) could only be a 
matter of conjecture. 
8.3 Alternate approach to safety analysis 
8.3.1 Features of alternate approach 
The alternate approach to safety analysis developed in Chapter 6 may be 
summarised as follows: 
-An airplane level analysis of the propulsion system, rather than a 
component level analysis. 
-Analysis is focused on types of accidents which have made major 
contributions to past accident rates. It is proposed for the high bypass 
turbofan-powered commercial transport fleet that the analysis should 
primarily address 
-Uncontained high energy debris 
-Propulsion related crew error 
-Thrust control difficulty 
-Fire 
-Hypothetical accident sequences, or those which have only resulted in 
a single accident for which specific corrective action has been 
implemented, need not generally be considered unless unconventional 
architectures or features greatly increase the potential for an accident 
from a single failure. 
-Historical engine-level failure rates and accident rates are used, 
calculated by a simple average or by reliability growth trending where 
sufficient data exists. Historically representative types and rates of crew 
error are fundamental to the analysis. Consideration of the effect of 
flight phase on failure rate is crucial in those cases where the airframe 
level criticality of the failure is determined by flight phase. 
-There is no requirement to repeat the analysis after small design 
changes or thrust rating changes (unless airplane level mitigating 
features are introduced or invalidated). The component design details 
are transparent to the analyst; it has been shown that continuity of 
design practices and expertise compensates for major component design changes and introduction of new technologies such as electronic 
engine controls. 
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- Mitigating design features are identified which would have prevented 
or reduced the severities of past accidents. Partial credit is then ascribed 
to each of these features, provided that close scrutiny confirms the 
feature would be likely to be effective in the specific application and 
implementation proposed. The partial credit is applied to the 
appropriate element of the accident rate. 
- Detailed review of the details of past accidents is both expected and 
necessary to the evaluation of mitigating design features and the credit 
to be given for them. Techniques such as Event Sequence Analysis may 
be required to uncover installation-specific aspects of failure criticality 
for past accidents (as in the discovery of the very low hazard ratio for 
uncontained failure of the outboard wing-mounted engines of four- 
engined aircraft, discussed in Chapter 6). 
8.3.2 Strengths of the proposed approach 
The approach outlined above has a number of significant advantages 
compared to the conventional safety analysis approaches, as follows: 
The most significant advantage of this approach to safety analysis, compared 
with previous conventional techniques, is the fidelity of quantitative results 
to actual service experience. Accident rates and engine level failure rates 
predicted by this means are extremely close to those occurring in service, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 7. This reflects the extensive historical database of 
accidents used as a baseline for the analysis, together with the general level of 
competence in the design and manufacture of propulsion systems among a 
limited number of European/US manufacturers of commercial transport 
aircraft and their engines. The close agreement between prediction and actual 
experience demonstrated in Chapter 7 may assist the credibility of this 
approach in the design community, although there is likely to be some 
difficulty in gaining acceptance of the approach as discussed below. 
Since the analysis requires comparatively little time and effort once the initial 
research into the historical accident record is complete, it can be executed at 
the design-study phase of a program when it is most likely that the actual 
design will be influenced by analysis results. Proposed mitigating features can 
be associated with quantifiable accident rate reductions rather than the 
somewhat nebulous claim that safety in general will be improved. 
The analysis specifically focuses on those aspects of the design which have the 
potential to mitigate the effects of a propulsion system failure, based on the 
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historical record. The majority of propulsion related accidents do not result 
from combinations of failures, but from individual failures in conjunction 
with extraneous enabling circumstances. The proposed technique specifically 
directs attention to mitigation of the circumstances. 
The results are concise and require no special knowledge (e. g. Boolean logic, 
fault tree pictorial conventions) to be understood. 
The airplane-level view of engine failure effects, as justified by the statistical 
analysis of Chapter 6 and validated by Chapter 7, takes no account of changes 
in the detailed engine component design. This eliminates the requirement to 
repeat the analysis after design changes producing new engine variants, 
provided that the new design is performed in the same manner as previous 
designsý' 
The results of the analysis are reasonably reproducible, being based on the 
historical accident record. There could be some dispute over the exact rate to 
be used; since the definition of an accident is not precisely the same in 
different countries, some events might be excluded under one definition but 
admitted under another. Events which were classified as accidents because of 
injuries incurred in emergency evacuations would have been excluded by 
some experts in the aircraft safety field. Moreover, some individual 
judgement is required in deciding the extent of the partial credit to be allowed 
for mitigating design features; one analyst might consider that a feature 
would avoid 207o of a given type of accident where another might assign a 
507o credit. However, this variability of judgement is likely to be within a 
factor of five or ten, whereas estimation of failure rates without a baseline 
may vary by up to two or three factors of ten (as in Chapter 2). 
Review of the advantages cited above shows that the technique meets many 
of the criteria originally specified as desirable in a safety analysis 
methodology. The disadvantages of the proposed approach are considered in 
detail below. 
41 In this context, "the same approach" need not imply the same analytical tools; it is the 
structured design process by a group which has acquired an appropriate level of technical 
sophistication, of defining design requirements, validating these requirements, complying with 
published internal Design Practices which incorporate the cumulative knowledge of that 
design function, review by peers and technical experts at critical phases of the design, testing 
and validation of the hardware, and so forth. 
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8.3.3 Limitations of the proposed approach 
The major limitation of this airplane-level approach is the lack of guidance it 
gives to the component or system designer in evaluating the relative safety 
benefits and penalties of design options and in identifying problems with 
system architecture or deficiencies in detail designý'. The proposed approach 
is of no assistance in reducing component failure rates. The insensitivity of 
the approach to design decisions may also reduce its credibility with the 
design community, or at worst, lead them to believe that their design choices 
do not affect safety. Nothing could be further from the truth; the proposed 
approach depends upon the design community maintaining the diligence 
and foresight with which they have approached previous propulsion system 
designs, and any reduction in such diligence will invalidate this historically 
based approach. Communication of this point will be essential to successful 
implementation of this technique. 
The lack of detail and generic nature of the approach may be interpreted as 
resulting in a superficial analysis incorporating insufficient mathematical 
rigour. It is difficult to prove that such a concept as 'continuity of design 
community technical sophistication' will always result in reliability growth 
between very dissimilar engine models; although the concept may be 
relatively easy to accept for close derivatives. The approach is completely 
empirical, and will appear unsatisfactory to those who do not consider the 
historical evidence sufficient to predict future behaviour. 
In the event of a completely new approach to design (such as the greatly 
increased validation activity associated with early ETOPS), the approach 
would be difficult to apply. It is not possible to forecast the quantitative effect 
on failure rates of such a paradigm shift; nor is feasible to use the historically 
derived accident and failure rates in the event of a new manufacturer 
entering the propulsion field, or an existing manufacturer producing a 
propulsion system based on principles not previously used in commercial 
transport (e. g. a ram-jet). 
' Conventional techniques are generally assumed to be helpful in this respect, yet this 
assumption is open to question. In practice, only the most naive errors or those occasioned by 
misinterpretation of system interfaces are likely to be discovered by FMEA or FTA; the safety 
analyst cannot devote as much time and attention to the design as the original designer because 
the analyst must address many systems and assemblies. Much of the designers activity must (and should) be accepted in good faith by the analyst. 
124 
8.4 Potential for improvements to alternate approach 
The proposed approach is based primarily upon the service history of the 
high bypass ratio commercial transport fleet. In some accident records there 
was little or no detailed information available; this severely curtailed the 
ability to propose and assess mitigating design features. More detailed 
information would enable the construction of event sequence sheets and 
improved understanding of event causal factors. Close liaison with engine 
and airframe manufacturers might reveal such accident details. It is likely 
that such a study would enable mitigating features to be identified for 
accidents resulting from propulsion system fires, for example. 
The mitigating design features proposed in this study are concepts rather than 
detailed design proposals. Each concept should be reviewed by a wide 
audience, including line pilots, airworthiness authorities, engine 
manufacturers and the many groups within the airframe design community 
to establish its practicality, desirability and possible associated penalties before 
a firm decision could be made that it should be implemented in future 
aircraft. A necessary part of such a review would be some form of validation 
to demonstrate that each proposed feature would actually deliver the 
intended safety benefit; the validation means might include the following: 
" Expert review by line pilots. 
" Review of propulsion-related accidents since 199443 (and therefore not in 
the database used to derive the mitigating design features) to assess the 
likely effectiveness of the proposed concepts. 
" In some cases, simulator modelling of proposed flight deck indications 
may enable such a validation. 
8.5 The Role Of The Alternate Approach 
The multiple roles of a propulsion system safety analysis were pointed out 
earlier in this work and may be briefly recapitulated at this point: 
- To gain airworthiness certification 
- To assess the safety of the design compared with previous designs 
'The extended interval between the occurrenoe of an accident and the publication of accident 
findings, together with the infrequent occurrence of propulsion-related accidents, makes such a 
review impracticable before publication of this study. 
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- To improve the propulsion system safety by identifying safety 
concerns and enabling appropriate design changes 
- To facilitate engineering trade studies where safety is a significant 
factor by provision of credible quantitative risk analysis/ failure rate 
forecasting. 
The traditional methods of propulsion system safety analysis have been 
historically successful in gaining engine/ propulsion system certification. 
Much credence is placed by the airworthiness authorities in the structured, 
comprehensive approach of an FMEA or FTA; it is felt that since every 
component or failure condition has been addressed, the analysis has been 
thorough and nothing is likely to have been inadvertently omitted. There is 
much to be said for this viewpoint if the system is completely unfamiliar or if 
no service experience is available. 
Some members of the airworthiness authorities believe that the reason for 
the excellent propulsion system accident experience record relating to 
multiple independent failures is the structured analyses which have been 
conducted to comply with certification requirements. This may be the case" 
when considering systems with significant architectural flexibility; fuel 
systems and electronic control systems are notable examples. Moreover, there 
is a general concern among regulatory authorities that as propulsion systems 
become more highly integrated with aircraft systems, visibility of system 
interactions under failure conditions will be lost unless a structured analysis 
is completed. 
Lastly, it has already been mentioned that traditional analyses, showing 
compliance with a standard of Catastrophic failure conditions being 
Extremely Improbable (1E-9/hour or flight) have the advantage of facilitating 
comparison from one certification program to another, since they are 
assumed to be conducted with similar ground rules. 
Given the above advantages ascribed to traditional methods, it is not likely 
that the traditional methods could be immediately discarded across the board 
for propulsion system certification; nor should they ever be discarded for 
some systems (those with architectural flexibility). It is proposed that the 
enhanced approach be used in conjunction with more traditional approaches. 
The relative emphasis placed on each may change through the years as the 
alternate approach becomes more generally accepted. 
" It is the authors personal experience that the certification safety analyses are generally 
conducted so late in the development program that their outcome is actually very unlikely to 
affect the design. 
126 
Specific implementation proposals are as follows: 
- The enhanced approach should be considered by airframe manufacturers as 
a means of forecasting propulsion related accident rates and of selecting 
mitigating design features for reduction of those accident rates. 
- Specific aspects of the research, which deal with the quantitative forecasting 
of engine-level failure rates and their variation with flight phase, should be 
used by the engine manufacturers as soon as possible. 
- The detailed assessment of engine component and assembly design should 
be addressed as before, by detailed design reviews, incorporation of lessons 
learned, and hazard analyses for the airworthiness authorities comparing 
design safeguards and margins to those of previous engines. Supporting FTAs 
and FMEAs may be significantly curtailed in comparison to previous 
analyses. 
- Where systems architecture is dissimilar to that of previous systems, a full- 
up FTA may be necessary. 
- For series mechanical systems, hazard analysis sheets (demonstrating the 
similarity of the design to those in service) in conjunction with the enhanced 
approach developed in this study, should be sufficient to demonstrate 
compliance with the safety requirements of the airworthiness authorities. 
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
WORK 
9.1 Conclusions 
a) The propulsion system safety analysis plays multiple roles; it may assist 
propulsion system design, assess propulsion system safety and also support 
engine and airplane certification. 
b) Current methods of propulsion system safety analysis are only partly 
successful in these roles. A baseline safety assessment of the RB211-22B 
showed that a FMEA approach did not forecast failure rates comparable to 
those experienced in service nor correctly identify high risk components or 
modules; hence the analysis would have been misleading rather than useful 
during propulsion system design and the assessment of propulsion system 
safety. 
C) It is proposed that failure effects to be addressed by the propulsion 
system safety analysis should be selected and prioritised according to historical 
accident rates. The failure effects considered during the analysis of high 
bypass ratio turbofans used in commercial transport airplanes should include 
the following: 
Uncontained rotor failure 
Propulsion failure accompanied by crew error 
Thrust control difficulties 
Fire. 
d) Traditional structured analytical approaches to propulsion system 
safety analysis rely upon the availability of component failure rates. Such 
failure rates are not generally available at entry into service since reliability is 
too high to obtain failure rates during development testing, since propulsion 
systems incorporate many unique components and published failure rates for 
off-the-shelf components are very misrepresentative, and since an approach 
to using service experience to develop failure rates at the component level is 
yet to be developed. The unavailability of these failure rates limits the 
effectiveness of traditional structured analysis techniques. 
e) Historical accident records suggest that independent combinations of 
failures do not make a significant contribution to the propulsion system 
accident rate. The record shows that single failures accompanied by adverse 
circumstances are a more significant contributor. 
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f) It is therefore recommended that quantitative safety analysis of 
propulsion systems be focused on airplane level effects rather than on 
component failures. Forecasts of accident rates based on historical levels, 
with credit allowed for mitigating design features, have been demonstrated to 
give good agreement with service experience, both for a derivative engine 
and a new centre-line engine incorporated in new aircraft. 
g) It is suggested that the alternate approach of forecasting airplane-level 
effects using historical propulsion system accident data is generally applicable 
to all conventional commercial transport high bypass ratio propulsion 
systems where the designer/ manufacturer has previous experience in 
commercial transport propulsion systems powered by large turbofans. It is 
further suggested that the consistency of propulsion system failure rates at 
entry into service is attributable to the continuity of design expertise within 
engine and airplane manufacturers, so that new designs are partially mature 
at entry into service. Nevertheless, a qualitative review of each new design 
should be conducted to establish that the new design is sufficiently similar in 
design philosophy and technology that historical engine-level failure rates are 
applicable. 
h) Engine level failure rates can be forecast with some assurance at entry 
into service using reliability growth modelling, based on data from previous 
engine models, or on a simple average where data is insufficient to support 
trending. 
i) Small design changes such as thrust increases or component design 
changes for a derivative engine, have no apparent effect on engine level 
failure rates overall, (apart from those changes introduced to address a known 
reliability problem). It follows that a new propulsion system safety analysis 
need not be executed after each such a design change. 
9.2 Recommendations for Further Work 
A) If this approach is successful in identifying mitigating design features 
and incorporating them into new propulsion systems, the propulsion-related 
accident rate will be significantly reduced for new aircraft. As newer types 
become predominant in the world fleet, dilution effects will reduce the 
overall propulsion-related accident rate; some mitigating design features 
might even be retrofitted into older airplanes, as is being done with the 
"Engine Fail" indication, accelerating this improvement in the accident rate. 
It follows that eventually this study, based on accidents over the first twenty- 
five years of high-bypass turbofans, will no longer be applicable since the 
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original predominating accident causes will have been greatly reduced. A new 
study will therefore be required in fifteen or twenty years time to address the 
new major contributors to the propulsion related accident record. 
B) The approach used in this study i. e. constructing the safety analysis 
around the historical accident record, may be used to address other systems on 
commercial transport aircraft, and other aircraft fleets besides the high-bypass 
turbofan commercial transport fleet. The approach may be applied in any fleet 
where detailed accident records are available, there have been sufficient 
accidents to draw meaningful conclusions regarding the vital few causes of 
failure, and the design and construction of the fleet is conducted by a few 
manufacturers with a well disciplined design process. Specific examples of 
applicability would include: 
- helicopters 
- commuter airplanes 
- commercial transport fleet (mechanical systems excluding propulsion) 
Q The lack of success of reliability growth modelling at the component 
level in this study may be attributed in part to the sparsity of SDR data and the 
concomitant difficulty in isolating trends from random variation. The ability 
to predict component reliabilities would be of great commercial interest in 
spares forecasting at entry into service; it is possible that examination of 
component failure rates rather than IFSD rates would enable the construction 
of component level reliability growth models. Such a model would be of 
limited value in safety analysis, however, since failure rates of critical parts (those which are primarily concerned in safety analyses) do not follow 
classical reliability growth patternsý". 
D) The enhanced safety analysis process developed in this study does not 
assist a component designer in making safety-related trade studies. It is crucial 
that some effective means of assisting the designer be developed; one possible 
approach would be to identify areas where the design process has been only 
partly successful, so that a component experiences early failures in service. 
Examination of multiple such areas might reveal some common features, 
implying weaknesses in aspects of the design and validation process which 
' Premature failure of a critical part is generally handled by a very aggressive field program, 
and by an internal audit to establish where the design process was lacking. As a result, these failures are generally single events, so that most critical part designs do not have a measurable failure rate in any meaningful sense. 
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could be identified and corrected. The safety analyst could be tasked with 
monitoring these aspects for new designs until an improved design process 
was implemented and validated. This approach would necessarily be internal 
to the engine or airframe manufacturer's organisation. 
E) The alternate approach does not readily lend itself to the safety analysis 
of completely novel propulsion systems based on new technologies or 
technologies without significant experience in the commercial transport 
aircraft environment. It is possible that a similar approach could be applied 
by analysing the propulsion system at the sub-system level rather than the 
airframe level, for those sub-systems with previous experience upon which 
the analysis could be based. A sensitivity analysis would be appropriate 
where the previous experience used was in a different environment. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ai Introduction to literature review 
Since comparatively little has been published relating directly to the safety 
analysis of high bypass-ratio gas turbines, the literature search extended 
over a considerable range of related subjects, in the hope that aspects of 
related work would prove pertinent to the topic of research. The search 
goals are first summarised, and the search methodology outlined, before a 
more detailed discussion of the literature pertaining to each goal in turn. 
The literature search was intended to: 
Ascertain the material already published on the safety analysis of 
high-bypass ratio jet engines, including guidance on the best means 
of conducting such an analysis. 
Review safety analysis techniques in general, in order to establish 
their relevance to jet engines. 
Establish sources of failure rate data for jet engines and their 
constituent components, to be used in quantification of safety 
analyses. 
Locate service data on high bypass-ratio jet engines, showing 
frequency of safety related events and accidents, and giving technical 
details of failure sequences of such events and accidents. 
Research reliability modeling approaches and techniques, in order 
to establish whether they could usefully be applied in new ways to 
safety analysis. 
Assure reasonable familiarity with the technical design pertaining 
to each type of safety-related event or issue, in order to assess the 
best means of addressing it in the safety analysis. Examples would 
include lifing of critical parts, fire precautions, thrust reverser 
system design, and the relationship between design and the 
propensity to maintenance error. 
In addition to the above specific goals, the search was intended to promote 
general familiarity with the field of jet engine reliability, and to establish 
the originality and utility of this research topic. 
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A ii Literature search strategy 
Both on-line and manual search strategies were pursued, taking particular 
care to establish citation paths on both sides of the Atlantic, since it soon 
became apparent that a philosophical conflict existed between European 
reliability practitioners and those in the US. A relevance tree was 
constructed to facilitate identification of search paths (Figure Al), together 
with a diagram of sources and interrogation strategies employed (Figure 
A2). 
Initial sources of references included: 
Cranfield Library catalogue, searched by keywords, by names of 
relevant manufacturers and by relevant sponsoring bodies, as 
follows: 
(RELIABILITY or SAFETY or FAILURE or ACCIDENT or 
AIRWORTHINESS) and (AIRCRAFT ENGINE or POWERPLANT 
or TURBOFAN or AEROENGINE or GAS TURBINE or 
PROPULSION SYSTEM) 
Rolls-Royce, General Electric, Pratt & Whitney, Allison, Garrett, 
SNECMA, Turbomeca, MTU, Fiat, Hispano-Suiza, Boeing, Airbus, 
British Aerospace. 
Flight Safety Foundation, IMechE. 
- Proceedings of Advances in Reliability Technology Symposia for 
years 1980,1982,1984,1986,1988,1990 
- Proceedings of 1979 National Reliability Conference, and of 
Reliability'85, Reliability'87, Reliability'89 and Reliability'91 
- Proceedings of Safety and Reliability Society Symposia, 1981 to 1993 
- FAA Service Difficulty Reports for the RB211, Tay, V2500, CF6, 
CFM56, PW2000 and PW4000 engines, from 1986 to 1993. 
- CAA database report of Engine-related Failures, Malfunctions and 
Defects, for the ALF 502, CFM56, R13211, PW2000, PW4000, JT9D, 
V2500 and Tay engines, from 1984 to 1993 
- NTSB database report of engine-related accidents and incidents, 1983 
to 1993. 
- Texts available in Cranfield Library, together with their 
bibliographies and references 
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- On-line search of NASA, European Aerospace Database, Society of 
Automotive Engineers, Compendex and NTIS databases from 1980 
to 1994 using keywords (GAS TURBINE or JET ENGINE or 
AEROENGINE or TURBOFAN) and (RELIABILITY or FAILURE or 
AIRWORTHINESS or SAFETY) 
- On-line search of IMechE database, using keywords AIRCRAFT 
ENGINE, SAFETY, RELIABILITY. 
- Review of recent articles and their references in professional 
journals, viz.: 
Reliability Engineering and Systems Safety, volumes 41 to 44 
journal of Engineering for Gas Turbines and Power, 1984 to 1994 
IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 1992 to 1994 
- Solicitation of advice from personal contacts in engine and airframe 
industry. 
Each source thus located formed a new departure point, citing further 
references, or being cited itself by more recent works. In fields where the 
volume of published literature appeared too great for an exhaustive 
survey, only those references with multiple citations or with titles of 
particular interest were pursued. 
A iii Review of literature 
a) Safety analysis techniques 
A compendium of safety analysis techniques in general use is provided by 
Clemens (63), outlining advantages and disadvantages of each. Many of 
these techniques are primarily intended to assure the safety of an 
individual maintaining or otherwise interacting with a system or plant at 
close quarters, rather than assurance of design safety, and are therefore less 
appropriate to the assessment of jet engine safety (a fundamental ground 
rule being that an operating jet engine is, by its nature, hazardous to 
approach). A detailed discussion of the applicability of different 
assessment techniques is given in Chapter 5. 
The background and major philosophical issues of system safety are 
discussed by Terry (7); whilst affording valuable insights into key 
conceptual problems of safety analysis, this does not, and is not intended to 
give specific recommendations on the best way to conduct an analysis. 
Guidance on the discipline of system safety in general can be found in 
Roland and Moriarty (64); this guidance is generally framed within the 
context of compliance with requirements and contract items of military 
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programmes, or of the superposition of a 'safety system' upon an existing 
design (Brown (65)), and emphasizes correct documentation rather than 
appropriate selection of analysis techniques or validation of failure rates 
used. Much of the material is irrelevant to the analysis of commercial 
products in general and civil jet engines in particular, but techniques such 
as Fault Tree Analysis and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis are described 
in rather more detail than is given by Clemens (63). Van Baal (66), 
addressing commercial airplane design, recommends a Hazard Analysis be 
performed to identify those airplane functions for which loss of an 
individual function could lead to a hazard to airplane or crew. FMEAs 
may then be performed upon the hardware and software supporting such 
functions. This approach gives no consideration to failures which could 
be actively hazardous, or to multiple failures. Collins and Leathley (67) 
point out that the analysis itself may be subject to errors and bias. 
b) Sources of failure rate data 
Generic failure rates have been published for a wide variety of 
components used in jet engines, among other applications. Use of such 
generic rates is currently under considerable scrutiny, even for the 
electronic components for which the approach is best suited. Shooman 
(68) points out that failure rates nominally from the same source (MIL- 
HDBK-217 (69), and MIL-HDBK-217A, (70) may vary by a factor of ten for 
the same component. Feduccia and Klion (71) have expressed concern 
over the link between stress-analysis reliability predictions, based upon 
MIL-HDBK-217, and electronic component failure rates experienced in the 
field; their comparison of predicted and observed failure rates indicated 
that predictions were generally pessimistic. Shurman (72) shows predicted 
subsystem failure rates, based on MIL-HDBK-217, being up to 62 times 
those measured, for military aircraft applications. Recent work conducted 
by the University of Maryland (55) suggests that the use of published 
failure rates should be completely avoided, even for electronic 
components, and an approach based upon the physics of failure should be 
employed instead. 
Smith (54) emphasizes the importance of properly accounting for different 
environments when using published generic rates, and of only making 
comparisons between reliability predictions which use data from the same 
source. Given the limited information available to the analyst, correctly 
accounting for different environments for a large number of components 
is likely to require an impracticable level of resources. Every effort should 
therefore be made to obtain failure rates seen in service on similar 
components, and the published data should be considered as a benchmark 
with which to compare these empirical results, rather than taken at face 
value. The work of Andre (73) illustrates some of the difficulties in such 
an exercise, where he assesses the scatter in failure rates due to the outlook 
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of the individual reliability engineer when using generic failure rates and 
severity factors. 
Table Al gives some specific examples of the differences between 
published failure rates and those currently experienced in service by the 
RB211-524 G/H (74). Reference to historical trends for jet engine reliability 
(1) confirm that overall failure rates as indicated by in-flight shutdown 
rates, have improved by an order of magnitude over the past twenty years; 
it is therefore no surprise to note a difference between published and 
current failure rates for individual components. Conversely, reference to 
the service records of many other engine models with apparently similar 
operating environments (such as the RB211-22B) would reveal a much 
higher failure rate than that of the RB211-524G/H. It is difficult to see how 
use of environmental severity factors would properly account for this 
effect, which may be attributed in part to reliability growth. 
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c) Service data 
Undoubtedly the most comprehensive records of engine failures in service 
are those kept by the engine manufacturers; since in the event of a failure 
their field representatives are immediately approached by the airline for 
technical advice and possible redress, and since the field representatives 
have a direct link (paper or electronic) back to the parent company. These 
records are proprietary and not generally available for consultation 
without special permission of the company involved; this permission has 
been granted by Rolls-Royce and the relevant material is located in 
Volume IL 
Otherwise, subsets of engine failures falling into well-defined categories 
may be reported to the appropriate regulatory authorities by the 
manufacturer, such as a Service Difficulty Report (45) reported to the FAA, 
or a Failure or Malfunction (46) reported to the CAA. It should be 
emphasized that this system is not comprehensive or consistent, 
depending in part upon the airline involved, the country in which the 
event took place and the interpretation of the individual responsible for 
filing the report. Some service incidents are called to the attention of 
other bodies such as the NTSB (75) which maintain independent 
databases. 
Statistical summaries of particular types of failure are published at 
intervals by various bodies within the industry (18), (50 - 52) and (35 - 44); 
although these are limited in scope, they often provide comprehensive 
coverage of all instances of a particular type of failure. The completeness 
of reporting of the above references is assessed in Appendix Q it is 
sufficient to remark at this point that available reports in the public 
domain do not permit failure rates to be produced for all failure types and 
engine models of interest, and that quantitative comparisons of predicted 
and actual failure rates are therefore limited to a few engine models. 
Aircraft accidents form a better-documented (47) and more accessible 
source of information than do safety-related engine failures, being 
recorded in the World Airline Accident Summary (76) in sufficient detail 
to isolate those accidents in which a high bypass-ratio engine was a 
significant factor. Fortunately for the industry, there are too few 
propulsion-related accidents to generate statistically significant failure rates 
for individual engine models, but records of accidents nevertheless form 
an extremely valuable resource for reviewing sequences of events leading 
to accidents (the necessary technical detail being obtained from individual 
accident reports). 
156 
d) Reliability modeling 
Many textbooks have been published giving general overviews of 
reliability modeling techniques, which form the foundation of much of 
the safety analysis produced today. The approach varies from the practical 
(Smith, (54)) to the theoretical (Kapur and Lamberson, (79)) and is 
considerably affected by the background of the author (electronics versus 
process plant versus mechanical engineering). The following were found 
to be particularly useful in the context of this study; Dhillon and Singh (80) 
(which also includes comprehensive reference lists) and Lloyd and Lipow 
(81). Alternative approaches are to be found in Beasely (82), Aven (83), 
Blockley (84), Green and Bourne (85) and Shooman (68). Previously 
published literature surveys include those of Lemon and Manning (86) 
and Martin, Strutt and Kinkead (87), and Taneja and Safie (22). 
Reliability modeling, as it pertains to safety analysis, may be considered as 
falling into several distinct areas: 
Forecasting failure distributions of individual components, either 
analytically or statistically. 
Synthesis of system failure rates given individual component 
failure rates, to assess design reliability. 
Verification of design reliability predictions by test. 
Estimation of the likely achieved reliability, given the design 
reliability (in other words, accounting for manufacturing errors, 
operational difficulties and maintenance problems). 
1. Analytical forecasting of failure distributions requires a thorough 
understanding of both the strength distribution of the component and the distribution of stresses to which it is exposed. The stress-strength interference technique, originally developed in the 1960s (Ghare, 88, and Kececioglu, 89) is discussed at some length by Carter (23); a brief summary being provided by Chapter 6 of Dhillon and Singh (80). Specific examples 
of its use in relation to aircraft engine components can be found in the 
works of Bompas-Smith (25), (26). It is not rigorously used in critical 
component life prediction for gas turbines due to the complexity of the 
models required (Harrison and Shepherd (90)), but aspects of the technique 
such as the statistical assessment of mission mix to generate the load distribution (Metz and Zimmerman (91), Osias, Meyer and Hill (92)) and the use of statistical strength distributions in conjunction with nominal design loads (Forrester and Thevonov (93), Pickard (94), Jeal (95), Adamson 
(96), Harrison and Shepherd (90)) are widespread. Hunsley (97) claims that 
this deterministic approach is more promising than the use of generic failure rates with severity. Martin (28) proposes the use of a complex 
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equipment model for such equipment as aircraft engines, in the context of 
explaining observed failure distributions rather than actual forecasting of 
reliability. 
Purely statistical forecasting of failure distributions generally requires 
hundreds or thousands of component tests and failures (Moore and 
Ebbeler (98)) before a distribution can be modelled with confidence. The 
high reliability of current commercial jet engines confines the analyst's 
interest to the short-life 'tail' of the distribution in many instances (the 
majority of components are retired from service without failing); 
techniques dealing with the modeling of distributions given a few failures 
at one of the extremes include Weibull analysis (Kao (99), Abernethy (100)), Extreme-value theory (Gumbel (101)), and threshold techniques (Smith (29)). However, the majority of the modeling techniques discussed 
require half a dozen failures of a single component or design before the distribution can be characterised; in practice, demonstrably hazardous failures are not permitted to recur several times in commercial aircraft 
engines without corrective action being instituted, throughout the fleet 
and in forthcoming designs. Gottfried and Weiss (8) summarizes the 
problem of making reliability predictions with only minimal data 
available. 
The challenge of forecasting the failure distribution of a component 
subjected to design changes in response to each failure may be partly met by Reliability Growth modeling. The basic concept of the technique is described by Duane (19) and model refinements are outlined in Lawlor (20) Mead (21) and Taneja (22), and models compared by Perera (102), who found that both Duane and Weibull-based models gave good agreement 
with observed trends for an electronic processor. Application of the 
technique to successive engine models is implied in Jackson (103) and Lloyd and Tye (11); Boiles and Hadel (104) has noted that the apparent 'step-change' in reliability from parent design to derivative may be 
accounted for, in part, by instantaneous incorporation into the derivative 
of all of the improvements gradually being introduced into the parent fleet. 
2. Once individual component failure rates have been established,. system failure rates may be synthesized from component failure rates by fault tree 
analysis, as described by Haasl (105) and discussed by Bendell and Ansell (106) (or by Markov modeling for state-dependent systems). Such 
synthesis generally assumes independent component failures; Martin (107) discusses the appropriate mathematical treatment for mutually exclusive failures (such as alternative failure modes of a single component) and of the frequently encountered consequential failures (such as are identified in 
an FMEA). Ansell and Walls (108) discusses the issue of dependency of failure modes in greater detail, and warns of the tendency to model a statistically apparent dependency without investigating the actual causal 
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technique to successive engine models is implied in Jackson (103) and 
Lloyd and Tye (11); Boiles and Hadel (104) has noted that the apparent 
'step-change' in reliability from parent design to derivative may be 
accounted for, in part, by instantaneous incorporation into the derivative 
of all of the improvements gradually being introduced into the parent 
fleet. 
2. Once individual component failure rates have been established, system 
failure rates may be synthesized from component failure rates by fault tree 
analysis, as described by Haasl (105) and discussed by Bendell and Ansell (106) (or by Markov modeling for state-dependent systems). Such 
synthesis generally assumes independent component failures; Martin (107) 
discusses the appropriate mathematical treatment for mutually exclusive 
failures (such as alternative failure modes of a single component) and of 
the frequently encountered consequential failures (such as are identified in 
an FMEA). Ansell and Walls (108) discusses the issue of dependency of failure modes in greater detail, and warns of the tendency to model a 
statistically apparent dependency without investigating the actual causal 
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relationship. The issue of dependent failures is explicitly applied to 
turbine blade-sets of an aircraft engine by Martin, Strutt and Kinkead (87). 
Architecturally simple systems may be modelled by FMEA alone, using the 
chain rule to develop the system failure rate from individual component 
failure rates; disadvantages of this approach are raised by Kytasty et al (12). 
3. The majority of reliability predictions regarding high bypass ratio jet 
engines cannot be confirmed during engine development testing; since the 
predicted MTBFs are so high that no failures are expected during 
development running, and reliability can therefore only be truly measured 
in service. However, engine and component testing can give some 
measure of the robustness of the whole system, compared to previously 
established benchmarks, and of such parameters as component fatigue life, 
as described by Horsley (109). 
4. Most of the references cited above address what Smith (54) has termed 
the "design reliability", resulting from 'the inherent reliability of the 
chosen components, their quantity, method of interconnection and from 
the configuration of the equipment ..... it is never achieved in practice. ' This bears a strong relationship to the basic engine failure rate quoted by 
manufacturers; failures attributable to exterior influences such as Foreign 
Object Damage, maintenance errors, flight crew error or aircraft systems 
are added to this to produce the total failure rate, which determines the 
safety of the propulsion system as a whole. Thurston (110) points out the 
importance of considering the pilot, aircraft and engines as a whole, rather 
than assessing design in isolation. Dhillon (111) provides a brief overview 
of human errors in mechanical systems, and Hunns and Daniels (112) 
discusses the quantification of human factors in reliability assessment, 
offering the method of paired comparisons as a means of extracting 
probabilities from the unquantified experience of an expert group. 
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e) Component failure mechanisms and failure propagation 
Some consideration of the failure mechanisms prevalent in jet engines is 
appropriate to a study of reliability and safety analysis techniques, as is a 
basic technical understanding of potential safety-related failure effects. 
1. Component failure 
Pinkel et al (113) presents an overview of failure mechanisms important 
to jet engine operation; although advances in technology have altered the 
relative importance of the failure modes cited, the basic principles remain 
unchanged. The predominant mechanisms of jet-engine component 
failure are still fatigue (high and low-cycle), creep, wear, corrosion, 
overtemperature, and mechanical overload attributable to such events as 
foreign object damage. Interaction between different damage mechanisms 
and loading orientations is the subject of considerable debate; various 
alternatives have been proposed to simple summation using Miner's law (for example, Tseitlin and Fedorchenko (114), propose superimposing 
multi-component loading by accounting for dynamic cycle asymmetry, 
resulting in the use of somewhat lower safety factors. ) 
The low cycle fatigue (LCF) lifing of critical parts such as compressor and 
turbine discs was discussed above in some detail, in the latter portion of 
subsection (d), although it is worth noting that concerns have been 
expressed by Mahorter, Fowler and Salvino (115) over the use of statistical 
materials data in such life prediction; they have documented significant 
discrepancies between disc lives so predicted and those actually measured 
during a programme of spin-pit testing (measured lives were found to be 
considerably lower). Occasionally alternative approaches to life prediction 
are suggested such as that of Drexler and Statecny (116) who hypothesize 
that any disc crack will be accompanied by a large number of slightly 
smaller cracks which nucleated shortly after the first one (assuming a homogeneous disc), thus greatly increasing the likelihood of successful 
crack detection. The main stream of disc lifing philosophy, however, is as described by Harrison and Shepherd (90). 
High cycle fatigue is of considerable importance to the reliability of flexible 
components subject to severe vibration, such as blades and tubes. Voysey (117) initially predicted that the introduction of high pressure ratios would 
be likely to result in compressor stall and consequent high-cycle fatigue 
blade failure, by analogy with wing flutter (a prediction born out by 
subsequent experience). Considerable efforts are made to detune the 
component natural frequency from engine running speeds (and harmonics), but cracking from some other cause may alter component 
stiffness to permit eventual HCF failure as documented by Yaker (118), 
who conducted laboratory testing of turbine blades, simulating service 
running, and determined that initial failures originated from stress- 
rupture cracking, followed by high-cycle fatigue. 
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Creep presents a major problem in the life of turbine blades, as described by 
Bagnall (119), even though recent blade designs incorporate sophisticated 
internal and surface film-cooling. Creep life prediction may be augmented 
by inspection of unfailed components to establish the remaining life, as 
described by Singh and Thomas (120). 
2. Fire safety 
Propulsion system fires generally originate from the coexistence of leaked 
flammable fluid (neglecting titanium and magnesium fires for the 
moment), an ignition source (electrical or thermal) and an appropriate air 
supply. Conflicting work has been published on the temperature of the 
ignition source required to ignite leaked fluids; Goodall (121) 
has 
published experimental data supporting considerably higher surface 
temperatures required for the ignition of kerosene in engine 
compartments than have been reported by others (Johnson et al 
(122), 
Clodfelter and Anderson (123) and earlier work by Kuchta et al (124,125)). 
The discrepancy may be attributable to experimental technique, such as the 
degree of fluid atomisation, surface geometry differences, or to the use of 
airflows representative of those in an engine nacelle. The wide variation 
in measured spontaneous ignition temperatures, together with the effect 
of air pressure and local ventilation flows renders the confident prediction 
of powerplant fire or fire safety difficult, - minimising the 
likelihood of 
flammable fluid leakage would appear to be the best means of 
defence 
against fire. 
3. Common mode failures 
The majority of common-mode failures affecting multiple engines are 
imposed by the external environment; notably by the fuel or air supplied 
to the engine, by foreign object ingestion, or by human error (discussed 
below). Independent, but near-simultaneous failures by the same failure 
mechanism on multiple engines form the exception rather than the rule. 
However, the potential for multiple-engine system malfunction under 
unusual operating conditions continues to present a real and significant 
threat. 
Early problems associated with contaminated fuel have been documented 
by Love, Hatchett and Peat (126). More rigorous fuel specifications have 
addressed some of these issues, but the potential for gross contamination 
by ice, dirt or bacteriological activity still remains. The role of excessive rain and hail in causing multiple engine flameout is 
outlined briefly by Devine (127). The potential for multiple engine birdstrike has long been recognised throughout the industry; many such 
incidents are recorded in recent birdstrike studies (128,129). 
There is almost no published material documenting any effects of man- 
made electromagnetic interference (EMI) upon aircraft engines. Lightning 
activity in close proximity to the aircraft has been recorded as causing failure of engine instrumentation (Clifford (130)) such as rpm and exhaust 
gas temperature gauges. Lightning strike has also produced engine stalls, 
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flameouts and rollbacks on small, fuselage mounted engines; instances of 
multiple engines being affected have been noted by Plumer (131). These 
events are ascribed to ingestion of the hot air column produced by the 
lightning (and therefore unlikely to affect larger, high bypass-ratio 
engines); there are no published instances of induced electromagnetic 
effects leading to engine malfunction, although the potential for such a 
common mode failure remains a cause for concern (Dubro, (132)). 
Since aircraft services (pneumatic bleed, electrical power and hydraulic 
power) are supplied by more than one engine, and designed to operate 
satisfactorily with one engine shut down, the architecture of each system 
has considerable redundancy. Consequently, little consideration has been 
given in the past to the loss of multiple systems, other than as a result of 
uncontained engine failure (addressed by system separation, as described 
by Lloyd and Tye (133)), or of multiple engine shutdown (in which case the 
emphasis has been on loss of thrust, systems consideration being 
secondary, as typified by Sprogis, (134)). 
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4. Crew error 
The contribution of flight crew error to propulsion-related aircraft 
accidents, either in isolation or in conjunction with an engine failure, has 
been discussed by Reason and Mycielska (135), who propose attentional 
capture as the main mechanism inducing the crew to misinterpret 
information presented on the flightdeck. Reason (136) has proposed a 
comprehensive error management approach to reducing the contribution 
of flight crew (and other) errors to aircraft accidents. Green et al (137) also 
emphasize the role of stress in narrowing the focus of flight-crew attention 
so that important information is excluded from the decision-making 
process. The deleterious effect of time pressure upon the accuracy of a 
decision is also cited, implying that engine failures occurring during times 
of peak workload are more likely to result in crew errors. Chamberlin (58) 
discusses the contribution of flight crew error in high speed rejected 
takeoff. Williams (138) presents a series of factors reducing the reliability 
of decisions, together with a numerical range by which the reliability may 
be affected, including shortage of time and channel capacity overload in 
the decision-maker. 
Reason and Mycielska present the execution of a highly organised (but 
inappropriate) sequence of actions as a weakness of expertise, in 
diametrical opposition to lack of familiarity with a task (implying that 
further training is not the best means of addressing this issue). This 
position is the logical consequence of the statement made by Fitz and 
Posner (139) "During the final phase of skill learning, component 
processes become increasingly autonomous, less directly subject to 
cognitive control and less subject to interference from other ongoing 
activities" and provides considerable insight into some instances of crew 
error. 
Quantitative evaluation of the propensity for crew error is hindered by the 
rarity of such events resulting in accidents; it may be assisted by 
consultation with flightcrew using the method of paired comparisons 
(Hunns and Daniels (112)) to give an order-of-magnitude numerical 
estimate. 
Sumwalt and Watson (140) point out that the seriousness of the initial 
malfunction is unrelated to the seriousness of the outcome after the crew 
has responded inappropriately. 
Maintenance error is a significant source of engine failures,, both those 
hazardous in themselves and those affecting multiple engines. Davies 
(141) and others have pointed out the close link between reliability and 
maintainability; the reliable component does not require routine 
maintenance action, and therefore is less prone to maintenance-induced 
failures. Dhillon (111) cites human error rates for selected maintenance 
tasks, although their general applicability is open to question, since many 
error rates are installation-specifiý, as emphasized in the US Air Force/ 
Army/ Navy presentations of (142). 
163 
APPENDIX B 
164 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK 
165 
APPENDIX B REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, PART 33. 
33.75 SAFETY ANALYSIS 
It must be shown by analysis that any probable malfunction or any 
probable single or multiple failure, or any probable improper operation of 
the engine will not cause the engine to - (a) Catch fire 
(b) Burst (release hazardous fragments through the engine case) 
(c) Generate loads greater than those ultimate loads specified in 33.23(a) 
(d) Lose the capability of being shut down. 
33.23 ENGINE MOUNTING ATTACHMENTS AND STRUCTURE 
(a) The maximum allowable limit and ultimate loads for engine 
mounting attachments and related engine structure must be specified. 
See also ADVISORY CIRCULAR 33-2B; 6/30/93 
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CODE OF-FEDERAL REGULATIONS. 
PART 25 Subl2art E 
--Powerl2lant 
25.901 Installation 
(c) For each powerpIant and auxiliary power unit installation, it must be 
established that no single failure or probable combination of failures will 
jeopardize the safe operation of the airplane except that the failure of 
structural elements need not be considered if the probability of such failure 
is extremely remote. 
25.903 Engines 
(b) Engine isolation. The powerplants must be arranged and isolated from 
each other to allow operation, in at least one configuration, so that the 
failure or malfunction of any engine, or of any system that can affect the 
engine, will not - (1) Prevent the continued safe operation of the remaining engines 
or 
(2) Require immediate action by any crew member for continued 
safe operation 
(d) Turbine engine installations. For turbine engine installations - 
(1) Design precautions must be taken to minimize the hazards to the 
airplane in the event of an engine rotor failure or of a fire originating 
within the engine which burns through the engine case. 
(2) The powerplant systems associated with engine control devices, 
systems, and instrumentation, must be designed to give reasonable 
assurance that those engine operating limitations that adversely affect 
turbine rotor structural integrity will not be exceeded in service. 
Subj2art F- Equil2men 
25.1309 Equipment, systems and installations 
(a) The equipment, systems and installations whose functioning is 
required by this subchapter, must be designed to ensure that they perform 
their intended functions under any foreseeable operating condition. (b) The airplane systems and associated components, considered 
separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that - (1) the occurrence of any failure condition which would 
prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane is 
extremely improbable, and- 
(2) The occurrence of any other failure condition which 
would reduce the capability of the crew to cope with adverse 
operating conditions is improbable. 
(C) Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to 
unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take 
appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls and associated monitoring 
and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors which would Create additional hazards. 
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(d) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this 
section must be shown by analysis, and where necessary, by appropriate 
ground, flight or simulator tests. The analysis must consider - (1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and 
damage from external sources. 
(2) the probability of multiple failures and undetected 
failures. 
(3) The resulting effects on the airplane and occupants, 
considering the stage of flight and operating conditions. 
(4) The crew warning cues, corrective action required, and the 
capability of detecting faults. 
(e) Each installation whose functioning is required by this 
subchapter, and that requires a power supply, is an 'essential load' on the 
power supply. The power sources and the system must be able to supply 
the following power loads in probable operating combinations and for 
probable durations: 
(1) Loads connected to the system with the system 
functioning normally. 
(2) Essential loads, after failure of any one prime mover, 
power converter or energy storage device. 
(3) Essential loads after failure of - (i) Any one engine on two-engine airplanes 
(ii) Any two engines on three-or-more engine 
airplanes 
(4) Essential loads for which an alternate source of power is 
required by this chapter, after any failure or malfunction in any one 
power supply system, distribution system, or other utilization 
system. 
(f) In determining compliance with paragraphs (e)(2) and (3) of this 
section, the power loads may be assumed to be reduced under a 
monitoring procedure consistent with safety in the kinds of operation 
authorized. Loads not required in controlled flight need not be considered for the two-engine-inoperative condition on airplanes with three or four 
engines. 
(g) In showing compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section 
with regard to the electrical system and equipment design and installation, 
critical environmental conditions must be considered. For electrical 
generation, distribution, and utilization equipment required by or used in 
complying with this chapter, except equipment covered by Technical 
Standard Orders containing environmental test procedures, the ability to 
provide continuous safe service under foreseeable environmental 
conditions may be shown by environmental tests, design analysis, or 
reference to previous comparable service experience on other aircraft. 
See also ADVISORY CIRCULAR 25.1309-1A; 6/21/88 
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JOINT AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS PART E 
SUB-SECTION D- TURBINE ENGINES; DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 
JAR-E 510 FAILURE ANALYSIS 
(See ACJ E 510) 
(a) A failure analysis of the engine including the control system for a 
typical installation shall be carried out in order to assess the likely 
consequence of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur. From 
this, a summary shall be made of those failures (including those multiple 
failures referred to in (c) and (d)), which could result in Major Effects or 
Hazardous Effects, together with an estimate of the probability of 
occurrence of those Effects. Where significant doubt exists on the Effects of 
failures and likely combinations of failures the Authority may require any 
assumptions to be verified by test (e. g. the effects of extreme unbalance 
arising from a large blade failure; the effects of a bearing failure; the effects 
of shaft failure). 
(b) It is recognised that the probability of prime failures of certain single 
elements (e. g. rotor discs) cannot be sensibly estimated in numerical terms. 
Where the failure of such items is likely to result in Hazardous Effects, 
reliance must be placed on their meeting the prescribed integrity 
requirements and where this is so, it shall be stated in the failure analysis. 
(See also JAR-E 515) 
(c) Where reliance is placed on safety devices, instrumentation, early 
warning devices, maintenance checks etc. to prevent a failure progressing 
to Hazardous Effects, the possibility of a 'safety system' failure in 
combination with a basic engine failure shall be covered. Where items of a 
'safety system' are outside the control of the engine constructor,, the 
assumptions of the failure analysis in respect of the reliability of these 
parts shall be clearly stated and supplied to the aircraft constructor. 
(d) Consequential secondary failures shall be taken fully into account. 
(e) Where the acceptability of the failure analysis is dependent on one or 
more of the following, these shall be identified in the analysis and 
appropriately substantiated. 
(1) Maintenance actions, including the verification of serviceability of 
items the failure of which could be dormant, being carried out at 
stated periods. These periods must be published in the appropriate 
manual. Additionally, where errors in maintenance of the engine 
control system could lead to Hazardous Effects, (e. g. particularly in 
respect of reverse thrust), the appropriate vital points shall be 
identified for inclusion in the engine maintenance manual. 
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(2) justification for the inclusion; in the Master Minimum Equipment 
list of any Engine-associated item permitted to be carried in an 
unserviceable state for specific periods. 
(3) Verification of satisfactory functioning of safety or other devices, 
etc., at preflight or other stated periods, the details of which must be 
published in the appropriate manual. 
(4) The provision of specific instrumentation not otherwise required. 
(f) In certain cases the failure analysis will depend on assumed installed 
conditions. Such assumptions shall be stated in the analysis. 
Amendment E/91/1 
JAR-E 515 CRITICAL PARTS INTEGRITY 
(See AQJ E 515 and AMJ E 515) 
The Engine Critical Parts shall be identified and their integrity shall be 
established by the following disciplines: 
(a) An engineering plan, the execution of which demonstrates that the 
combination of loads, material properties, environmental factors and 
conditions are sufficiently well-known or predictable by analysis, or test 
experience to allow the parts to be withdrawn from service at a life before 
hazardous failure can occur. 
(b) A manufacturing and inspection plan, which defines the method of 
manufacture 
(1) For producing all parts with the attributes assumed by the 
engineering plan of (a) 
(2) To enable the relevant manufacturing history to be traceable. 
(3) To ensure that manufacturing changes will be controlled to 
prevent the assumed attributes being degraded. 
(c) The manufacturer shall demonstrate that adequate procedures are 
adopted to ensure the necessary control of the engineering and 
manufacturing functions associated with the production of Critical Parts. 
These procedures shall specify the objectives and responsibilities of the 
organisation necessary to control and implement the overall Product 
Assurance Policies. 
(d) The manufacturing processes, maintenance in service and overhaul of 
Critical Parts must be such as to ensure that they have characteristics 
essentially similar to those on which the certification of the design was based, and must be associated with specified acceptance standards and 
Non-Destructive Inspection. 
Amendment E/91/1 
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JOINT AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS PART 25 
SUBPART E- POWERPLANT 
GENERAL 
JAR 25.901 Installation 
(a) For the purpose of this JAR-25 the aeroplane powerplant installation 
includes each component that - (1) Is necessary for propulsion 
(2) Affects the control of the major propulsive units or 
(3) Affects the safety of the major propulsive units between normal 
inspection intervals or overhauls. 
(b) For each powerplant 
(1) The installation must comply with - (i) The installation instructions provided under JAR-E 
Section 4 paragraph 7 and 
20X-1) 
(ii) The applicable provisions of this subpart (see also AMJ 
(2) The components of the installation must be constructed, 
arranged and installed so as to ensure their continued safe operation 
between normal inspections or overhauls. (See ACJ 25.901(b)(2)) 
(3) The installation must be accessible for necessary inspections and 
maintenance 
(4) The major components of the installation must be electrically 
bonded to the other parts of the aeroplane (See ACJ 25.901(b)(4)) 
(c) The powerplant installation must comply with JAR25.1309. 
(d) Not required. 
(e) The satisfactory functioning of the power unit must be demonstrated by 
ground and flight tests over the range of operating conditions for which 
certification is required and must include tests under hot climatic 
conditions, unless equivalent evidence can be produced. (See ACJ 
25.901(e)). 
JAR 25.903 Engines 
(a) Engine type certification 
(1) Each engine must have a type certificate (See ACJ 25.903(a)) 
(2) Any engine not certificated to JAR-E must be shown to comply 
with JAR-E 790 and JAR-E 800 or be shown to have a foreign object 
ingestion service history in similar installation locations which has not 
resulted in any unsafe condition. 
(b) Engine isolation. The powerplants must be arranged and isolated from 
each other to allow operation, in at least one configuration, so that the 
failure or malfunction of any engine, or of any system that can affect the 
engine, will not - (1) Prevent the continued safe operation of the remaining engines, 
or 
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(2) Require immediate action by any crew member for continued 
safe operation. 
(c) Control of engine rotation. There must be a means for stopping the 
rotation of any engine individually in flight, except that, for turbine 
engine installations, the means for stopping the rotation of any engine 
need be provided only where continued rotation could jeopardise the 
safety of the aeroplane. 
(1) In particular, where no means is provided to prevent continued 
rotation, the safety of the aeroplane must be shown in the event of failure 
of the engine oil supply (See JAR-E 710 and ACJ E 710) 
(2) Each component of the stopping system on the engine side of the 
firewall that might be exposed to fire must be at least fire resistant. 
(3) If hydraulic propeller feathering systems are used for this 
purpose, the feathering lines must be at least fire-resistant under the 
operating conditions that may be expected to exist during feathering. 
(d) Turbine engitie histallations. For turbine engine installations - (1) Design precautions must be taken to minimise the hazards to the 
aeroplane in the event of an engine rotor failure or of a fire originating 
within the engine which bums through the engine case. (See ACJ No 1 
and ACJ No 2 to JAR 25.903(d)(1). 
(2) The powerplant systems associated with engine control devices, 
systems, and instrumentation, must be designed to give reasonable 
assurance that those engine operating limitations that adversely affect 
turbine rotor structural integrity will not be exceeded in service. 
(e) Restart capability 
(1) Means to restart any engine in flight must be provided. 
(2) An altitude and airspeed envelope must be established for in- 
flight engine restarting, and each engine must have a restart capability 
within that envelope. (See ACJ 25.903(e)(2)). 
(3) For turbine engine powered aeroplanes, if the minimum 
windmilling speed of the engines, following the in-flight shutdown of all 
engines, is insufficient to provide the necessary electrical power for engine 
ignition, a power-source independent of the engine-driven electrical 
power generating system must be provided to permit in-flight engine 
ignition for restarting. 
See also ACjs to JAR 25.903(d)(1) 
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SUBPART F- EQUIPMENT 
GENERAL 
JAR 25.1309 Equipment, systems and installations 
(a) The equipment, systems and installations whose functioning is 
required by the JAR and national operating regulations must be designed 
to ensure that they perform their intended functions under any 
foreseeable operating conditions. (See AMJ 25.1309 and ACJ No 2 to JAR 
25.1309) However, systems used for non-essential services need only 
comply so far as is necessary to ensure that the installations are neither a 
source of danger in themselves nor liable to prejudice the proper 
functioning of any essential service. 
(b) The aeroplane systems and associated components, considered 
separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that (see 
AMJ 25-1309 and ACJ No 3 to JAR 25.1309 and AMJ 25.1309(b)) - (1) The occurrence of any failure condition which would 
prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the aeroplane is 
extremely improbable; and 
(2) The occurrence of any other failure condition which 
would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the 
crew to cope with adverse operating conditions is improbable. 
(c) Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe 
system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate 
corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and 
warning means must be designed to minimise crew errors which could 
create additional hazards. See AMJ 25.1309 and ACJ Nos. 4 and 8 to JAR 
25.1309. 
(d) Compliance with the requirements of subparagraph M of this 
paragraph must be shown by analysis, and where necessary, by appropriate 
ground, flight or simulator tests. The analysis must consider (see AMJ 
25.1309)- 
(1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and 
damage from external sources 
(2) The probability of multiple failures and undetected 
failures 
(3) The resulting effects on the aeroplane and occupants, 
considering the stage of flight and operating conditions, and 
(4) The crew warning cues, corrective action required, and the 
capability of detecting faults. 
(e) Each installation whose functioning is required for certification and 
that requires a power supply is an 'essential load' on the power supply. 
The power sources and the system must be able to supply the following 
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power loads in probable operating combinations and for probable 
durations (see ACJ No 6 to JAR 25.1309) 
(1) Loads connected to the system with the system 
functioning normally. 
(2) Essential loads, after failure of any one prime mover, 
power converter, or energy storage device. 
(3) Essential loads after failure of - (i) Any one engine on two-engined aeroplanes, and 
0i) Any two engines on three or more engined 
aeroplanes. 
After the failure of any two engines on a three-engined aeroplane, 
those services essential to airworthiness must continue to function 
and perform adequately within the limits of operation implied by 
the emergency conditions. (see ACJ No 7 to JAR 25.1309). 
(4) Essential loads for which an alternate source of power is 
required by any applicable JAR or national operating regulations 
after any failure or malfunction in any one power supply system, 
distribution system, or other utilisation system. 
(f) In determining compliance with subparagraphs (e)(2) and (3) of this 
paragraph, the power loads may be assumed to be reduced under a 
monitoring procedure consistent with safety in the kinds of operation 
authorised. Loads not required in controlled flight need not be considered 
for the two-engine inoperative condition on aeroplanes with three or 
more engines. 
(g) In showing compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
paragraph with regard to system and equipment design and installation, 
critical environmental conditions including vibration and acceleration 
loads, handling by personnel and where appropriate fluid and pressure 
effects, must be considered. For power generation, distribution, and 
utilisation equipment required by or used for certification, the ability to 
provide continuous safe service under foreseeable environmental 
conditions may be shown by environmental tests, design analysis or 
reference to previous comparable service experience on other aeroplanes. 
See also ACjs to JAR 25.1309. 
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APPENDIX C: SERVICE EXPERIENCE BASE 
Ci Substantiation of Data 
The attempt to relate propulsion system safety analysis to previous service 
experience required the compilation of a service experience database, 
including all propulsion-related accidents in the high bypass commercial 
transport fleet up to the end of 1993. A database of safety-related incidents was 
also compiled. It must be recognised, however, that any attempt to generate 
failure rates relies upon the accuracy and completeness of the reporting of 
such failures from the field. No single database can be relied upon to include 
every relevant powerplant failure, but it was anticipated that amalgamation 
of failure events from several databases would both allow assessment of the 
completeness of reporting, and also allow production of failure rates 
representative within a few percent, and at least as accurate as any currently 
published within the industry. 
Events were selected and assigned primary causal factors as described in 3.2. 
Data was extracted from the following sources: 
a) NTSB 
b) FAA Service Difficulty Reports for US airlines, January 1986 - 
December 1994, engine failures. 
c) CAA, Reports of Failures, Malfunctions and Defects reported for 
high-bypass engines, January 1984 - December 1994 
d) FAA Service Difficulty Reports for US airlines, 1978 -1979 and 
1981 - 1989, Engine Rotor Failures 
The accident record from the above sources was cross-checked against the 
annual airline safety report issued by "Flight International" and against the 
World Airline Accident Summary published by the CAA. It is felt that the 
accident database presented in table C. 1 is relatively complete. Some events 
may have been included which might not be considered accidents by some 
groups: this results from the inconsistent usage of the term "substantial 
damage" from one airworthiness authority to another. 
The safety-related incident record, omitted in the interest of brevity, is known 
to be incomplete. Cross-checking between the above sources showed that 
there was minimal redundancy, in that only one event was reported by more 
than one of the databases (RB211-535 multiple engine flameout on , reported by FAA, CAA and NTSB). This initially caused some concern, since it 
implied the potential existence of large numbers of safety related events 
external to both Britain and the US, unreported by sources a), b) and c). It was 
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also discovered during the course of the research that although US engine 
manufacturers report all in-flight shutdowns, rejected takeoffs and safety- 
related events to the FAA, only a small fraction of this material is then 
published in the FAA SDR database for public reference. The reason for this 
anomaly is unclear, but the implication is that the SDR database cannot be 
used to generate reliable rates. Hazard ratios and failure rates generated using 
incident data should therefore be treated with considerable scepticism unless 
they can be confirmed by an alternate source such as data published by 
independent industry committees, which have access to larger data samples. 
Cii Detailed World Fleet Accident and Incident Experience 
The following material describes statistical details of the data assembled in 
table C. 1. 
Uncontained debris 
There were 21 accidents resulting from uncontained failures in the high 
bypass ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. The majority of these 
accidents were the direct result of airplane system damage or structural 
damage, although there were three or four accidents involving high speed 
rejected takeoffs, which might arguably have affected the outcome. 
Uncontained failures were the single greatest contributor to propulsion- 
related accidents. The risk of an uncontained failure-type accident appeared to 
be confined mostly to the older aircraft models; the 747, L1011, DC10 and 
A300. It had been proposed by Taylor (1) that the rate of uncontained-failure 
accidents would be proportional to the number of engines. This is not the 
case; the uncontained failure rates (accidents and total events, per airplane 
flight hour) for the models cited above are as folloWS46: 
Accident rate 
Uncontained 
failure rate 
747 DC10 
21.9E-7 ±. 2 2.3E-7 ±. 4 
1.5E-6 1.2E-6 
L1011 A300 
2.7E-7 ±. 9 2. lE-7 ±1.1 
1.2E-6 1E-6 
461tis acknowledged that this distribution of accidents does not agree with that of table 6.1 - 17 of AIR4770 (52), which showed twins having a lower "uncontained accident" rate per 
aircraft departure, by a factor of 4, than 3 or 4 engine aircraft. AIR 4770 dealt with a5 year 
timespan, involving only 8 uncontained-event accidents, and is therefore considered more likely to be affected by random variation. It also calculated rates based on departures, not hours, which would make long-haul operations typical of 3 and 4 engined aircraft appear 
worse for the same number of accidents. 
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There is no clear difference between the three airplane configurations as 
regards the likelihood of having an uncontained failure which results in an 
accident. 
8 of these uncontained failure accidents occurred during takeoff, 8 in climb, 3 
in cruise and 2 during landing (reverse thrust). The distribution of 
uncontained failures by flight phase and that of resulting accidents are similar 
(within the scatter imposed by one additional uncontained accident) for all 
flight phases but cruise, where the risk of an accident resulting given an 
uncontained failure is somewhat reduced (see below). It would be reasonable 
to expect a slightly reduced risk in cruise, given the additional time for the 
flight crew to make optimal decisions in dealing with the engine failure and 
any consequent damage before landing the airplane. 
Incidence of 
uncontained failures 
Incidence of accidents 
caused by uncontained failures ±5% 
T/O 437o 
Climb 30 7o' 
Cruise 217o' 
Landing 4 7o' 
38% 
38 7o' 
147o' 
9710 
The magnitude of the hazard ratio may be estimated as follows: the high 
bypass ratio fleet accrued 400 million engine hours by the end of 1994. This 
gives an uncontained-failure accident rate of 5.2E-8/engine flight hour. The 
SAE studies (50,51,52) on uncontained failures quote the high-bypass-ratio 
uncontained failure rates as 8.5E-7/hour; the hazard ratio may therefore be 
estimated as 0.06, that is, that in the event of an uncontained failure, six times 
out of a hundred an accident will be the result. 
As a comparison, the uncontained incidents and accidents in the author's 
database would lead to an uncontained failure rate of 3.3E-7/hour, implying 
that the database used for this study has no more than 38% of the incidents 
which actually occurred (the reporting of uncontained failures can be expected 
to be significantly better than that of less dramatic failures, the truth is 
probably less than 387o for other failure modes). 
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Propulsion failure plus crew error 
There were 15 accidents resulting from propulsion system malfunction + 
crew error in the high bypass ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994.10 
of these occurred in takeoff, two in climb, one in cruise and two in landing. 
It may be assumed that every inflight shutdown or high speed (100kts+) 
rejected takeoff affords an opportunity for crew error resulting in an accident. 
The total number of IFSDs in the high bypass fleet is estimated as 35,000±15yo, 
the number of rejected takeoffs above 100 kts has been estimated as of the 
order of 500 (ref. personal communication with GP Sallee, Boeing). An 
estimated hazard ratio would be 4E-4, in close agreement with the mean 
value of 3.7E-4 cited by Sallee (47). 
Incidence of Incidence of accidents 
engine failures caused by propulsion system 
crew error ±77o 
T/O 57o 667o 
Climb 31% 1 3'Yo 
Cruise 36 7o' 7 7o' 
Descent 1970 0% 
Landing 9% 137o 
The majority of these accidents resulted from an engine malfunction late in 
the takeoff roll, and an incorrect decision to reject the takeoff with insufficient 
runway available. There have been a large number of rejected takeoffs and 
continued takeoffs with an engine malfunction recorded (203 RTOs and 130 
continued takeoffs). It is noteworthy that in the high bypass fleet, a decision to 
continue the takeoff given an engine malfunction has almost always resulted 
in a safe landing47. Given the limited number of occasions upon which a 
performance-limited takeoff occurs48, the practice of some operators of using a 
lesser value of V1 than recommended for the airplane and ambient 
conditions (and thus reducing the chance of an unsuccessful RTO) is 
endorsed by service history. 
470ne exception is the engine separation at rotation, ACC18, which resulted in the loss of 
the aircraft and all crew and passengers. 48VJ, the speed at which an irrevocable decision is made to continue or to reject the takeoff, is based upon airplane weight, local conditions such as altitude, ambient temperature, 
runway length and slope, wind and airplane configuration such as bleed selection and 
engine thrust derate. 
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The remaining accidents in this category have involved injuries incurred 
during unwarranted emergency evacuationS49 50, failure to stabilise the 
airplane flight path whilst troubleshooting an engine problem, and shutting 
down the wrong engine. Reference to reports submitted under the ASRS 
system shows a number of further incidents in which an engine problem has 
led to procedural errors such as altitude deviations, incursions into forbidden 
airspace and loss of separation between aircraft. It is a cause for considerable 
concern that each one of these 15 accidents was initiated by a propulsion 
system problem which should have been handled easily by the aircraft and 
crew. It will not be technically possible to eliminate all propulsion system 
failures with the capability of precipitating crew error; vigorous efforts must 
therefore be made to understand the source of the error and to address it, 
either by design or procedure. 
It was hypothesized that those aircraft with a flight engineer (three rather 
than two-person crews) might be less susceptible to propulsion system failure 
followed by crew error; flight crew reports in ASRS contain comments that 
two people are not enough to handle an engine problem in busy airspace. The 
accident rates for this cause do not support this contention (. 12/million hours 
for 2-person, . 10/million hours for 3-person aircraft). 
It was conversely hypothesized that the number of engines might affect the 
propensity to crew error after propulsion system failure. Other things being 
equal, more failures would be anticipated with more engines, and the need to 
keep track of additional information might exacerbate any tendency to 
misinterpret instrument readings.. The relative accident rates by twin, tri and 
quad (propulsion system failure and crew error) are . 13,. 06 and . 12/ million flight hours. The relatively good performance of three-engined aircraft in this 
respect invites further investigation; it has been attributed by some to the 
existence of a dedicated engine failure indication in the cockpit, which may 
reduce confusion under some circumstances (this concept is discussed further 
in Chapters 6 and 7). It might also be speculated that it is easier to maintain 
directional control of a three engined aircraft in the event of an engine 
failure. 
"Gross has shown an average of 0.6 serious injuries per emergency evacuation of 
commercial transports. There has, however, been a downward trend in the 1990s. 5Me majority of studies have excluded evacuation injuries from consideration. 
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Fire 
There were 9 accidents resulting from propulsion system fire in the high 
bypass ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. One of these was at 
takeoff power, four were in climb and two occurred while the airplane was 
static/taxiing on the ground. There were 141 engine fire incidents identified 
which did not result in accidents. 
Incidence of Incidence of accidents 
engine fires caused by fire: L137o 
T/O 127o 11% 
Climb 427o 44 7o' 
Cruise 207o 
Descent 1% 
Landing 67o 
Other5l 207o' 337o 
It had been anticipated that the majority of fires would occur in takeoff, where 
temperatures and ambient pressures are highest. It was anticipated that very 
few fires would occur in cruise, since the undercowl pressures are generally 
insufficient to sustain combustion at high altitudes. However, there have 
been a large number of oil system fires within the bearing chambers and/or 
gearbox, which are pressurised enabling combustion throughout the flight 
envelope. Given the role of the oil system fires, the length of time spent at 
cruise accounts for the high percentage of fires occurring there. 
The contribution of the oil system fires is particularly interesting because the 
airworthiness regulations contain many prescriptive rules on fire 
precautions, requiring fire detection and extinguishing in engine nacelles, to 
ensure that undercowl fires will always be detected and extinguished. These 
prescriptive rules are effective for fires resulting from flammable liquid 
leaking and igniting on hot engine casings, but they are not effective against a 
fire originating in a gearbox, and burning its way out into the undercowl 
region. Even if the fire detectors have been routed to respond to such a local 
fire, there is generally no means of shutting off the supply of flammable fluid 
feeding the fire (engine oil) nor is discharging fire extinguishant likely to be 
effective, since the extinguishing agent will not enter the pressurised gearbox 
where the fire originates. The volume of engine oil available to the fire is too 
5 'These fires occurred while the airplane was static. 
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small for the fire to hazard the airplane, but in one instance, the fire did 
sufficient damage to the cowl door latches that the cowling separated and 
damaged the airplane. 
Those fires resulting in accidents have not necessarily been so severe in 
themselves that they caused substantial damage to the airplane. In some 
cases, the fire was the occasion for a heavy landing and substantial damage, or 
for an emergency evacuation in which passengers were injured. It may be 
argued that there is some contribution from human error in these cases. The 
hazard ratio for engine fires is estimated at . 06. If only those fires which inherently caused substantial damage/ severe injuries are included, the 
hazard ratio becomes . 025 (four accidents). 
There were 2 accidents resulting from tailpipe fires in the high bypass ratio 
fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. Both of these involved L1011 aircraft. 
27 incidents were identified which did not result in accidents. More than half 
of these incidents also involved the L1011 airplane. It appears likely that the 
RB211, particularly as installed in the L1011, is especially subject to tailpipe 
fires. 
Incidence of Incidence of accidents 
tailPipe fires caused by tailpipe fires 
; L337o 
T/O 77o 
Climb 3 
Landing 7 
Static 797o 10070 
Both these accidents were injuries incurred in emergency evacuations, 
evacuations which should never have taken place, since a tailpipe fire does 
not in any way threaten the passengers. The hazard ratio has been calculated 
as 0.07, but it is likely that the incidence of tailpipe fires is greatly under- 
reported and that the hazard ratio is therefore smaller. 
Engine separation 
There were 7 accidents resulting from engine separation in the high bypass 
ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. One occurred in takeoff, three in 
early climb and three in landing. No incidents were found in which engine 
separation did not lead to an accident. This may be because the failure 
sequence as an engine tears away from a wing is likely to produce substantial 
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damage of itself; there is also a risk of the separated engine hitting the 
airplane or of a major fire resulting from the fuel leak at the wing/pylon 
interface after separation. 
None of the accidents resulted from the failure progression specifically cited 
in FAR 33.75; in which the engine generates extreme loads beyond the design 
capability of the mount system. The accidents resulted from existing damage 
in the mount system as a result of maintenance abuse or of a design flaw, 
which propagated to the point of mount failure during normal or severe 
transient loads. The designed-in redundancy of the mount system did not 
prevent failure because inspections did not detect the mount damage before 
the accident. As a result of these accidents, visual reference points have been 
added to the nacelles of 747 engines, to enable easy detection of partial mount 
failure during pre-flight checks. 
Incidence of accidents 
caused by engine separation. +10o' 
T/O 14% 
Climb 43% 
Landing 43 7o' 
Of the three engine separations occurring in landing, one resulted from the 
vertical loads during touchdown (although reference to the DFDR showed 
that it was in no sense a hard landing, with vertical speeds of 10 ft/s or less), 
one occurred during reverse thrust and one occurred after cancellation of 
reverse thrust in the landing roll. 
It is notable that four of the seven accidents involved 747 freight airplanes. 
Two of these were attributed to fatigue failure of the mid-spar fuse pins 
attaching the engine strut to the wing, possibly induced by corrosion. One of 
the engine separations resulted from overload during severe mountain-wave 
turbulence, imposing multi-axis loads of over 2g upon a strut weakened by an 
existing fatigue crack in the forward firewall web. The remaining freighter 
accident resulted from failure of the strut forward bulkhead, as a result of 
fatigue cracking originating from damage caused by collision with a baggage 
cart (this was the accident in touchdown referenced above). The relatively 
high airplane weights associated with a freight operation can only have 
exacerbated any weakness in the engine mount system and pylon, leading to 
failure earlier than would be the case for more lightly loaded passenger- 
carrying aircraft of the same design. (The other two engine separation 
accidents involved maintenance-induced damage). It is also notable that all of 
these separations have been for wing-mounted engines. This might be 
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expected from the limited fleet exposure of high bypass ratio tail mounted 
engines, and does not necessarily imply design superiority. 
There were 5 accidents resulting from major component separation in the 
high bypass ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. All of the accidents 
were due to cowl separation in climb and the subsequent impact of the cowl 
on the airplane wing or tail. There were 39 instances of component separation 
identified which did not lead to an accident, ranging from cowls to fan 
spinners and exhaust cones. Smaller components have the capability to 
penetrate fuel tanks or depressurise the fuselage if they hit the airplane with 
the right orientation, but the risk is considerably less than for a large item 
such as a cowl. 
Incidence of Incidence of accidents 
separations caused by component 
separation. +_20% 
T/O 237o 
Climb 34% 10070 
Cruise 7 7o' 
Landing 157o' 
Cowl separation does not necessarily result in an accident, of the 39 
component separation incidents in the author's incident database, 20 were 
cowl separations. These occurred primarily during takeoff and climb, as 
aerodynamic loads upon the cowls became significant. The overall hazard 
ratio is . 11, but if only cowl separations are considered and smaller 
components assumed to be de facto non-hazardous, then the hazard ratio for 
cowls is . 2, averaged over the fleet. However, the validity of such a fleet 
average must be called into question when it is realised that all of the 
accidents resulting from cowl separation were experienced by tri-jets. The 
path taken by a detached cowling has been considered unpredictable, as the 
aerodynamic loads on the detached cowl vary with its orientation as it 
tumbles in the airstream. However, the general path of the cowling appears 
from this study to be strongly affected by the model of airplane involved, to 
the extent that it is somewhat predictable. It appears that if a wing engine 
loses its cowl on a DC10, it is very likely (3 events out of 4) to impact the tail 
engine or tail control surfaces under the effect of aerodynamic forces. The 
same may be true for other tri-jets such as the L1011; this was the case for the 
single L1011 cowl loss event on record. This is not the case for other aircraft; 
the 747 experienced a substantial number of cowl separations (17 events, for a 
variety of causes), none of which produced 
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accidents and only one of which resulted in an impact to the tail. (The 
aerodynamic loads upon the Boeing 747 inboard engines are known to be in 
the outboard direction (53)). There is not sufficient data to draw firm 
conclusions regarding the likely trajectory of cowlings for twin engine aircraft; 
only three Airbus twins have had cowl separations, one of which impacted 
the tail but did not result in substantial damage. 
Multiple engine failure 
There were 5 accidents involving multiple engine failures in the high bypass 
ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. It should be noted that four of the 
five would affect all engines equally (fuel exhaustion, volcanic ash, 
maintenance procedural error) no matter whether a twin or a four-engined 
airplane were involved. One accident was due to multiple-engine birdstrikes 
on a 747. It should also be noted that all of these multiple engine failures 
involved either some degree of permanent damage to one or more of the 
engines involved or some other circumstance definitively precluding the 
engines from being restarted. The capability of an undamaged engine to 
restart in flight was not a factor in any of these accidents. 
Incidence of multiple 
engine failures 
T/O 8% 
Climb 22 7o' 
Cruise 327o' 
Descent 6 
Landing 5 Yo 
Incidence of accidents 
caused by multiple 
engine failure ±207o 
207o' 
407o 
40% 
It should be noted that the 62 incidents of multiple-engine failure include a 
number of independent engine failures occurring on the 747, with first 
generation high-bypass ratio engines featuring relatively high IFSD rates. No 
accidents have resulted from independent failures, and given the IFSD rates 
currently existing in the fleet (5/million engine hours), independent failures 
would not be expected to form a significant contribution to future accident 
rates. 
The hazard ratio for multiple engine failure is estimated as . 07. 
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Case rupture 
There were 3 accidents resulting from engine case rupture in the high bypass 
ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994. All of these involved CF6 
engines . Two of the accidents were the result of bird or tire ingestion by the 
engine; the other resulted from fatigue cracking. Only one of the three 
involved a hull loss or serious injuries, as a result of the fuel fire which 
spread to the rest of the aircraft. A case could be made for crew error (high 
speed rejected takeoff) as being a more appropriate classification for these 
accidents. Ten incidents were identified which did not result in accidents, the 
majority of these involved the JT9D engine. 
Incidence of Incidence of accidents 
engine failures caused by case rupture ±33% 
T/O 77% 66 7o' 
Climb/Cruise 15% 337o' 
The hazard ratio has been estimated as 0.3. 
Thrust control 
There were 8 accidents resulting from loss of thrust control in the high bypass 
ratio fleet between 1970 and the end of 1994, corresponding to a historical 
accident rate of 5.6E-8/airplane flight hour. All but one of these occurred 
during approach or landing. A detailed review shows that the incidence of 
thrust control-related accidents is much higher for first generation high 
bypass commercial transports; the 747, and A300 both have accident rates of 
about 1E-7/airplane hour from this cause. Of the second generation 
commercial transports, only the 737 has experienced this type of accident, 
presumably reflecting higher thrust reverser reliability and the greater 
integrity of redundant electronic throttle control signals compared to 
mechanical throttle cables. It may therefore be postulated that a new aircraft 
type would have a significantly lower incidence of these accidents than the 
fleet history; possibly 5E-8/airplane flight hour (reflecting the rate for the twin 
fleet). Aircraft with fuselage mounted engines such as the F100 might do even 
better than this, since less asymmetry would be involved in inadvertent 
thrust excursions. 
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Crew Error 
There were 4 accidents resulting from crew error in the high bypass ratio fleet 
between 1970 and the end of 1994. There was insufficient data available to 
develop hazard ratios for this type of event. 
Summary of Accident Experience 
The major contributors to the causal factors of the historical propulsion- 
related accident rate are uncontained failures, propulsion failure 
accompanied by crew error, thrust control problems and engine fire. Multiple 
independent failures do not appear to contribute to this rate, nor do several 
other factors playing a significant part in airworthiness regulations, such as 
EML HIRF, inability to shut an engine down, toxic cabin bleed air, or casing 
burnthrough by a torching flame. 
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APPENDIX D EVENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
Di Introduction 
The majority of accidents do not occur as the result of a single failure, but 
after a series of specific circumstances or failure consequences has bypassed 
the safeguards and defences intended to prevent the accident (Reason, 57). 
Identifying the specific circumstances required for the component failure 
to Produce an accident, or the specific results of the component failure 
which contributed to the accident, could enable weak points in the 
safeguards to be pinpointed and design measures taken to reduce the 
likelihood of future component failures resulting in such an accident. 
Dii Results 
Event sequence sheets were derived for each of the accidents resulting 
from uncontained failures for which sufficient data was available. 
Examples of event sequence sheets are presented in this appendix. Means 
which were specifically recommended in the accident investigation report 
are marked thus*, and means which have either been implemented on at 
least one application, or which are planned to be implemented in the near 
future are marked thus". Details of the analysis of the results are given in 
Chapter 6. 
It should be noted that a large proportion of the accidents reviewed were 
so classified as a result of the high cost of repairing local punctures or 
gouges in aircraft skin, rather than because airplane safety was jeopardised. 
No safeguards could intervene (or be bypassed) between the rotor 
fragment departing the engine and impacting the aircraft skin. The fact 
that skin damage alone was involved could be interpreted as a successful 
airplane design, in terms of avoiding critical system damage as a result of 
uncontained rotor failure. Those uncontained rotor failures which 
involved system damage or fatalities offered considerably more potential 
for improvement of safeguards. These results may imply that the event 
sequence analysis technique is most useful for those accidents or events 
strictly related to safety. 
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EVENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
5BEE 
ACCIDENT NUMBER: ACC24 
ACCIDENT TYPE: Substantial damage 
DC10 #3 engine 
EVENTSEQUENCE INTERVENTION OPPORTUNrriES 
Tool left inside engine during 
maintenance 
Maintenance procedures to positively 
locate all tools before releasing engine. 
Tool destroyed bolts securing LP 
turbine disc to shaft 
Credible vibration monitoring might 
detect a change in vibration signature 
Damage tolerant means to secure disc 
to shaft 
Disk oversped and burst Reduce strength of blade attachment 
relative to disk strength 
Debris caused structural damage 
to front spar and to #1 and #3 
hydraulic systems at that location 
Local armour for critical systems in 
debris zone** 
Debris damaged slat cables 
Shrapnel damage to aircraft skin 
(wing and fuselage) 
Enhanced wingskin toughness 
Outboard slats retracted without 
cable input 
Control surfaces to remain in the last 
commanded position if input is lost. ** 
Rejected takeoff 0 96 kts. No 
injuries 
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EVENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS SHEET ACCIDENT NUMBER: ACC8 
ACCIDENT TYPE: substantial 
DC10 #1 engine 
EVENTSEOUENCE INTERVENTION OPPORTUNITIES 
Tyre failure in takeoff roll 
Engine ingested tyre, engine fire Possible improvement from 
enhanced bird ingestion standards 
(8 lb bird)** 
Rejected takeoff at 148 kts (above VI) Improved crew training to continue 
takeoff above V1. 
Clear indication of V1** 
Runway departure 
- Substantial damage, no injuries--- F 
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EVENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS SHEa ACCIDENT NUMBER: ACC33 
ACCIDENT TYPE: substantial damage 
747 #2 engine 
EVENTSEQUENCE INTERVENTION OPPORTUNrriES 
Rolling takeoff. HPT blade retainer 
failure on #2 engine at 56 kts (EGT, 
rpm began to rise) 
Prohibit rolling takeoffs at maximum 
weight and unfavorable conditions* 
Flight engineer reduced throttle 
Discuss go/no-go strategy before 
initiating takeoff** 
EGT reached 990 C@ 125 kts 
Flight engineer called for RTO 0 154 
kts (rotation) 
Means to monitor actual airplane 
acceleration compared to flight 
manual*. 
Clear indication of Vl*. 
Rejected takeoff above V1 Improved flight crew training to 
continue takeoff above V1. 
#2 engine did not develop full reverse 
thrust. Airplane veered left. 
Simulator training on asymmetric 
thrust (especially on ground, low 
speed) 
Airplane ran off side of runway @ 55 
kts. Gear collapsed. 
' I 
* Recommended in accident report 
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APPENDIX E CREW ERROR STUDY 
Ei Introduction 
Worksheets for all of the events are included at the end of this appendix. 
The worksheets were intended to establish which crew errors relating to 
propulsion systems are most likely, and to give insight into major factors 
potentiating the error, and particularly to provide insight into the 
potential for design modifications or changes in training or procedures 
which could reduce the likelihood of crew error. Difficulties pertaining to 
individual flight crews (Crew Resource Management, pilot fatigue) or 
airlines (organizational factors) were generally omitted in favour of issues 
relating to engine performance and instrumentation and widely 
implemented procedures and training, which would apply throughout the 
fleet. 
The worksheet questions were structured around the SHEL model 
(Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware) with the omission of 
the Liveware for the reasons given above, and * around 
the RAIT approach 
cited by (Johnstone et al "Beyond Aviation Human Factors"), neglecting 
the organizational factors which cannot reasonably be used in the safety 
analysis of hardware design. 
The implications of the study for propulsion system safety analysis are 
discussed in Chapter 6 above; this appendix presents the factual results of 
the study. 
Thirty-nine propulsion related events involving crew error were studied, 
comprised of sixteen accidents and twenty-three incidents. These form 
only a sample of the relevant events, but it is a sufficiently large sample to 
identify some significant features. This sub-set of accidents and incidents 
should not be used directly to generate rates for the commercial transport 
fleet, but it can be used to estimate the proportional contribution of 
various factors, given existing rates. A study based on different selection 
criteria for the accidents might result in some change in relative 
importance between factors, especially if a different operational 
environment were considered (e. g. commuters). Some of the accidents 
appearing in Table CA as attributable in part to crew error were not used in 
this study because insufficient detail was available to draw conclusions 
regarding the causes of crew error. The data for this study was primarily 
drawn from NTSB and Flight Safety Forum reports prior to 1995, and from 
de-identified incident reports from the ASRS system (selecting on crew 
error and propulsion failure and on asymmetric thrust). Some significant 
accidents involving non-high bypass ratio engines have been included in 
the study, since they contained valuable data. 
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Eii ERROR SCENARIO 
Five distinct error scenarios emerged from the study as being involved in 
multiple accidents or incidents: 
Five accidents and one incident resulted from a rejected takeoff 
above V1. 
Five accidents and eight incidents resulted from asymmetric engine 
thrust and loss of directional control or other inappropriate 
compensation by the crew. 
Three accidents and two incidents arose from mismanagement of 
the engine thrust by the autothrottle/autopilot (either from lack of 
congruence between the crew intention and the autothrottle logic, 
or an actual malfunction). 
Seven incidents resulted from a propulsion system malfunction 
distracting the crew so that the airplane deviated from the course 
approved by ATC. 
Four incidents resulted from unintended shut down of one or more 
engines in flight. 
The remainder of the accidents and incidents were distributed among a 
number of isolated events. 
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Eiii HARDWARE 
Concerns have been raised over the practice of Time Limited Dispatch 
(permitting airplane departure for a limited number of flights with some 
equipment inoperative which is normally required). It has been stated that 
this significantly raises the accident risk for those aircraft dispatched in this 
condition, by reducing safety margins. None of the accidents were 
influenced by the unavailability of equipment due to Time Limited 
Dispatch. One incident (a deviation of 300 ft from the assigned altitude ) 
was caused by high workload from dispatching with the autothrottles, 
thrust rating computer and performance management system inoperative. 
It appears that Time Limited Dispatch does not significantly increase the 
risk of crew error resulting in an accident/ serious incident, as far as the 
propulsion system is concerned. 
Eiv ENVIRONMENT 
It had been suggested in another field that error would be more likely in 
times of high workload and reduced time for decisions, and that external 
factors (such as traffic and weather) might form a distraction potentiating 
crew error. (Bello and Colombari, TESEO model). 
Traffic appeared to be a factor in only one accident (wake turbulence may 
have contributed to 3 of 4 engines stalling in the landing roll). Traffic was a 
factor in six of the incidents; three of these were simple loss of separation 
after a propulsion related problem, and two incidents involved an 
unintended action or a deviation from procedure directly initiated as a 
result of the presence of traffic. 
Thirteen out of sixteen of the crew errors resulting in accidents occurred at 
low altitude (below 2000 ft above the ground, during the takeoff and climb- 
out or approach and landing phases). All of these resulted directly from 
the attempt to take off or land. It is not possible to distinguish between the 
effects of high workload and the reduced time for decisions and error 
recovery, since both of these are the case during takeoff and landing. 
Three of the landing accidents might have been avoided had the crew 
chosen to conduct a missed approach once they realized that all was not 
well; allowing more time to evaluate the situation. Fourteen out of 
twenty three of the incidents also occurred below 2000 ft. It might be 
postulated that the events at higher altitude resulted in benign outcomes 
because more time was available for recognition and recovery, but review 
of the event details does not support this position. The higher altitude incidents were not generally likely to have resulted in an accident if they had occurred at lower altitude (for example, six out of nine of these higher 
altitude incidents were traffic conflicts or minor deviations from the 
assigned altitude). 
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Adverse weather conditions were a factor in three out of the sixteen 
accidents (windshear delaying touchdown in two cases and a tailwind 
contributing to a non-stabilized approach in another). In two of these cases 
weather conditions were deteriorating and the crew may have been 
unwilling to conduct a missed approach, lest the additional delay result in 
diversion to another airport. The majority of accidents took place in good 
weather. Adverse weather was a factor in eight of twenty-six incidents 
(three events involved snowy runways and loss of directional control at 
low speed, three involved propulsion system failures initiated by 
thunderstorms/ turbulence, one involved crosswinds in landing and one 
involved an air-miss in IMC. 
It is concluded that altitude/flight phase (specifically the high workload 
associated with takeoff and landing) is by far the most significant 
environmental factor associated with propulsion related crew error 
resulting in accidents. Weather and traffic have some contribution to 
make, but the majority of these accidents were not influenced by weather 
or traffic. 
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Ev SOFTWARE 
One accident and one incident resulted from autothrottle malfunction; in 
both cases the autothrottle commanded a higher thrust than desired. This 
disoriented the crew in both cases so that they did not maintain the desired 
flightpath. In the case of the accident, the autothrottlý malfunction went 
undetected for some time, and was not corrected after detection. 
Instrumentation was sufficient to show that the airspeed was too high 
during final approach, but it was not effectively monitored. 
Control mode awareness was a major factor in three accidents and two 
incidents. Two of the accidents involved a correctly operating autothrottle 
commanding a missed approach without the knowledge of the flightcrew. 
The other resulted from the autopilot's attempts to compensate for 
asymmetric thrust while the crew were otherwise occupied - when they 
attempted to re-enter the loop, they were unprepared for the extreme 
inputs required to the control surfaces. The incidents resulted from 
confusion over which systems (autopilot, autothrottle) were engaged. 
Evi ERROR CLASSIFICATION 
Errors were classified according to the logic proposed by Rasmussen and 
broadly accepted in the field of cognitive psychology, as being skill-based, 
rule-based or knowledge based. Briefly, a skill-based error is one in which 
the protagonist has all the information necessary, makes an appropriate 
decision, and then at an unconscious level, does something other than 
intended (pours tea into the sugar bowl as a trivial example). A rule-based 
error is one in which the protagonist has all the information necessary but 
makes an inappropriate decision, and executes it as intended (example; 
setting off to work on a Saturday morning, having forgotten the day). A 
knowledge based error is one in which the protagonist is faced with an 
unprecedented situation and must reason out the correct course of action, 
based on the data available. The importance of distinguishing between 
these error types can be appreciated when considering the frequent 
response to human error; a demand for more training. Skill based errors 
are typical of the highly trained individual doing a task which is second 
nature (and accompanied by infrequent conscious checks); training is 
unlikely to be effective here. Likewise, training cannot prepare flight crew 
for situations which have not been covered in training .. it might even have a reverse effect, and exacerbate the disbelief and bewilderment 
associated with a new situation for individuals who "know" they have 
been thoroughly and comprehensively trained for all situations. 
The majority of the errors fell into the skill-based (22 errors) or rule- 
based(27 errors) categories. The number of errors exceeded the number of 
events, since many events involved multiple distinct errors. Lateral error 
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Inappropriate performance of an over-learned sequence appeared only in 
those incidents where engines were shut down inadvertently. 
Accidents generally involved rule-based or knowledge based errors, skill- 
based errors generally led to incidents rather than accidents. It is possible 
that recovery from a skill-based error is much faster, since the crew 
member recognizes that an error has occurred as soon as their attention is 
drawn to the undesired situation, whereas in the event of a rule-based or 
knowledge-based error, the crew member is already attempting, however 
inappropriately, to recover the situation. Reluctance to revoke a decision 
or reconsider a strategy, once initiated, is a well-recognised phenomenon 
in the field of human error (Reason, 57)'. The implications for safety 
assessment/ accident prevention are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Evii ERROR RECOVERY 
The ability of the crew to recover from an error was considered by 
assessing significant situational factors. In 13 cases a single error relating to 
propulsion system control was immediately followed by the accident or 
incident (within a few seconds) so that no error recovery was possible. For 
the cases where error recovery may have been possible, recovery was 
delayed in eleven cases by imminent and essential crew activity diverting 
attention from the error. Accidents where recovery was possible generally 
resulted from a sequence of errors producing a gradually deteriorating 
situation. 
In nine cases the error was not readily detectable by cockpit 
instrumentation. The autothrottle mode was not recognised in four cases 
and in three cases it was unclear whether an engine was flamed out, 
operating transiently sub-idle, or operating normally at low power. 
In six cases propulsion system damage delayed recovery from the error. 
In six cases the system response time was sufficiently slow that it delayed 
recovery from the error. 
In six cases the crew were aware of the error for a significant time before 
taking action to address it; and this procrastination may be assumed to 
make error recovery more difficult. 
1 Previous studies have noted that recovery from skill-based errors is more likely than from rule-based 
or knowledge based errors. (Reason, 57). 
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CREW ERROR WORKSHEET 
PROPULSION RELATED ACCIDENTS/SERIOUS INCIDENTS 
EVENTDATA 
REFERENCE # ASRS95408 OUrCOME Incident 
SCENARIO High speed RTO LOCATION ORD 
DATE 10188 OPERATOR Unknown 
AIRPLANEMODEL Unknown ENGINE MODEL Unknown 
DATASOURCE ASRS 
SUMMARY 
Compressor stall at rotation and rejected takeoff. Crew could not tell which engine had 
failed. 
HARDWARE 
TIME LIMITED DISPATCH? No 
CREW RECONFIGURING? No 
PROPULSION SYSTEM EVENT 
ENGINE POSITION #3 
ENGINE POWER T10 
TACTILE SYMPTOMS Vibration, loud stall noises 
INSTRUMENT SYMPTOMS Enginefail light (not specific engine position) 
# REMAINING ENGINES 2 
SOFTWARE 
AUTOPILOT Unknown 
AUTOTHROTTLE Unknown 
ENVIRONMENT 
(within last 5 minutes of pivotal decision/event) 
FLIGHT PHASE Takeoff ALTrME Oft 
TRAFFIC No WEATHER VMC 
TIME PRESSURE Extreme 
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ERROR A 
CREW MEMBER Captain 
TASK Monitorfirst officer's takeoff 
ERROR DESCRIPTION 
Took command and rejected takeoff above V1. 
ERROR CLASSIFICATION Rule based 
ERROR ANALYSIS 
Correct procedure is to continue the takeoff above V1. Studies have shown that loud 
noises of enginefailure and airframe vibration are associated with a decision to reject a 
takeoff above V1, flightcrew are concernedfor the airworthiness of the airplane in 
these conditions. Viese conditions are generally not simulated during flight training. 
Inability to identify the engine which hadfailed could only increase the concern of the 
flightcrew. 
ERROR RECOVERY 
No recovery possible in time 
Was instrumentation/displays correct/sufficient to show error? 
Yes, but clearer indication of which engine hadfailed (beyond an engine fail light 
applying to any) might have avoided the error. 
Did propulsion system damage hinder recovery? 
No 
Did system response time hinder recovery? 
No 
Was control mode awareness a factor? 
No 
Did imminent necessary crew activity divert attention? 
No 
Were crew reluctant to deviate from planned activities? 
No 
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APPENDIX F PREDICTING FAILURE RATES 
Fi Demonstration Of Reliability Growth In Service 
Figures F. 1 and F. 2 show the annual incidence of Service Difficulty Reports 
(SDRs) as described above. Some form of reliability growth Is evidently 
occurring in the field, and the CF6-50 has benefited in some respects from tile 
experience of the earlier CF6-6 model. It is significant that tile C176-80A 
entered service with the same reliability (based on SDRs) as the mature CF6- 
50. The inflight shutdown and rejected takeoffs which were due to random 
events such as bird ingestion or errors during routine maintenance are 
shown separately; it appears that the overall failure rate trends toward tile 
random rate after sufficient service experience (as proposed by Smith). 
Figure F. 3 shows the SDR rates versus die total fleet hours. Although there Is 
considerable random variation from year to year, die CX-6-6 and CF6-50 
engines appear to have similar reliability growth rates between 2 million and 
20 million fleet hours, the CF6-50 remaining generally more reliable by a 
factor of 2 to 3. 
It was hypothesized that variation in product su port policies (over time and 
between engine programs and operators) migFit account for some of the 
Itrandom variation", in that a concerted effort to introduce a fix Into tile fleet 
would cause a discontinuity in the SDR rate. This effect was assessed by 
considering only new problems, thus eliminating the effects of repeat failures. 
Figures FA and F. 5 show the results. The CF6-6 and CF6-50 behaviour Is very 
similar if only new failure modes are considered. This result supports the 
approach of treating derivative engines as variants on an existing engine with 
respect to reliability growth trending. 
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Fii Quantitative Modelling Of Reliability Growth 
Development of a mathematical model at the engine level was hindered by 
the difficulty of accounting for the gradual dilution of the fleet by engines 
incorporating design fixes, by the dependence of reliability growth on both 
operating hours and calendar time and by the effects of varying product 
support'policies in the prevention of failure recurrence. These indeterminate 
effects, together with the random variation from year to year in the data, 
made anything but the simplest mathematical treatment of questionable 
value (as previously noted (22)). An equation of the form proposed by Smith 
Industries (20) was consistent with the observed behaviour of the fleet: 
X=A +Be-Ct 
where 
/X= incidence of SDRs per engine hour 
A= random failures unrelated to specific design or manufacturing 
problems, e. g. maintenance error or birdstrike 
t= fleet hours summed over all models 
The following values of AAC were calculated using a least-mean-squares 
technique, and calculating the 907o' confidence range (two-sided): 
A A B B c c 
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range 
AIISDRs CF6-6 1.06E-5 0.46-1.65 1 E-4 . 65-1.5 3E-8 2E-8- 4 E-5 E-4 E-8 
All SDRs CF6- 0.86E-5 0.71-1.01 7 E-5 . 45-1.0 513-8 4E-8- 6 
50 E-5 E-4 E-8 
New SDRs CF6-6 - 2.7E-5 
1 
1.3-5.4 8E-8 613-8 -1 
E-5 E-7 
New SDRs CF6- - 2 E-5 . 74 - 
ý. 2 8E-8 . 55-1.1 
150 1 1 1 
E-5 
I 
E-7 
i ame t,. i 
It is evident that A (the rate of random, non-design-related failures) is 
effectively the same number for both the CF6-6 and CF6-50. Future engine 
models designed to be more resistant to birdstrike or maintenance abuse 
might have lower values of A. 
Likewise, B is the same for both the C176-6 and C176-50, within the statistical 
variation of the measured rates. 
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C has a different value for the CF6-6 and CF6-50, for all SDRs, but is the same 
if only new SDRs are considered. There is a strong case for modeling 
reliability growth of both engines with the same equation,, given the statistical 
variation in the measured rates. These results are shown on Figures F. 6 to F. 9. 
In order to confirm that the reliability growth seen for engine failures as a 
whole extended to safety-specific failures, uncontained failure trends were 
reviewed. Although comprehensive data specific to each engine is not 
publicly available, fleet-wide rates ' of uncontained 
failures were available for 
both first generation (entry into service before 1980) and second generation 
engines. Figure F. 10 shows the results. There is a steady improvement 
evident- in the uncontained failure rate, which may be expected to deviate 
from linearity as the rate becomes lower and lower (the exact form of the 
relationship is difficult to assess given the magnitude of random variation 
from year to year). 
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Development of a mathematical model at the engine level was hindered by 
the difficulty of accounting for the gradual dilution of the fleet by engines 
incorporating design fixes, by the dependence of reliability growth on both 
operating hours and calendar time and by the effects of varying product 
support'policies in the prevention of failure recurrence. These indeterminate 
effects, together with the random variation from year to year in the data, 
made anything but the simplest mathematical treatment of questionable 
value (as previously noted (22)). An equation of the form proposed by Smith 
Industries (20) was consistent with the observed behaviour of the fleet: 
X=A +Be-Ct 
where 
X= incidence of SDRs per engine hour 
A= random failures unrelated to specific design or manufacturing 
problems, e. g. maintenance error or birdstrike 
t= fleet hours summed over all models 
The following values of AB, C were calculated using a least-mean-squares 
technique, and calculating the 90% confidence range (two-sided): 
A A B B c c 
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range 
AIISDRs- CF6-6 1.06E-5 0.46-1.65 1 E-4 . 65-1.5 3E-8 2E-8- 4 E-5 E-4 E-8 
All SDRs CF6- 0.86E-5 0.71-1.01 7 E-5 . 45-1.0 513-8 4E-8- 6 
50 E-5 E-4 E-8 
New SDRs CF6-6 - 2.7E-5 1.3-5.4 8E-8 6E-8 -1 
E-5 E-7 
New SDRs CF6- - 2 E-5 . 74-5.2 8E-8 . 55-1.1 
150 
E-5 E-7 
rable F. 1 
It is evident that A (the rate of random, non-design-related failures) is 
effectively the same number for both the CF6-6 and CF6-50. Future engine 
models designed to be more resistant to birdstrike or maintenance abuse 
might have lower values of A. 
Likewise, B is the same for both the CF6-6 and CF6-50, within the statistical 
variation of the measured rates. 
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Fiii Detailed (Component) Failure Rate Prediction 
The work described above relates to failure prediction at the engine level. The 
feasibility of producing more detailed predictions of failure rates was assessed 
by grouping the service difficulty reports into submodules of similar 
components (such as HP compressor blades and vanes, main bearings, or 
power offtake gearboxes and drives). Figures F. 11 and F. 12 rank the relative 
contributions of these submodules to the overall SDR totals. Many 
submodules made a minimal contribution; seven submodules were major 
contributors and were selected for further examination. These seven 
submodules each contributed 50 or more events in the time period of interest, 
and accounted altogether for over 757o' of all events. The annual SDR rates for 
each of these submodules are found in figures F. 13 and F. 14. There is 
substantial variation from one year to the next, suggesting that trending of 
less significant contributors (or at the component level) would not be 
informative. 
For each engine model, the single least reliable submodule (referred to below 
as "Worst" submodule) accounted for the majority of the overall reliability 
growth in the first few years after entry into service. More reliable 
submodules show relatively modest (or negligible) reliability growth. This 
result could be anticipated from a rational deployment of product support 
effort. Comparison of submodule reliability from one engine model to the 
next shows that design changes do introduce higher failure rates into some 
submodules, but that the overall effect is an improvement from the parent 
model to the derivative. Specifically, the CF6-6 HPT blade problems were 
fixed for the CF6-50, but the -50 HPC blades did not do as well as the -6 HPC 
blades (although still twice as well as the -6 HPT blades). After many years, the 
CF6-50 failure rates were generally lower than those of the CF6-6. The CF6- 
80A "worst" submodule was the bearings at entry into service, although the 
bearing failure rate was only half that of the CF6-50 HPC blades at the pea 
,k 
of 
their unreliability (the CF6-80A "worst" submodule was still much better 
than the worst submodule of its' precursor. 
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Fiv Effect Of Flight Phase 
Further insight can be gained into the desirability of using phase-dependent 
failure rates by consideration of the failure mechanisms which could 
potentially be associated with different phases of flight, and by review of 
experience to establish their importance. 
The take-off phase entails the highest rotor speeds and gas temperatures and 
pressures, and imposes severe thermal transients upon core components. 
There is considerable exposure to foreign object damage such as bird 
ingestion. Flight crew workload is high, and response to a failure may be 
time-critical; there is therefore a higher potential for even benign failure to 
precipitate crew error. In the event of such error, there is minimal time for 
recovery. 
Uncontained failures are overwhelmingly more likely during takeoff than 
any other phase of flight, and this is primarily due to the high rotor speeds 
encountered, which both precipitate a rotor failure if one is incipient, and also 
entail higher fragment energies than experienced in other flight phases, so 
that parts are more likely to penetrate the engine casings. It had been 
postulated that bird ingestion might also play a significant role in generating 
uncontained failures in takeoff, but in fact Foreign Object Damage accounted 
for only 47o of such events. The FAA (35 - 44) has explicitly linked the rate of 
rotor bursts with high power settings (take-off and climb), although review of 
the data shows that takeoff is very much more significant than climb. 
At climb power, gas path pressures, temperatures and the hazards of low 
altitude (birds, time pressure in crew response) are much reduced from 
takeoff. Temperatures of some components (disk bores) may actually be 
higher than at take-off due to the lag in temperature response. High disk 
temperatures have resulted in uncontained failures on some occasions, 
although this is not a typical disk failure cause. there is significant potential 
for nacelle fire when power is reduced from takeoff to climb. Casing 
temperatures are high, and the reduction in nacelle cooling flow (associated 
with power reduction) around the core may be of critical importance in 
increasing the residence time of leaked flammable fluid sufficiently to enable 
spontaneous ignition. 
The cruise phase of flight is relatively unlikely to precipitate failures. 
Components may approach steady-state temperatures and stresses; gas path 
temperatures and pressures are moderate, and engine performance has been 
exhaustively modeled at the "design point". It is instructive to compare the 
extended lives of industrial gas turbines, which essentially spend all of their 
238 
time at cruise, with that of aircraft turbofans. Nevertheless, there are some 
types of time-dependent failure prevalent at cruise, such as gearbox failures. 
The risk of under cowl fire resulting from a flammable fluid leak is negligible 
since ambient pressures will not support combustion. In the event of a 
serious failure, the crew may have time to plan their response and possibly to 
respond better than for failures in time-critical phases of flight. The exposure 
to Foreign Object Damage is very limited, although it must be acknowledged 
that ice shed by the airframe poses a serious threat to the engine, and that 
migratory waterfowl have been known to fly at cruise altitudes. 
Descent and final approach would appear initially to place few demands upon 
the integrity of the engine (and this is indeed the case for rotor burst type 
failures). However, the relatively low operating pressure ratios and rotor 
speeds make many engines vulnerable to flameout if severe weather is 
encountered, or even if rapid throttle movements are commanded by the 
flight crew. 
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APPENDIX G: . 
RB211 BASELINE SAFETY ANALYSIS ASSESSMENT 
Gi Introduction to baseline safety analysis. 
The following analysis is intended to evaluate the safety of the RB211-22 as 
it would have been done in the approach to engine certification, in the late 
1960s. It is largely based upon the original failure analysis performed by 
Rolls-Royce, except that some assemblies and systems have been added, 
and some additional material is presented throughout (such as item 
function and hazard classification). Original Rolls-Royce material appears 
in plain text, material added for this study is in italics. The analysis has 
been supplemented by additional'drawings of engine details and systems, 
in conjunction with an icon indicating the general area of the assembly 
being analysed. 
The hardware analysed is to the 1969 standard (no service bulletins 
incorporated) and where there are differences in the predictions of several 
Rolls-Royce reports, the 1969 version is used. 
The failure rates used by Rolls-Royce were based upon service experience 
of previous engines such as the Spey, Tyne and Conway, and upon a 
limited amount of development running with the RB211. Material added 
during this study uses failure rates obtained from one of the following 
sources (in order of preference): 
Rolls-Royce technical report prediction, failure analysis or FMEAa- 
Close analogy to a RR technical report prediction, e. g. from one oil 
line to anotherb 
Spey experience up to 1970c 
Published industry datad 
Best estimate based upon author's personal experiencee 
The source of each failure rate is indicated by the corresponding subscript, 
supplemented in some cases by a note in the right-hand column of the 
analysis. 
In the interest of brevity, failures with no safety effect have been omitted 
from the safety analysis, unless it forms the only permanent record of such 
failure effects (i. e., analysis performed solely for this study includes all 
failures). 
A summary of the results of the analysis and a comparison of predicted 
failure rates with service experience can be found in Chapter 2. 
4 
G ii Substantiation Of Failure Rates For Baseline Analysis 
It was considered essential that the engine selected for the baseline 
comparison should have accrued a significant basis of experience in 
service; this factor, together with access to the original safety analysis, led 
to the selection of the RB211-22 as a test case. It must be recognised, 
however, that any attempt to generate failure rates relies upon the 
accuracy and completeness of the reporting of such failures from the field. 
No single database can be relied upon to include every relevant 
powerplant failure, but it was anticipated that amalgamation of failure 
events from several databases would both allow assessment of the 
completeness of reporting, and also allow production of failure rates 
representative within a few percent, and at least as accurate as any 
currently published within the industry. 
Data was extracted from the following sources: 
a) NTSB 
b) FAA Service Difficulty Reports for US airlines, January 1986 - December 1993, engine failures. 
C) CAA, Reports of Failures, Malfunctions and Defects reported 
for high-bypass engines, January 1984 - December 1993 d) FAA Service Difficulty Reports for US airlines, 1978 -1979 and 1981 - 1989, Engine Rotor Failures 
It was discovered that there was minimal redundancy between sources a), b) and c), in that only one event was reported by more than one of the databases (RB211-535 multiple engine flameout on, reported by FAA, CAA 
and NTSB). This initially caused some concern, since it implied the 
potential existence of large numbers of safety related events external to 
both Britain and the US, unreported by sources a), b) and c). The option 
remained of generating failure rates based on the limited experience of a few carriers for which the comprehensiveness of data could be verified; for 
instance,, that of the US carriers, for which reporting engine failures to the 
Service Difficulty Report system forms a legal requirement. The 
limitations of this approach are evident for the types of events where the 
entire commercial fleet may only experience a few occurrences. 
The assistance of Rolls Royce was therefore solicited in determining in- 
flight shutdown service experience for the baseline assessment only. This 
proprietary information is confined to Volume II of, this thesis. 
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APPENDIX H: EFFECr OF SMALL DESIGN CHANGES 
Hi Introduction 
It is common practice within the aircraft engine industry to produce 
higher-thrust versions of an engine model as experience is gained in 
service by the baseline model, and confidence in the basic design increases. 
The likely reliability and safety of higher-thrust derivative engines has 
been the occasion of considerable debate. It has been argued that an 
increase in engine thrust must necessarily involve reduced margins for 
such design parameters as rotor speed, turbine gas temperature and 
compressor delivery pressure, and that therefore reliability must 
necessarily be reduced. Conversely, it has been claimed that incorporation 
of lessons learned from the original engine model will eliminate many 
problems and produce an engine with greater reliability than the original, 
providing that margins for physical parameters conform to accepted design 
standards, and that few causes of engine failures are directly linked to 
engine thrust. 
Given this fundamental disagreement upon the effect of thrust growth, it 
is not surprising that guidance should be lacking upon the extent of design 
change which would necessitate a modification to the safety analysis. If 
the safety analysis is to provide useful information to the design 
community, it is essential to establish how small changes in design or 
operation are likely to impact the validity of a previous safety analysis. 
Hii Engine selection 
The Spey engine was used to study the effect of thrust growth upon engine 
failure rates. The Spey has been in service since the 1960s; the Spey 505, 
Spey 506, Spey 511 and Spey 512 offer progressively greater take-off thrust 
ratings and the Spey 555 represents a greater departure from the baseline 
design, being both lighter and simpler. The Spey 555 formed the basis for 
the core of the recently offered Tay high bypass-ratio engine, with 
considerable increases in thrust offered. 
The Tay 610/611 and Tay 620 are physically identical; the Tay 650 features 
fan, combustor and high pressure turbine changes to accommodate higher 
thrust. The Spey/Tay family, therefore, permits assessment of thrust 
growth effects and also the effects of major redesign, in the case of the Spey 
555 and Tay engines. 
The record of in service events (IFSDs etc) analysed in this study was 
provided by Rolls Royce for the purpose of this specific study and is 
proprietýry to Rolls Royce. 
192 
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Hiii Reliability/ safety parameter 
Two measures of engine reliability were initially chosen for making 
comparisons between engine models; the in-flight shutdown rate and the 
rate of unscheduled engine removals. Both of these were calculated 
annually, per engine operating hour. The selection was heavily 
influenced by the availability of service data; it is conceded that these 
parameters provide a better measure of reliability than of safety as such. 
The rarity of purely safety-related events, however, introduces 
considerable random scatter in event rates from year to year, rendering 
trending of rates a questionable exercise, and making small differences in 
event rates (such as might be seen between two engine models) difficult to 
assess. The validity of this approach was tested by reviewing the incidence 
of rotor bursts in the Spey, using a series of FAA studies ((54) through (63)). 
Rotor burst, although not necessarily resulting in uncontained failure, is 
clearly related to engine safety. Figure HA illustrates the variation in rotor 
burst incidence from year to year. 
I 
When a mean rotor burst rate was calculated for each of the models 
assessed, the ratio of the rates (555/506 rate) was approximately 0.29. 
Comparison of equivalent IFSD rates gives a value of 0.4, and comparison 
of UER rates gives a ratio of 0.5 for these two engine models. It can 
therefore be concluded that analysis of IFSD rates and of UER rates gives 
some indication of relative engine safety, although more credence is to be 
placed in the IFSD rate than the UER rate, both intuitively (an IFSD 
approaches closer to an emergency than does a UER) and statistically (the 
IFSD ratio described above is closer to the rotor burst ratio, which has a 
direct safety relationship, than is the UER ratio. ) 
Hiv Variation of failure rates with time 
The IFSD rates and UER rates for civil Spey engine models from 1967 to 
1993 are shown in Figures H. 2 and H. 3. Although all the data available 
from Rolls-Royce has been used to generate these figures, the apparent low 
failure rates in the 1960s and early 1970s do not reflect the actual 
performance of the fleet, but rather the difficulties associated with a 
manual data-storage system. Introduction of an electronic data storage 
system in the late 1970s enabled a much greater proportion of events to be 
recorded in an accessible form. The effect of recording systems' influence 
upon the study has been minimised by using data from 1980 onwards for 
comparison of failure rates. It should also be noted that several models are 
in the process of going out of service, greatly reducing the number of fleet 
hours per year for the 1990s. Error bars indicate the change in rate 
IThe absolute values of the rates shown should not be considered, since they were calculated using a 
subset of rotor bursts (those in the USA) divided by world fleet engine operating hours, but the rates 
serve to compare the incidence of rotor burst from one model to the next. 
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attributable to one more or one less IFSD or UER in the later years; clearly 
the absolute magnitude of the failure rate should be treated with some 
caution where the size of the error bar approaches the difference in failure 
rates between models. 
Subject to the above caveats, the following points are clear from inspection 
of Figs H. 2 and H. 3; the Spey 505 experienced the highest rates of IFSDs and 
UERs, followed by the Spey 512, the Spey 506 and 511, and the lowest rates 
were experienced by the Spey 555, in general (the order may vary in 
individual years, but is generally valid for the time period 1980 - 1990). 
It has been hypothesized that the earlier models would have the highest 
failure rates, and there would be a steady improvement from model to 
model as design problems were addressed and as design techniques 
improved in sophistication. This did not prove to be universally true, as 
demonstrated by the relatively high failure rate2of the Spey 512 (see Fig 
H. Q. 
It might be argued that comparison of failure rates versus calendar time is 
inappropriate, since the engine models were introduced into service in 
different years, and have accrued experience at different rates, not only do 
the different models have differing maturity at the outset, but the 
relationships between models also vary with time. The failure rates were 
therefore plotted against fleet hours, as shown in H. 5 and HA 
Unfortunately, data corresponding to similar fleet maturities were 
unavailable for all five models, rendering true comparison impossible, but 
it seems unlikely upon reviewing the figures that the putative correlation 
between thrust and failure rate would obtain. 
2Hourly IFSD rates and UER rates averaged (total events/total hours) over the experience of the fleet 
since the beginning of 1980 
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Hv Relationship between failure rates and basic physical parameters 
It appears intuitively obvious that higher thrust settings, involving higher 
core air pressures and temperatures and higher rotor speeds, would 
produce higher failure rates, other factors being equal. Figures H. 7 to H. 10 
show mature average failure rates with respect to rated thrust, compressor 
delivery pressure (T/O power), core engine speed (T/O power) and turbine 
gas temperature. The Spey 505 and 512 generally exhibited higher failure 
rates than would be anticipated from consideration of basic engine 
parameters. Review of the Tay IFSD rates (see Table H. 1) confirmed that 
there was no strong relationship between failure rates and basic engine 
parameters between one model and the next. 
TAYMODEL 610/611 620 650 
IFSD RATE 10.4 27.8 16.1 
(/MILLION 
HOURS) 
THRUST (LB) 12420 13850 14000 
SLS 
N2 AT 12234 - 12446 12550 12560 
TAKEOFF 
(RPM) 
COMPRESSOR 232 232 238 TO 244 
DELIVERY 
PRESSURE (PSI) 
TABLE H. 1 
As a final check, a similar table was constructed for a completely unrelated 
engine family, the CFM56. No clear relationship between engine-caused 
IFSD rates and basic parameters was evident (table H. 2). 
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CFM56 MODEL CFM56-2 CFM56-3 CFM56-SA CFM56-SC 
ENGINE- 8 2 5 8 
CAUSED IFSD 
RATE 
(/MILLION 
HOURS) 
THRUST (LB) 22000 20100 25000 31000 
SLS 
EGT-(CELSIUS) 905 930 905 905 
COMPRESSOR 367 '91 460 550 
DELIVERY 
PRESSURE (PSI) 
TABLE H. 2 
A more detailed study of the Spey and Tay IFSDs was undertaken, 
separating the IFSDs by cause into four system groups; those attributable to 
instrumentation errors and false fire or overheat warnings, those 
attributed to the fuel or oil systems, those attributed to turbomachinery 
(including bearing and gearbox failures) and all others (mainly associated 
with the bleed system). The results are shown in Figures H. 11 to H. 16. 
The following points are of considerable significance: 
Turbomachinery failures were not the dominant contributor to the 
IFSD rate. Instrumentation faults and fuel/oil system problems each 
made similar contributions to the overall IFSD rate. 
Those models with high overall IFSD rates (the 506 and 512) had 
high rates of IFSDs caused by instrumentation as well as those 
caused by turbomachinery. The rates of instrumentation problems 
might have been expected to be similar from one engine to the next. 
The IFSD rate caused by turbomachinery alone was not strongly 
related to any engine basic parameter. 
The Tay IFSD rates for instrumentation and for fuel/oil systems 
were comparable to those of Spey engines. The Tay turbomachinery 
IFSD rate was an order of magnitude better than that of the Spey. 
Significant improvements in the reliability of turbomachinery 
appear to result from major redesigns (Spey 555 and Tay 610/611). 
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Hvi Installation effects 
It was proposed that the number of engines in the aircraft installation 
could have a significant effect upon the IFSD rate, since the crew would be 
less likely to perform a precautionary shut down on an engine of a twin 
than of a tri-jet. All IFSDs caused by instrumentation/ false warnings can 
be considered precautionary shutdowns; those caused by turbomachinery 
or fuel/oil system failures are generally likely to have led to an IFSD 
regardless of the crew's reluctance to shut down an engine (with certain 
exceptions). 
If the crew of a 3-engined aircraft is more disposed to precautionary 
shutdowns than the crew of a twin, then the ratio of IFSDs caused by false 
warnings or instrumentation faults should be higher for the 3 engined 
airplane, other factors being equal (the crew of the twin will verify an 
apparent problem by reference to other engine parameters before shutting 
down). The Spey 512 is installed on both twin engined and 3-engined 
aircraft. Review of the causes of Spey 512 IFSDs, from 1980 to 1990, showed 
that for twins, faulty instrumentation/ false warnings caused 257o of all 
IFSDs, and for 3-engined airplanes, these causes accounted for 197o, of all 
IFSDs. This difference can easily be explained by such factors as selection of 
different instrument vendors by different airplane companies, but there 
does not appear to be a significantly greater likelihood of a precautionary 
IFSD for a tri-jet than a twin. 
The Tay appeared to experience a significantly greater number of IFSDs 
attributable to instrumentation/ false warnings when installed in the F100 
than the GIV. It must be recognised that the operational environment of a 
short-range commercial transport is very different from that of a business 
jet, and high usage might increase the number of IFSDs attributable to 
limited troubleshooting or hurried maintenance. 
Hvii Design margin 
It had been suggested that design margin would provide a better indicator 
of engine safety/ reliability than absolute levels of any physical parameter. 
This possibility is difficult to evaluate directly without access to detailed 
design studies. The Tay turbomachinery-related IFSD rate increased from 
1 /million hours to 1.5/million hours when the same turbomachinery was 
run at higher thrust and design margin can be presumed to be smaller (Tay 
611 vs. 620). However, this effect is negligible compared with the IFSD 
contribution from instrumentation and fuel/oil systems. 
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Hviii Conclusions 
There is no clear relationship between increased thrust (or core speed, or 
turbine gas temperature, or compressor discharge pressure) and 
turbomachinery-caused IFSD3 rate. The overall IFSD rate is strongly 
influenced by instrumentation faults and problems with ancillary systems 
such as fuel and engine oil, which would not be expected to be closely 
linked to engine thrust levels. The contribution of turbomachinery to the 
IFSD rate is much smaller for recent engine models than for those 
entering service thirty years ago, to the extent that it could be claimed that 
turbomachinery is an insignificant contributor to the IFSD rate. 
Turbomachinery failures are nevertheless the major contributor to other 
safety related failures such as uncontained failures and casing rupture, but 
the relationship between these and increased thrust is yet to be established. 
This study was initiated to attempt to establish the effect upon the engine 
safety of a small design change such as a thrust bump, and the necessity or 
otherwise of modifying the safety analysis. Generally, the qualitative 
portion of the analysis does not consider such factors as thrust levels in the 
prediction of failure progressions. It appears from this study that there is 
no clear means of forecasting the effect on failure rates of a design change 
such as a throttle push. The original study should therefore remain valid, 
except for any specific failure modes which have been precluded (or 
enabled) by changes to the hardware. 
3 The concept of using a base failure rate with severity factors applied to different environments is 
immediately called into question 
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